At the beginning of the XII century. after a short reign of the Kyiv Grand Duke Vladimir Monomakh (1113-1125) - one of the outstanding statesmen of that era and his son Mstislav Vladimirovich (1125-1132), who still managed to maintain the state unity of Kievan Rus, the Old Russian state entered the most difficult period of its development : as a result of intensified centrifugal processes, it broke up into a number of independent lands and principalities.

In the historical literature, this period did not find an unambiguous assessment either from the point of view of the nature of the socio-economic and political system established in the Russian lands, or from the point of view of its place and significance in the historical evolution of Russian statehood. Pre-revolutionary historical science traditionally called him specific period, Soviet historians considered it as a natural, progressive stage of feudal fragmentation, a number of Western authors, on the contrary, see it as evidence of the political crisis of medieval Russia.

A. S. Akhiezer, proceeding from the socio-cultural model of Russia’s development proposed by him, characterizes this period as a transitional period from the dominance of the early conciliar moral ideal to the dominance of the early moderately authoritarian moral ideal. Like all subsequent stages, this stage in the development of Russian statehood was, according to the author, the result of an inversion type reaction and contained a mass increase in an uncomfortable state on the bankruptcy of the dominant moral ideal of the previous stage.

One of the most controversial issues of the period under review in the history of the development of ancient Russian statehood is still the question of the formation and features of feudal relations in ancient Russian society. The essence of the disagreement concerns, first of all, the main question: how applicable is the concept of "feudalism" in its classical sense to the conditions of the development of Ancient Russia, and can in this connection be called the time after the collapse of the united Kievan Rus a period of feudal fragmentation, through which all Western European states passed?

The protracted dispute about the nature of the socio-economic and political development of ancient Russian society began in the middle of the 19th century. the founders and theorists of Russian Slavophilism (M. P. Pogodin, I. V. Kireevsky and others). Proving in a dispute with Westerners the idea of ​​the inferiority of Western European feudalism, which, in their opinion, along with the influence of Greco-Roman rationalism and individualism, was one of the main reasons for the disintegration of Western society, the Slavophiles were among the first to sharply speak out against identifying the specific period of Russian history with Western European feudal fragmentation. . First of all, the historical views of N. M. Karamzin were sharply criticized, who, from the point of view of the Slavophiles, did not make any difference between the development of Ancient Russia in the specific period and the development of feudalism in Western countries. According to the theorists of Slavophilism, ancient Russian history does not give grounds for such conclusions. Although appanage division in a certain sense can be considered an analogue of feudalism in ancient Russia, it, nevertheless, was fundamentally different, according to the Slavophils, from feudalism.

As I. V. Kireevsky argued, this was due not only to the fact that, in contrast to the Western European fief system, all Russian princes were members of the same family, obedient to the authority of the senior prince (the so-called "family" nature of Russian feudalism), which is already secured, according to the philosopher, the unity of ancient Russian society, the "conflict-free" nature of its development. The reason for the development of disintegrating processes in Western societies, Kireevsky proposed to look for in the very structure of Western feudalism and, in particular, in the dominance of egoistic individualism, on which, in his opinion, the system of feudal relations was built. The symbol of this medieval individualism was a knight-robber, who closed himself in a castle and represented a kind of "state within a state." The idea of ​​a common statehood was initially alien to him. Such a system not only could not ensure the internal unity of Western societies, but also gave rise to an ongoing struggle between the central government and the feudal aristocracy, between rigidly isolated estates, the state and the Church. Nothing like this, as the Slavophils believed, was not in Ancient Russia. It had no aristocracy, no knights, no third estate, just as it did not know the iron delimitation of immovable estates, no class hatred, no struggle, no slavery.

Recognizing the originality and importance of some of the provisions of the concept of the socio-political development of Ancient Russia proposed by the Slavophiles, one cannot but notice its main flaw - excessive idealization of the nature of the development of ancient Russian society in comparison with European countries, which was largely due to the fallacy of the initial thesis of the Slavophils about " conflict-free" ancient Russian history. Historical facts do not support such an assessment of the historical evolution of Ancient Russia. As V. O. Klyuchevsky rightly noted, in the old Kyiv life there were not only truly great events. Old Kyiv, with its princes and bogatyrs, glorified by the people and forever preserved in the people's memory, with its Saint Sophia and the Pechersk Lavra, also knew another life with the incessant strife of the princes, a life "in which there were many troubles, a lot of stupid hustle;" senseless princely fights ", in the words of Karamzin, were a direct national disaster."

In our opinion, a more scientifically accurate answer to the above questions can be found in M. Weber, who also believed that feudalism in its pure form was developed only in Western Europe and was not typical for most countries of the East. Considering the features of traditional domination in the theory of patrimonial government we mentioned earlier, Weber, along with a detailed analysis of patrimonial power structures, identifies two types of traditional societies - Western European feudalism and eastern patrimonialism. Their main difference, according to Weber, is that under feudalism there are mutual contractual obligations between the lord and vassals, while patrimonial relations are based on the personal dependence of the servant and master. In addition, under feudalism, vassals opposed to the king have their own military forces. On the other hand, within the framework of a traditional society, feudalism should be considered as a special case of patrimonial domination, since, according to Weber, the feudal principle could not completely replace the patrimonial system of government at the state level, and the feudal vassal acted as a patrimonial master in relation to his serfs.

If we abstract from some particulars, we should highlight three basic principles, on which, according to Weber, Western European feudalism was built: 1) polycentrism; 2) property hierarchy; 3) vassalage system(vassal, contractual relations between the lord and his vassals). In this system of relations, the political hierarchy is based on the hierarchy of property, when, in addition to personal relations, there are also land relations (as was the case, for example, in France in the 8th-9th centuries). Accordingly, the vassal service is built on the terms of an agreement (contract) that does not infringe on the personal freedom of the vassal, who is under the patronage of the lord.

Based on our analysis in the previous chapter of the initial stage of the formation of Old Russian statehood, the features of the formation of service relations that developed between the Kyiv princes and combatants, we can conclude that one of the main signs of feudalism was absent in Kievan Rus - the hierarchy of property as the basis for establishing feudal vassal relations .

Representatives of the emerging ruling class - the boyars and combatants, who, as already noted, received certain regions and cities in temporary administration ("feeding") without the right to own, were not feudal lords in the full sense. With great difficulty, taking into account what has been said, one can also call the prince himself a feudal lord, especially if one bears in mind such a feature of princely power in Kievan Rus as the constant movement, "nomadism" of princes. This feature was due to the special system of replacement of princely thrones that operated in the Old Russian state according to the principle tribal eldership, according to which Russia was perceived by the Rurikoviches as their common inseparable tribal possession, which provided each member of the dynasty with the right to temporary possession of a certain part of the land in order of seniority. According to V. O. Klyuchevsky, such a peculiar order of princely possession was established in Russia after the death of Yaroslav the Wise (1016–1054). He did not assume either sole supreme power, or her personal succession by will. The Yaroslavichi "did not divide the property of their fathers and grandfathers into permanent shares and did not transfer the share that each received to their sons by will. They were mobile owners who moved from volost to volost according to a certain queue."

Causes and prerequisites for the formation of specific order in the Russian lands

The collapse of the once unified Old Russian state into a number of separate lands and principalities, which marked the beginning of a long period of specific fragmentation that lasted almost three centuries, was prepared by a number of fundamental changes that were taking place at that time in the socio-economic and political development of Old Russian society. According to the opinion established in the scientific literature, the growth of centrifugal tendencies in the Russian lands was primarily associated with the emerging in the 11th-12th centuries. the socio-economic progress of society, the development of agriculture and trade relations, the growth and strengthening of cities, which began to play an increasing role in the social and political life of ancient Russian society. As many scientists believe, it was these changes, accompanied by the growth of economic and economic independence of individual lands and regions, that ultimately led to the beginning of the process of transformation of state-political relations in Ancient Russia, as a result of which the political system of Russia acquires a polycentric character.

Significant changes took place primarily in the upper stratum of the ruling elite of the ancient Russian state, which was largely due to the process of decomposition of the corporate ties of the grand ducal squad that began even earlier. From it stands out the boyar-druzhina elite, whose influence on the processes taking place in society has noticeably increased. Unlike the younger warriors, who were fed by taxes and fines collected on behalf of the prince and were directly dependent on the prince, the emerging boyars, strengthening their positions, sought to defend their personal interests. The change in the position of the boyar-druzhina elite was directly related to the development of patrimonial land ownership, the emergence of large private land holdings (votchinas), regular income from which made the boyars-votchinniks an independent and economically and politically independent force, not only no longer in need of protection from outside prince, but also often opposed to him.

Noting the importance of these factors, which predetermined the strengthening of centrifugal tendencies in ancient Russian society and the subsequent disintegration of the Old Russian state into a number of independent state formations, it should be noted at the same time that scientific literature often does not take enough into account political reasons such developments. The study of the Kyiv period in the development of the Old Russian society allows us to conclude that one of its main features was the weak degree of integration of individual parts of the Russian state, its political amorphousness and the associated political instability of the Old Russian statehood. This circumstance was once pointed out by S. F. Platonov, who believed that the princes of Kievan Rus, older or younger, interconnected by their attitude to the Russian lands as a common tribal possession, were to a large extent politically independent from each other. For the most part, they had only moral duties: the volost princes had to honor the Grand Duke of Kyiv as the eldest, together with him they had to protect their volost, together with him "think" about the Russian land and solve important issues of Russian life.

Naturally, the power of the Kyiv princes under these conditions could not acquire the form of autocracy. After Svyatoslav and Vladimir I, Russia was divided into principalities several times. During the life of the prince-father, the sons sat as governors in the main cities and paid tribute to their father, but after his death, the land was divided into parts according to the number of sons, which often caused dynastic disputes and fierce struggle between the princes. After the death of Yaroslav the Wise (1054), his grandchildren began to convene princely congresses (removals) to resolve disputes, which not only resolved important state issues (war and peace, changes in legislation), but were also called upon to reconcile princes who had quarreled over dynastic disputes. One of these congresses ancient written sources call the congress of princes in Lyubech in 1097, at which the princes tried to divide all Russian volosts on the basis of justice, approving the rule: "everyone keeps his fatherland." As subsequent events showed, this did not lead to an end to the civil strife, which was also the subject of discussion at other princely congresses convened for these purposes (Vitichevsk in 1100 and Dolobsky in 1103).

Political tensions between the princely power and city councils, due to the legal uncertainty of the position of the latter, also did not contribute, as S. F. Platonov wrote, to the correct order of political life. Vecha very often intervened in political affairs, and often, not recognizing the accounts of princely seniority as obligatory for themselves, they called princes of their choice to the cities, thereby interfering with questions of inheritance. The position of city vech during this period was not constant: under a strong prince, who had a large squad, the political significance of the vech decreased, while under a weak one, on the contrary, it increased. In large cities, the veche had a much greater political influence than in small ones. Under Yaroslav the Wise and his sons, it did not enjoy serious political influence. However, when the family of Rurikovich grew greatly and hereditary accounts got confused, the city councils tried to regain their political significance. Taking advantage of the turmoil, they themselves called to themselves the prince they needed and concluded "ranks" with him. Often the veche turned out to be so strong that it entered into open confrontation with the prince, and often "showed the prince the way" (expelled him).

Contradictions continued to grow in the princely environment itself. At the heart of these contradictions was clearly identified by the beginning of the XII century. the crisis of the former system of tribal eldership, which no longer met the interests of the Rurik family, which had grown by that time. Its representatives, using the absence of any clear order in the inheritance and distribution of destinies, fought for the redistribution of principalities in their favor, which gave rise to numerous princely civil strife. To a certain extent, this process was initiated by the princely congresses mentioned above. Having secured lands and volosts for each prince as their hereditary possessions ("fatherlands"), they thereby created a precedent that undermined the former order of princely possessions, based on the order of seniority, which naturally intensified the political struggle within the ruling elite. All this led to the weakening of the central government, destroyed the state integrity of Kievan Rus.

By the middle of the XII century. The Kievan state as a kind of integrity ceased to exist. A new one is coming specific period in the history of the Old Russian state, one of the main features of which was the change in the order of princely possession, which was now based on completely different principles. In the old Kievan Rus, the idea of ​​a common inseparable princely possession was considered the norm, being, according to V. O. Klyuchevsky, the basis of possessory relations even between princes who were far from each other, who recognized themselves as members of the same possessive family, and the whole order of princely possession was kept in line with seniority . Now, however, a new order is gradually being established, based on the "paternal" principle of inheritance from father to son. If earlier certain parts of the Russian land, inherited by one or another representative of the princely family, were considered their temporary possessions and therefore were called allotments or volosts, now their status is fundamentally changing. Having become the property of individual princes, they began to be called at first princely estates, and later appanages in the very sense that they now became separate possessions, the permanent and hereditary property of the local appanage prince. They differed from the usual boyar estates in that the prince was the bearer of supreme political power in his inheritance.

Here it is necessary to point out one important, in our opinion, circumstance (to which V.O. Klyuchevsky once drew attention), which allows us to look at the reasons for the establishment of specific order in the ancient Russian principality lands from the other side. We are talking about the origins of specific psychology, about what formed in the minds and behavior of the regional princely-boyar elites a persistent habit of treating the principalities and lands where they sat as their own property, which ultimately led to specific order. Analyzing the reasons for the establishment of a specific order in North-Eastern Russia, which later played an outstanding role in the formation of Great Russian statehood, Klyuchevsky pointed out the features of the development (colonization) of this region, which, in his opinion, was the determining factor and source of the very idea of ​​an appanage as the personal property of a specific prince. If in Kievan Rus the first called princes came to the Russian lands already in a ready-made society with a social system that had developed before them, and therefore could not feel themselves the creators and creators of this land, then the situation was completely different in the lands-princes of North-Eastern Russia, mastered by the resettled themselves. here the princes. Unlike the first Rurikovichs, they looked at themselves as the organizers of these lands, considered them the work of their own hands: this is mine, this was instituted by me, this is my destiny.

We find a similar assessment of the reasons for the formation of the specific order in S. F. Platonov, who recalled that in the specific period, local princes were not only the bearers of supreme power in their lands, they were their hereditary owners, "patrimonials". According to the scientist, it was the principle of "patrimony" (patrimony) of power that was the basis on which all social relations were built, known under the general name of "specific order" and very dissimilar to the order of Kievan Rus. Unlike the Kyiv princes, who embodied the unity of the state order with their power, the specific prince, as V. O. Klyuchevsky aptly put it, is "a patrimony with the rights of a sovereign, a sovereign with the habits of a patrimony".

It was in this situation that a complex process of regionalization of power began, accompanied by the formation and strengthening of local land dynasties. Specific princes they no longer move from volost to volost, but become sedentary, live in their specific cities (even if they occupy the grand prince's table in turn), transfer their possessions to relatives at their own discretion. In the system of power relations, local princes acted as overlords of specific principalities, just as before relying on the squad. What was new here was that the representatives of the boyar elite were now vassals of the prince, who had the right to freely choose their overlord and move from one prince to another. The junior squad, personally dependent on the prince, was princely court and performed the main administrative functions (collecting taxes, court fines), from its composition the prince appointed posadniks to cities and regions. At the same time, the specific princes ceased to pay tribute to Kyiv, which, for a number of internal and external reasons, was gradually losing its centralization capabilities.

The loss of Kyiv's leading role in the socio-political life of Ancient Russia was another important factor that accelerated the process of regionalization of power and the disintegration of a single state into separate lands and principalities. By the end of the XII century. old Kyiv is no longer a nationwide political center, retaining only the role of a church-administrative and sacral center. The status of the senior grand-ducal table and the political center of the Russian lands passes to Vladimir on Klyazma, - the main city of the Vladimir-Suzdal principality, which eventually became the political center of North-Eastern Russia. At the turn of the XIII-XIV centuries. The chair of the Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Russia was also transferred to Vladimir. If in the middle of the XII century. on the territory of Ancient Russia, there were, according to some sources, 15 principalities and separate lands, then by the time of the Horde invasion at the beginning of the 13th century. there were about 50 of them, and in the XIV century. - more than 250.

Features of public administration in Russian lands in conditions of specific fragmentation (XII–XIII)

The entry of Ancient Russia into a period of specific fragmentation was accompanied by differentiation of forms of government in the formed lands-principalities, in a certain sense, allowing us to talk about the formation of alternative ways of the political and state development of ancient Russian society. Although, on the whole, in most of the independent principalities that arose in the conditions of fragmentation, the former features of political power characteristic of the early feudal monarchy were preserved, the peculiarity of the conditions in which the various regions of the Old Russian state found themselves, as well as the peculiarities of political traditions, formed in each of them their own model of power and control with its characteristic features and characteristics. The differences concerned, firstly, the ratio of the princely (monarchist) and veche (republican) principles in the system of power and administration, and secondly, the degree of independence of the political power of the prince in his relations with the boyars, who were strengthening their positions.

In modern historical research, in accordance with the specifics of the three sub-civilizational centers and three groups of principalities formed during the fragmentation of Russia ( Galicia-Volyn land, Novgorod-Pskov land, Vladimir-Suzdal principality) it is customary to distinguish three main models of state power and administration that have developed in these lands and distinguish them from each other.

The regime of government established in southwestern Russian lands, which were part of the Galician and Volyn principalities and then united at the end of the 12th century. into one principality, is characterized in the latest research as princely-boyar. Its formation was due to the peculiarity of the political and state development of the southwestern lands, which occupied a special place in the Old Russian state. Traditionally, these lands were ruled by the descendants of the Monomakhs, who were minor outcast princes who were exiled or fled here from Kyiv and other cities as a result of princely civil strife. The position of outcasts created both some inconvenience and certain advantages for the local princes. In contrast to the system of princely possessions that prevailed at that time in Kievan Rus, built on the principle of tribal eldership, the Galician-Volyn princes already from the 11th century. owned their lands on the basis of a family, not a tribal principle. According to the established tradition, an outcast prince could not claim other volosts, but other princes should not have claimed his volost either. This ensured significant political independence of the Galician-Volyn princes, who sought to pursue an independent policy from Kyiv.

At the same time, the special position of the southwestern lands within the Old Russian state created great problems for the local princes, who were forced to wage a tense struggle with the boyar oligarchy, which traditionally occupied strong positions in this region. Its power was based on large patrimonial landownership, which was not inferior and even exceeded the size of princely domains. In many respects, this was facilitated by more favorable conditions for the development of southwestern Russian lands compared to other principalities. Fertile lands, close trade ties with neighboring countries such as Hungary, Poland, Byzantium, Bulgaria, as well as relative safety from nomads ensured rapid economic progress in this region and created all the necessary prerequisites for the formation of large boyar estates. Relying on rich and well-defended cities (Galych, Vladimir-Volynsky, Przemysl), using their economic and political power, the boyar oligarchy actively resisted any attempt to strengthen princely power. In the absence of strong veche traditions in the southwestern Russian lands, the advantage most often turned out to be on the side of the boyars, who did not disdain to apply for foreign military help in the fight against the prince. According to researchers, it was the constant civil strife that prevented this rich principality from forming into a centralized state, and it was subsequently divided between Poland and Lithuania.

In contrast to this, in Vladimir-Suzdal Rus, considered from the time of Vladimir Monomakh, who reigned here, as the patrimony of the Monomakhoviches, from the very beginning there was a tendency to form a strong princely rule. To a large extent, this was due to the previously noted features of the development of this region, which largely determined the formation of a completely different social system compared to the southern and southwestern Russian lands.

Earlier, we have already said that the princes themselves with their squads took an active part in the development of the northeastern lands, which have long been one of the main areas of Slavic colonization. Along with the old cities (Rostov, Suzdal) with their veche way of life in Suzdal, new cities arose and rapidly developed (Tver, Vladimir, Moscow), arranged by the princes themselves and fundamentally different in their type from the old ones. As S. M. Solovyov noted, the difference between them was that "the old cities, considering themselves older than the princes, looked at them as aliens, and the new ones, who owe their existence to them, naturally see their builders in them and put himself in relation to them in a subordinate position. All this not only gave the princely power special weight and significance, but also elevated it above the local population, made it wider and fuller. The old veche towns with the local landed aristocracy and boyars who were sitting in them could not reconcile with this new position of princely power. This rivalry of the old cities with the newly emerged ones, as well as the constant struggle of the urban elite - the boyars with the princely power that was gaining strength for a long time were the hallmarks of the development of Vladimir-Suzdal Rus. Ultimately, the victory in this struggle was won by the princes, who gradually subjugate the old cities and raise new ones above them. Already by the middle of the XII century. the young Vladimir-Suzdal principality becomes one of the strongest, and its prince Yuri Dolgoruky (son of Vladimir Monomakh) at the end of his life was able to take the great Kyiv table. The son of Yuri Dolgoruky, Vsevolod III (1176–1212), was already considered one of the most powerful princes, with whom neither the rebellious boyars nor other princes dared to enter into a dispute.

Based on the noted features of the political and state development of Vladimir-Suzdal Rus, a number of modern authors consider it possible to talk about the emerging trend in this principality towards strong monarchical power, which, however, for a number of reasons did not have time to fully realize itself in the pre-Mongolian period. As an example, the reign of Prince Andrei Bogolyubsky is usually cited, who was one of the first Russian princes to try to establish a regime of personal power and who eventually fell victim to a conspiracy of boyars.

A special regime of government developed in Novgorod and Pskov, which, unlike other Russian lands and principalities feudal republics- state formations unique for the feudal system with an original veche structure. From the point of view of the nature of power relations, the Novgorod system is usually defined as a boyar republic, where all the threads of government were in the hands of several hundred boyars ("council of masters"), who controlled representative (veche) and executive power. Looking ahead, let's say that it was this feature of the Novgorod system that predetermined its subsequent evolution towards the oligarchic form of government and was one of the reasons for the defeat of Novgorod in its confrontation with the strengthened Moscow principality.

Some authors call the Novgorod regime of government an "Orthodox republic", referring to the special role of the Novgorod lord (archbishop) in the political life of Novgorod. Being the highest clergyman in Novgorod, Vladyka was also the actual head of the "council of lords", was the keeper of the city treasury, together with the prince was in charge of foreign relations, exercised control over the standards of measures and weights, had his own military formations, had the right to court.

After the expulsion from Novgorod in 1136, by the decision of the veche of Prince Vsevolod Mstislavovich, the Novgorod land becomes a politically independent state entity from Kyiv. The supreme body of power in Novgorod was formally the people's assembly - the veche, which, in comparison with the city assemblies of other cities of Kievan Rus, had wider functions and already from the end of the 11th century. having achieved the right, by decision of the Novgorodians, to expel or refuse to reign to the governor of the great Kyiv prince. The vecha, in which all free citizens could participate, was in charge of most of the domestic and foreign policy issues of the Novgorod Republic: declaring war and making peace, approving and amending legislation, inviting and expelling princes. One of the main functions of the veche was the election of senior officials - the posadnik, the thousandth and the bishop (later the archbishop).

The executive power in the republic was exercised posadnik, who was chosen, as a rule, from representatives of the most noble boyar families and had the widest range of powers. His duties also included convening the veche and directing its work, exercising external relations and judicial functions. As a representative of the city, he defended its interests before the prince, who was invited by the Novgorodians under an agreement to the post of military leader, as well as an arbitrator in the most difficult legal proceedings. Without a posadnik, the prince could not judge Novgorodians and distribute volosts. In the absence of the prince, he ruled the city, often led the troops and conducted diplomatic negotiations on behalf of Novgorod. Another important elected dignitary in the republic was the tysyatsky, in contrast to the posadnik, who represented the lower classes of Novgorod society. He exercised military power in the city (for which the Germans called him "Herzog"), was the leader of the city militia, called a thousand. At the same time, he was an assistant to the posadnik in many matters of city government: together with the posadnik, he exercised control over the princely power, police supervision of order in the city, was in charge of trade affairs, and in wartime helped the prince, commanding the militia.

The republican structure of Novgorod, along with the election of senior officials, also assumed the elective nature of all the lower levels of the administrative system. From the point of view of administrative-territorial division, the city was a kind of federation of self-governing districts - the ends, which were divided into streets. In each of these administrative units, there was a veche self-government with Konchan and street elders chosen from local residents, who were subordinate to the posadnik. The entire territory of the Novgorod land was divided into regions - pyatins (according to the number of ends in Novgorod to which they obeyed), which in turn were divided into volosts and graveyards.

The Novgorod Republic lasted more than three centuries and turned out to be a fairly viable state entity. Most researchers see the reasons for such stability in the historical and geopolitical features of the development of northwestern Russia. Being one of the oldest centers of ancient Russian civilization and statehood, Novgorod from the very beginning sought to pursue an independent policy, which was also largely facilitated by the "provincial" position of the Novgorod land, its geographical remoteness from the capital city of Kyiv. On the other hand, Novgorod with the "suburbs" adjacent to it was the largest economic and cultural center of Russia. The favorable geopolitical position of Novgorod contributed to its transformation into one of the most significant trading centers, even by European standards, with rich merchants and a developed middle class.

While agreeing on the whole with the above explanations of the reasons for the rise and political "longevity" of Novgorod, we should pay attention to one more, in our opinion, no less important circumstance. Along with the noted factors that to some extent determined the original path of development of the Novgorod land, no less important was the originality of the political structure of Novgorod, based on the successful combination of the veche principle and strong executive power, which, together with the princely power that remained, created the basis for the formation of this state, in modern terms, a kind of system of checks and balances, formed in line with the national traditions of power and control.

Here we should once again return to the characterization of relations between Novgorod and the princes invited by it, whose role in the governance structure of the Novgorod Republic, as it seems to us, is either underestimated by most authors of historical studies, or is not quite correctly interpreted. The position of the prince in Novgorod really differed significantly from the status of princely power customary for Ancient Russia, and his prerogatives were limited by a number of formal conditions established by the decision of the veche (he could not manage the city treasury, use income in excess of strictly established amounts, he was forbidden to acquire possessions in the Novgorod land for yourself and your team). However, it cannot be said that the role of the prince in the political life of the Novgorod Republic was purely nominal. Moreover, as some authors rightly point out, the princes invited by the Novgorodians, losing their former rights as governors of the Kyiv prince, no longer opposed Novgorod society, and in this sense their real role in the system of government even increased. Under the conditions of the freemen of Novgorod, which was accompanied by a sharp struggle between various factions in the veche and among the boyars, a lot depended on the ruling prince, his political will, flexibility, ability to find a common language with the disputing parties and maintain peace in society. In addition, the boyar groups ruling in Novgorod could not retain power without the support of the ruling prince. At the same time, the Novgorodians sought to prevent the prince from gaining power, controlled all his actions and strictly monitored that the prince complied with the terms of the agreement concluded with him, and in case of violations, "showed him the way."

In 1237-1240. as a result of the invasion of the Mongol hordes led by Batu Khan, a significant part of the northeastern and southern Russian lands was defeated and subjected to the power of the Mongol khans, turning for many years into one of the many uluses (Russian ulus) of the Mongol Empire, and then its heir - Golden Hordes. Russia was overlaid with a huge tribute ("Horde output"), which was collected under the supervision of special khan officials - the Baskaks, and the Russian princes themselves became vassals of the Golden Horde Khan, who received special letters of commendation from him ( labels) to reign in their lands. The eldest among the princes, the Grand Duke of Vladimir, was given a special label for a great reign. From the 14th century The Grand Dukes were also given the right to collect the Horde "exit", which led to rivalry between them for the Grand Duke's throne. This rivalry later became the cause of the rise and strengthening of Moscow principality, who played an outstanding role in the struggle for the liberation of Russian lands from the Mongol-Tatar yoke.

In the scientific literature, the issue of the features and nature of the relationship between the Russian lands, the Mongol Empire and the Golden Horde has not received sufficient coverage, and remains the subject of controversy and discussion. The complexity and ambiguity of the influence of the so-called "Mongolian factor" on the development of ancient Russian society gives rise to completely different, sometimes mutually exclusive, points of view on this problem. If some authors deny any serious consequences of the influence of this factor, then others, on the contrary, tend to attach paramount importance to the role of the Mongol conquests in the historical evolution of ancient Russian society. The original interpretation of this issue was found by Eurasian authors (P. N. Savitsky, G. V. Vernadsky, later L. N. Gumilyov), who first drew attention to the role of the Mongol conquests in the formation of the territorial and geopolitical unity of medieval Russia and believed that it was precisely under their influence carried out a complex ethno-cultural and geopolitical synthesis and created a powerful Russian state (Russian Empire).

Ancient Russia, the Golden Horde and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania: historical alternatives for the state and political development of medieval Russia in the 13th–15th centuries.

In the XIII-XV centuries. medieval Russia experienced, perhaps, one of the most difficult and dramatic periods of its history. Two main factors had a decisive influence on the development of Old Russian society during this period:

1. establishment from the middle of the XIII century. after the Mongol-Tatar invasion, as mentioned above, the vassal dependence of the Russian lands on the Golden Horde, which isolated the country from Europe and marked the beginning of a long era of the Mongol-Tatar yoke in Russia;
2. the inclusion of the western and southern Russian lands into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Poland, which led to the actual collapse of the ancient Russian sub-civilization, on the basis of which two diverse cultural and historical phenomena were formed - Muscovite Rus and Lithuanian Rus.

Without losing sight of the complex relationship between these two factors, let us first try to characterize the relations that were established between the Russian lands and the Golden Horde and determined their development over the course of two centuries. These relations cannot be simplified and presented, as is often done, only in the form of Horde raids, punitive expeditions and robberies. This approach is wrong, if only because the state of affairs in Russia, which was the most important source of replenishment of the state treasury for the Golden Horde, could not be indifferent to the Mongol khans and therefore, intervening in inter-princely feuds, they also pursued the goal of maintaining at least some order in this one from their richest uluses. One can agree with the opinion of some authors, who pay attention to the peculiar paternalism of the Mongol khans in relation to the conquered Russian lands: one way or another they were forced to show "care" for their "economy", from which they wanted to regularly receive tribute.

Although the question of the nature of the relationship of the Russian lands with the Mongol Empire and the Golden Horde continues to cause controversy and is interpreted very ambiguously, the available data allow us to speak of indirect(indirectly), and about direct the impact of the Mongol conquests on the nature of Russian state power and the system of government.

As G. V. Vernadsky rightly noted in this regard, first of all, the Mongols profoundly transformed the relationship between the Russian lands and the steppe. Before them, the Russian migration of Kievan Rus was limited to nomadic shepherds, and the "unorganized steppe" itself was not an object of central authority. The Mongols organized a scattered steppe, which ultimately determined Russian expansion to the East. This movement in itself required a strong centralized authority. On the other hand, having weakened the scattered Russian principalities and the main force of the aristocracy - the boyars, the Mongol conquests thereby further strengthened the grand ducal power in the Russian lands they conquered, which objectively prepared the ground for the subsequent unification of the Russian lands into a single centralized state.

But the Mongols also had a more direct impact on the evolution and nature of state power in medieval Russia, which was reflected in the strengthening of oriental, orientalist features in Russian political culture. For a long time (up to the crushing defeat in 1380 on the Kulikovo field), the Horde was the most important source of legitimacy and prestige for their power for the Russian aristocracy and princes. Close ties with the khan's court, where other orders, different from the ancient Russian ones, dominated, built on relations of rigid, often blind subordination, could not but affect the consciousness and behavior of the Russian political elite, which gradually absorbed the imperial spirit of the Horde statehood. It was the Mongols who introduced the beginnings of strict discipline, hierarchy and despotism into the relations of domination and subordination in Russia, and were (and one can also agree with the Eurasians on this) the real predecessors of the Russian autocratic state.

To a certain extent, the noted changes, which led to the strengthening of authoritarian, despotic tendencies in the system of power relations in Russia, were explained by psychological reasons. The originality lay in the fact that, finding themselves in a humiliated position as "servants" of the Mongol khans, the Russian vassal princes increasingly sought to compensate for this state of humiliation by extreme despotism in relation to their subjects. This spirit of despotic rule can already be observed in the policy of the first Moscow princes, who, over time, became more and more burdened by both the old squad orders and the independence of local appanage princes. Forced to fulfill the will of the khan, they could no longer put up with the "Russian freemen", unceremoniously suppressing any manifestation of it.

On the other hand, already in the XV century. in connection with the beginning of the process of disintegration of the Golden Horde into a number of khanates (Kazan, Astrakhan, Crimean, Siberian), a reverse process is observed - an active departure of the Tatar nobility to serve in the Muscovite state. Often there were cases of mixed Russian-Tatar dynastic marriages. The Horde, and then the Kazan aristocracy, which had converted to Islam by that time, brought to Moscow many eastern customs and relations of power, which also did not contribute to softening the despotic principles that were firmly established in Russian political culture.

The influence of the Mongol factor on changes in the internal administration of the Russian principalities and, as a whole, in the system of the Russian administration, which, as is known, was not subjected to any serious interference and regulation by the Horde authorities, can only be spoken of with a high degree of conventionality. However, the very principles of the Golden Horde administrative model in the future left a certain imprint on the nature and methods of bureaucratic management in the emerging Muscovite state. This was due not only and not even so much to the fact that, unlike most nomadic states, the Golden Horde, having come to Europe, already had a developed bureaucracy, during the creation of which the Mongol khans relied on the traditions of the political and administrative system of China they had previously conquered. It is known that a significant part of the officials of the civil administration in the Golden Horde were Chinese or syncultural Mongols, Khitans and Uighurs. More significant was the fact that, having transferred the Chinese administrative model to the soil of an undeveloped nomadic culture, the Mongol khans transformed it into a primitive simplified form of unlimited despotism, although outwardly similar to the autocracy of the Chinese emperors, but unlike it, did not imply any counterbalances. in the form of Confucian and Buddhist ethics, as it was in China.

Relations between the emerging Moscow state and its western neighbor, Lithuanian Rus, were no less complex and dramatic. The formation of the Lithuanian state is usually attributed to the end of the 12th - beginning of the 13th century, when Lithuania began to actively expand due to the annexation of neighboring Russian lands. In many respects, this was facilitated by the weakening of the western and southern Russian principalities in the conditions of the onset of fragmentation of Russia and the rise of Vladimir Russia, which was accompanied by an intensification of internecine struggle in these lands and principalities. The internecine strife of the Russian princes was used by the Lithuanians, whom the Russians themselves called for help and interfered in their strife. By the beginning of the XV century. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania turned into a vast and fairly strong state (federation of lands), three-quarters of which consisted of the Russian population. Owning the Galicia-Volyn, Chernigov, Smolensk, Polotsk and other Russian lands and cities, many of which had long been the historical domains of the older branches of the Rurikovich, the Lithuanian principality eventually began to claim the role of a kind of "alternative Russia" and a real rival of Moscow, along with her who fought for the unification of Russian lands. Researchers note the active process of Russification of native Lithuania, in which the Old Russian culture and Orthodoxy occupied a dominant position, and Russian was the state language of the principality. At the beginning of the XV century. there was a separation of the Western Russian Orthodox Church into an independent Kyiv Metropolis, autonomous in relation to Moscow. The increase in the prestige of the ruling elite of Lithuania was also facilitated by its foreign policy and military successes: inflicting a number of defeats on the Horde in the struggle for South Russia, as well as defeating the Teutonic Order in alliance with Poland (1410).

In contrast to the later Moscow model of power and administration, the Lithuanian-Russian statehood was closer to European, experienced a significant influence of Western culture and early showed a development trend towards estate-legal state. Many old Russian cities that became part of Lithuanian Rus had a European status of self-government based on the Magdeburg Law. At the same time, the local Russian aristocracy was actively involved in the prestigious forms of Polish, German, and Hungarian culture. In the system of state power and administration of Lithuania, along with the pagan Lithuanian and Russian-Orthodox state traditions, the principles of European state law played an increasingly important role. From the beginning of the XVI century. The Great Wall Sejm began to be convened as a class-representative body, consisting of two chambers: the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. All this gives many scientists reason to consider the Lithuanian-Russian statehood as the most likely alternative path for the development of the Old Russian state according to the pan-European model, which, according to many, was already potentially laid down in Kievan Rus.

The strengthening of the Lithuanian state ran into active opposition from Moscow, which saw a serious danger for itself in strengthening the position of Lithuania and sought, by using various means (setting the Horde against Lithuania, etc.), to prevent the transformation of the Lithuanian principality into a new all-Russian center. These efforts of Moscow were also facilitated by a number of mistakes made by the leaders of the Lithuanian state (for example, their frequent military campaigns against Moscow together with the Crimean Khan, etc.), which seriously damaged the prestige of Lithuania in the eyes of the local Russian-speaking population. The process of the state unification of Poland and Lithuania, which began after the election of the Lithuanian prince Jagiello as the Polish king in 1385, and the active Catholicization of the western Russian lands that were part of the Lithuanian state that accompanied it, finally buried Lithuania's claims to become an alternative center for the unification of Russian lands, the population of which is increasingly reoriented towards Moscow as a "defender of the Orthodox". After the Union of Lublin in 1569, Lithuania became an integral part of a single state - the Commonwealth.

Kievan Rus in specific period

By the end of the XI century. the cities of Kievan Rus flourished, but the centralization of the country did not occur. After Yaroslav the Wise in Kyiv, only an outstanding ruler is noticeable - his grandson Vladimir Monomakh(1113 - 1125). He became famous for his successful struggle against the Polovtsians and for his unsuccessful attempts to establish peace among the princes.

The reason for the princely strife was the economic and political isolation of cities due to the rapid flourishing of crafts and trade. Strife and wars were fought mainly for control over trade routes and sources of raw materials.

Political fragmentation, which implies the distribution of power over several levels, is the most appropriate organization of society under feudalism. The advantages of relatively small, compact state formations clearly affected Russia as well.

The constant movement of princes in search of a richer and more honorable throne ceased. The rulers no longer perceive the cities and lands subject to them as temporary sources of human and material resources in the political struggle. The authorities approached the person, became more attentive to his needs.

The princes, who now passed on their possessions by inheritance, were more concerned about the well-being of cities and estates. The strife, so frequent in a formally unified state in XI - n. 12th century although they did not stop, they acquired a qualitatively different character. Now the princes competed not as contenders for the same throne, but as rulers who tried to solve any problems of their states by military means. The state power itself began to take on a more distinct shape, got the opportunity to respond in a timely manner to conflict situations (enemy raids, rebellions, crop failures, etc.). Power has become more effective than in those days when the management of some lands was reduced to the periodic "feeding" of the princes and warriors or to the people.

The feudalization of state structures took place simultaneously with the formation of feudal, patrimonial land tenure. Agriculture gradually acquired greater importance for the well-being of the state than military-trading expeditions. The transformation of many old and new cities into independent political centers contributed to the development of handicrafts and local trade.

The process of development of patrimonial property in Russia in XII - ser. 13th century was similar to similar processes that took place in the countries of Western Europe. In Russia, the estate was divided into princely, boyar, church. But unlike the West in Russia, the state form of ownership still remained the leading one. With the exception of Novgorod, the cities in Russia did not play an independent political role, the power in them was in the hands of the princes.

The organization of the military service nobility is also undergoing a change. This is due to the strengthening of the independence of the boyars, who secured the inheritance of the patrimony.

During the second half of the XII - XIII centuries. The squad broke up into boyars-votchinnikov, who remained vassals of the prince, and the princely court, whose members were called nobles, or servants.

Thus, the prerequisites for the fragmentation of Kievan Rus were, firstly, the complication of the system of state feudalism - the formation of stable regional corporations of the military-service nobility, fed by part of the income from state taxes, and secondly, the growth of patrimonial property, primarily princely domains.

If in the XI century. Russian princes easily changed principalities - by the will of the Kyiv prince, by right of inheritance or as a result of internecine wars, then with the strengthening of princely domains in various regions, territories are consolidated behind the branches of the overgrown Rurik family and gaining independence from Kyiv.

The decline of the role of Kyiv as an all-Russian center in the XII century. happened also because from the end of the XI century. Byzantium began to weaken and the trade route along the Dnieper becomes less important. On the contrary, the significance of the path along the Volga is growing - “from the Varangians to the Persians”, so that the northern cities of Tver, Yaroslavl, Suzdal, Rostov, Kostroma are flourishing. Residents of the south of Russia, tired of the Polovtsian raids, move here.

While agriculture was the basis of economic life in the Suzdal (from the middle of the 12th century, Vladimir-Suzdal) principality, the economy of the Novgorod land retained its predominantly commercial character. Baltic trade in the XII century. flourished, the Vikings almost stopped attacks on the coastal regions of Western Europe. Novgorod merchants established close ties with German cities; farming on folding lands was, although not very efficient, but safe. The relatively weak feudalization of Novgorod life led to the creation of a state in which merchants and artisans played no less prominent role than the boyars, who owned estates. Novgorod became a medieval republic that had an elected "Minister of War" - a prince and a lifelong (but also elected) bishop.

Other cities did not declare themselves, like Novgorod, independent (in 1136, Novgorod residents expelled the prince and announced that the city was “free among princes”), but by the beginning of the 13th century. almost all the major cities of Russia became independent, they entered into equal treaties with the princes.

In the northeast (as well as in the outlying Novgorod possessions), in parallel with the emergence of feudal holding of land and patrimonial economy, peasant and monastic colonization of lands was going on.

The development of desert sparsely populated areas often began with the founding of a monastery, which then became a local center where the peasants sought protection and help.

The agricultural population of numerous specific possessions of North-Eastern Russia (black people) could freely move from patrimony to patrimony, from city to city, from one specific state to another. In such conditions, the prince was not so much a ruler-sovereign, but rather an owner, owner of the land, and his rights were close to the rights of private landowners-boyars.

The first signal of a terrible danger to the independent development of the Russian lands was the crushing defeat of the Russian-Polovtsian army in the battle on the Kalka River in 1223, the enemy who defeated these troops was the Mongols-Tatars. The result of the battle was impressive - six princes died, only every tenth warrior returned from the battlefield. However, no conclusions were drawn, especially since there were no new invasions for the next 15 years.

Only in 1237, the troops of Batu Khan carried out a massive invasion of Russian lands. And although the number of the enemy army was smaller, but the superiority in military experience and, most importantly, the disunity of the Russian principalities led to the loss of independence for almost two hundred and fifty years. In the history of Russia, the stage of the Mongol-Tatar yoke began.

Since the campaign of 1237 - 1238. began in late autumn, then the enemy cavalry, moving along the frozen rivers, easily reached most of the cities of North-Eastern Russia, capturing and destroying many. Only the spring thaw saved Novgorod and some other cities of North-Western Russia from a similar fate, and they agreed to pay tribute to the Horde under the threat of punitive raids.

The forms of subordination of the Russian principalities to the Golden Horde were different and did not remain unchanged.

After Batu's ruin in 1237 - 1242. for several decades, the Baskaks, the khan's governors, were in charge in Russian cities, whose main tasks were to collect tribute and supervise the princes. After the formation in 1242 of the Golden Horde proper - the multi-tribal state of Batu - the conquered Russian lands became part of this state. Batu and his successors partially retained the system of government that had developed before the invasion, the only means of influencing the situation in Russia was the issuance of labels for reigning and the provision of military support to one or another prince in the internecine struggle.

The Mongol strike did not crush either the Russian people or the Russian state (it actually collapsed much earlier), but dealt an irreparable blow to urban trade: the Dnieper route finally lost its former significance not only because of the decline of Byzantium, but also because of the Horde's control over the Black Sea steppes , The Volga route also went through the Horde. As a result, only Novgorod conducted free trade with Europe and continued to prosper, maintaining democratic self-government even under the princes of Vladimir, the rest of Russia turned from a “country of cities” into a “country of villages”. The city veche fell into disrepair, and the boyars ceased to be an independent estate: earlier it itself managed the citywide affairs, and now the boyars have become assistants to the prince, who himself was an assistant to the khan. So the princes became the masters of the cities, where before they were the highest paid employees.

This is the beginning of Russian absolutism, which, before the overthrow of the Horde yoke, developed in close cooperation with Russian democracy. Unlike the former organization of civil democracy (veche, posadnik, elders), it became a "military" democracy.

The second person in the city after the prince was the thousand man - the head of the militia of the townspeople. The balance of these two forces was shaky and depended on success or failure in the fight against the Horde. The same uneven was the attitude of the boyars to the princely power. They submitted to this authority insofar as the prince headed all the economic activities of the city and the district, ensuring regular payment of tribute to the Horde. But now, having lost an active role in the urban economy, the boyars strove to become the same independent feudal lords as the barons in Western Europe.

With the establishment of the yoke, the division of the Old Russian state into northeastern and southwestern parts was actually completed, relations between which increasingly began to acquire the character of interstate. In Southwestern Russia, the process of state fragmentation reached its maximum by the time of the Mongol-Tatar conquest. Then, having fallen under the rule of Lithuania, these lands gradually began to overcome decay and isolation. The Lithuanian-Russian state was a rare form of political cooperation between several emerging nationalities. Lithuania helped to get rid of the isolation imposed by the Mongols, and the Russian lands helped in the fight against the German knights.

The lands of northeastern Russia from the second half of the 13th century, on the contrary, underwent further fragmentation, and by the end of the century 13 specific principalities were formed. At the same time, the weight and importance of the Vladimir principality fell sharply, all the specific principalities acquired real independence, their political significance began to be determined to a predominant extent not by family ties with the Grand Duke, but by the military strength of the principality itself.

The only institution that ensured the unity of the north-eastern Russia of that period was the church. The Mongol-Tatar conquest did not affect her status at all. Following their policy of non-interference in the religious affairs of the conquered countries, the Tatars not only subjected the monasteries to less destruction, but also granted them certain privileges: in the first years after the conquest, they did not take tribute from the monastic lands and did not collect other payments.

In the west of North-Eastern Russia, local princes, while maintaining subordination to the horde, were forced to provide active military resistance to Lithuanian, German and Swedish expansion. Particularly significant successes were achieved during the reign of Prince Alexander of Novgorod.

In Russian historical literature, several different points of view can be distinguished on the influence of the yoke on the historical development of the country. The first unites those who recognize the very significant and predominantly positive (strange as it may seem) influence of the conquerors on Russia; the yoke prompted the creation of a unified state. The founder of this point of view is N. M. Karamzin . At the same time, Karamzin noted that the invasion and yoke retarded cultural development. G. V. Vernadsky believed that "autocracy and serfdom were the price that the Russian people paid for national survival."

Another group of historians ( S. M. Soloviev, V. O. Klyuchevsky, S. F. Platonov ) assessed this impact on the inner life as insignificant. They believed that the processes that took place during this period either organically followed from the tendencies of the previous period, or arose independently of the horde.

Finally, many, especially Soviet researchers, are characterized by an intermediate position. The influence of the conquerors was regarded as noticeable, but not decisive, and at the same time as extremely negative, hindering the development of Russia, its unification. The creation of a single state, these researchers believe, happened not thanks to, but in spite of the horde. In the pre-Mongol period, feudal relations in Russia developed on the whole according to the pan-European pattern from the predominance of state forms to the strengthening of patrimonial forms, although more slowly than in Western Europe. After the invasion, this process slows down and the state forms are conserved. This was largely due to the need to find funds to pay tribute to the horde.

The most important events of the historical period

1113 - 1125 The reign of Vladimir II Monomakh.

1125 - 1132 The reign of Mstislav the Great.

1123 - 1137 The reign of Yuri Dolgoruky in the Rostov-Suzdal principality.

1126 The first election of a Novgorod posadnik by a veche from among the Novgorod boyars.

1136 Uprising in Novgorod. Beginning of the Novgorod Republic.

1169 Capture of Kyiv by Andrei Bogolyubsky. Transfer of the center from Kyiv to Vladimir.

1223 Battle on the Kalka River.

1237 - 1238 Batu Khan's invasion of North-Eastern Russia.

Spring 1239 Batu's invasion of the southern Russian lands.

b December 1240 Siege and capture of Kyiv.

1252 - 1263 Board of Alexander Nevsky in Vladimir.

1276 Formation of an independent Moscow principality.

1299 Resettlement of the Metropolitan of "All Russia" from Kyiv to Vladimir.

Questions for self-control:

1.What are the main reasons for the onset of feudal fragmentation?

2. List the main features of a new stage of historical development in the political and economic fields.

3. What are the similarities and differences between the processes of decentralization in the countries of Western Europe and in Russia?

4. What features did the development of individual Russian lands have?

5. What are the main reasons for the victory of the Mongol-Tatar troops during their invasion of the Russian principalities?

6. What was the socio-economic and political situation of the Russian lands under the Mongol-Tatar yoke?

7. What features characterize the development of North-Eastern and North-Western Russia? What was it about?

8. How is the Mongol-Tatar yoke assessed in historical literature?

Introduction

The Mongol-Tatar yoke is one of the key moments in Russian history, since all Russian principalities became a real colonial possession of the Jochid dynasty for a long time (the countdown starts from 1240 to 1480). As a result, a variety of resources flowed from Russia into the possession of the Mongols - money, goods, people. The Mongol-Tatar yoke significantly weakened Russia politically, economically and socially. Having established the order in which the Khan of the Golden Horde issued a label for a great reign in Russia, the Mongols ensured that the territories of Russia suffered from internecine wars that princes staged among themselves in the struggle for this title of great reign.

The study of the causes and consequences of the struggle for a great reign during the period of the Mongol-Tatar yoke is quite relevant, since this stage in the functioning of the Russian state largely determined the direction of its further development.

In the course of studying the consequences of the struggle for a great reign during the period of the Mongol-Tatar yoke, the following tasks were set:

Determining the causes and consequences of the specific fragmentation of Russia;

The study of the establishment of the Mongol-Tatar yoke, its features and consequences;

Study of the methods and timing of the struggle for a great reign (during the period of fragmentation and in the course of political unification in Russia);

Determining the prerequisites for liberation from the Mongol-Tatar yoke.

In order to solve the tasks set, the works of Russian and foreign authors in the field of the problem under study in the educational literature and various scientific articles were studied.

Causes and consequences of the specific fragmentation of Russia at the turn of the 11th-12th centuries.

At the turn of the XI and XII centuries. The Old Russian state breaks up into a number of independent regions and principalities.

The main reasons for this collapse are:

1. The natural division of land between the children of the deceased Prince Yaroslav the Wise. So after his death (1054), the Kievan state was divided among his five sons, he did it in such a way that the sons' possessions mutually divided each other; it was almost impossible to manage them independently. However, this did not prevent strife, as a result of which, by the middle of the 12th century. 13 large principalities were formed on the territory of Russia: Novgorod and Pskov lands, the principalities of Vladimir-Suzdal, Polotsk-Minsk, Galicia-Volyn, Kiev, Ryazan, etc.

The process of fragmentation was intensified by the existing order of inheritance of the principalities, according to which the inheritance was transferred not to the son, that is, to the direct heir, but to the eldest in the family, the rest of the close relatives received an inheritance - part of the state. Seniority, according to Yaroslav's plan, was to be determined as follows: all his brothers followed the ruling Kyiv Grand Duke; after their death, their eldest sons inherited their father's places in a string of princes, gradually moving from less prestigious thrones to more significant ones. At the same time, only those princes whose fathers had time to visit the capital's reign could claim the title of Grand Duke. If some prince died before it was his turn to take the throne in Kyiv, then his descendants were deprived of the right to this throne and reigned somewhere in the province. Such a system of "ladder ascent" - the "next order" of inheritance, was very far from perfect and gave rise to constant strife between the brothers and children of the princes (the eldest son of the Grand Duke could take his father's throne only after the death of all his uncles).

As a result of such inheritance, by the beginning of the 13th century, about 50 practically independent states-principalities and appanages appeared on the territory of the Old Russian state, and Ancient Russia turned into a kind of federation of principalities and lands:

Nominally, the Kyiv prince remained the head of state;

Relations between princes were regulated by agreements and customs.

2. Economic reason: a subsistence economy developed, in which each of the economic units (family, community, inheritance, land, principality) provided itself with products and consumed them, that is, there was virtually no commodity exchange.

3. Socio-political reasons:

Representatives of the supreme power (boyars), who by the XI-XII centuries. from the military elite (combatants, princely husbands) they turned into specific landowners, striving for political independence;

The growth of the population and, accordingly, the military potential of various regions of Russia contributed to the emergence of civil strife among the princes;

There was a complication of the social structure of society, the birth of the nobility.

4. Foreign policy factors: the invasion of the Mongol-Tatars and the rupture of the ancient trade route "from the Varangians to the Greeks", which united the Slavic tribes around itself, completed the collapse.

All these factors led to the fact that Russia was ready for disintegration, and the beginning of the period of fragmentation (both political and feudal) should be considered from 1132, when the princes ceased to reckon with the Grand Duke of Kyiv as the head of all Russia.

Effects:

1) positive - the outskirts of Russia are turning into independent principalities, which surpass Kievan Rus in terms of economic, socio-political and cultural development;

2) negative - there was a process of fragmentation of lands (at the end of the 13th century there were about 250 principalities and appanages), as a result, often the specific princes, supported by the boyars, became the instigators of civil strife and tried to take over the senior table, the local aristocracy prepared conspiracies, rebelled; moreover, the contradictions between senior and junior princes within the same principality, between the princes of independent principalities were often resolved by war, the victors burned and plundered villages and cities, and most importantly, captured numerous hordes, turned captives into slaves, resettled them on their lands.

As a result of such civil strife, the military potential of the country as a whole was weakened, which turned out to be fatal for Russia on the eve of the Mongol-Tatar invasion.

Vladimir-Suzdal land

Yury Dolgoruky

Andrey Bogolyubsky

Vsevolod III Big Nest

Galicia-Volyn principality

Yaroslav Osmomysl

Roman Mstislavovich

Daniel Romanovich

Novgorod Republic

Veche

council of gentlemen

Posadnik

Tysyatsky

Archbishop ("Vladyka")

prince

2. The conquests of the Mongols

Reasons for the success of the Mongols

• numerical superiority of the army
• fighting qualities of the Mongols - maneuverability, clear organization (tens, hundreds, thousands, tumens), tough discipline
• use of military-technical achievements of the captured peoples
• disunity of opponents
• intimidation through terror

Yoke- the system of dependence of Russian principalities on the Golden Horde.

Manifestations of the yoke

• obtaining a label for a great reign
• terror against unwanted princes, hostage
• punitive raids (total 50 during the yoke)
• inciting civil strife in order to increase fragmentation
• payment of exit (tribute), requests (extraordinary payments), commemoration (gifts to the khan)
• maintenance of the Horde ambassadors and Baskaks
• natural duties: construction, supply of soldiers to the Horde
• stealing specialists and artisans to the Horde
• privileged conditions for Horde merchants
• the special status of the Russian Orthodox Church, the use of the Christian idea of ​​humility by the khan to subjugate Russia
• the influence of the Horde foundations on everyday life, speech, customs, morality
• suppression of the will of the population to resist through terror

The consequences of the invasion of the yoke

• population migration to the north and northeast
• decline of old centers
• desolation of the lands
• destruction of cities, simplification of craft
• inhibition of the development of commodity-money relations
• numerous casualties among the population
• preservation of political fragmentation
• introduction of oriental elements into the state system: despotism, authoritarianism, rigid vertical subordination, punitive apparatus
• breaking ties with other countries
• strengthening the position of the ROC
• slowdown in cultural development

Reasons for the disappearance of the veche order

• veche traditions were supplanted by the growing princely power, the influence of which prevailed in areas with a pronounced agricultural bias
• Russian cities, unlike Western European ones, were initially dependent on the princes and could not fight them
• the princes, forced to obey the Horde, tightened their power in order to keep people in obedience to themselves and the Horde

Reasons for the growing influence of the church

• in the conditions of the yoke and civil strife, the church played the role of a comforter and spiritual guide for people
• the clergy were exempted from paying tribute - the enrichment of the Church
• the princes replaced the tithe with the distribution of lands to the clergy

Personality of Alexander Nevsky

Alexander is the grandson of Vsevolod the Big Nest, the son of the great Vladimir prince Yaroslav. He was a prince of Novgorod, defeated the troops of Sweden and the Livonian Order, showing his talent as a commander. In 1249 he received the label of the Grand Duke of Vladimir. He pursued a cautious and flexible policy, maintained peaceful relations with the Horde, restoring the economy. The course of Alexander made it possible for the Russian lands to survive. The death of Alexander in 1263 was marked by the following words of his contemporaries: "The sun of the Russian land has set."

3. Unification of Russian lands

Association prerequisites

• distribution of three-field, increasing the efficiency of agriculture
• strengthening the commercial nature of the craft
• increase in the number of cities
• development of economic ties between the destinies and with other countries
• the need of the urban population for a strong state power
• peasants' need for centralized power to protect against Mongols and landowners
• the need to overthrow the yoke
• the need for protection from Lithuania, Poland, Sweden, the Livonian Order
• the desire of the Russian Orthodox Church for centralized power in order to strengthen its influence
• community of religion, culture, traditions

Reasons for the rise of Moscow

• crossroads of trade routes
• forest protection from raids
• center of arable farming and developed crafts
• flexible policy towards the Horde and other principalities
• purchase, inheritance and seizure of destinies
• support of the Russian Orthodox Church (since 1325)
• absence of strife for a long time

The meaning of victory

• the collapse of the plans of Mamai and Jagiello for the division of Russia
• growth of Moscow's authority
• weakening the Horde
• recognition by the Horde of the supremacy of Moscow in Russia
• the emergence of prerequisites for the liberation of Russia from the yoke
• growth of national consciousness
• tribute reduction

1382 - the ruin of Moscow by Tokhtamysh; return of the yoke

Basil I(1389-1425) - received a label from his father by inheritance

1392 - annexation of Nizhny Novgorod

Vasily II the Dark (1425-1462)

1425-1453 - dynastic war

Approval of the principle of inheritance not "by seniority", but "from father to son"

4. Recovery of the Russian economy

Features of the Russian city

• restoration took place under the yoke and feudalism
• urban development takes place in areas of developed agriculture
• resumption of stone temple construction
• the narrowness of market relations between cities and the provinces; the main role in trade belonged to landowners
• a significant part of the city was occupied by estates of landowners
• payments and requisitions in favor of the prince and the aristocracy
• major anti-feudal and anti-Horde uprisings

Russian cities were characterized by opposite tendencies:

1. interest in overcoming political fragmentation
2. the city's desire to maintain independence

Vladimir-Suzdal land

North-Eastern Russia, the interfluve of the Oka and Volga. Scarce land, harsh climate. The forest zone provided protection from nomads.

dominance of agriculture. Forest industries. Developed craft. The influx of population from South Russia, the emergence of new cities (1147 - Moscow).

Weak veche traditions in the cities, weak boyars, strong princely power, deliberative powers of the veche. The principles of allegiance were laid down.

Yury Dolgoruky(1125-1157) - son of Vladimir Monomakh; after the collapse of Kievan Rus, he began an active struggle for the expansion of his principality

• 1147 - the first mention of Moscow

Andrey Bogolyubsky(1157-1174) - the son of Yuri, moved the capital to Vladimir, in 1169 captured Kyiv, killed by the boyars.

• under Andrei, the title of "senior prince" passed from Kyiv to Vladimir

Vsevolod III Big Nest(1176-1212) - Andrei's brother, dealt with the boyars, fought with the Bulgarians and Polovtsians.

Galicia-Volyn principality

Southwestern Russia, the interfluve of the Dniester and the Prut, the Carpathians. Fertile land, mild climate. Vulnerable to nomad raids.

dominance of agriculture. Developed trade with Southeast and Central Europe. Salt mining.

A powerful boyars formed early, challenging the power of the princes. Political ties with Germany, Poland, Byzantium, Hungary, the Pope.

Yaroslav Osmomysl(1153-1187) - Galician prince.

Roman Mstislavovich(1170-1205) - the ruler of Vladimir-Volynsky, in 1199 united Galich and Volyn.

Daniel Romanovich(1221-1264) - after a long struggle with the boyars, he again united the principality.

Novgorod Republic

From the Arctic Ocean to the upper reaches of the Volga, from the Baltic to the Urals. The climate and soils are not suitable for agriculture. An outpost from Western aggression. Remoteness from the Steppe - protection from nomads.

Dominance of marine and forest industries: hunting, salt production, fishing, iron production, etc. Developed craft. Active trade with the Volga Bulgaria, the Baltic states, Scandinavia, the Hansa (a union of European cities).

Weak princely power (in 1136 the Novgorodians ousted their prince Vsevolod and established a republic). Strong boyars and merchants who owned real political power. In Novgorod (and later - in Pskov) a type of aristocratic, boyar republic was formed. The symbol of the freedom of the city is the veche bell.

Veche- the highest authority, which included the owners of estates and heads of families; senior officials were elected at it, issues of war and peace were resolved, the prince was invited (for 1 year).

council of gentlemen(50 people) - Konchansky posadniks and thousandths were included, they were engaged in the implementation of clerical affairs, the preparation of the veche.

Posadnik- the highest official, the head of the veche, was in charge of diplomacy, administration and court.

Tysyatsky- assistant posadnik, carried out a commercial court, managed trade affairs, led the militia.

Archbishop ("Vladyka")- head of the Council of Lords, treasurer, managed church lands

prince- Managed the armed forces.

Historians' perspectives on fragmentation

1. The fragmentation of the Russian lands is similar to the feudal fragmentation in Western Europe, and the relationship between princes, boyars and junior warriors is similar to the relationship between seigneurs and vassals in the West.
2. The fragmentation of the Russian lands is not similar to Western Europe, since it was not a system of mutual obligations between the superior and the inferior.

2. The conquests of the Mongols

DICTIONARY

Specific evening period, a generally accepted, although not entirely accurate designation of the first centuries of Russian history, marked by fragmentation into parts of the country's territory, the absence of state unity and, at the same time, the development of urban government.
The beginning of the period is usually attributed to the XI century, to the divisions of Russia after the death of St. Vladimir (1015) and especially Yaroslav the Wise (1054); the end of the period is represented by the 15th and the beginning of the 16th century, when the state (more precisely, patrimonial) idea finally triumphs, and specific fragmentation is replaced by autocracy under the rule of Moscow (North-Eastern Russia) and Lithuania (South-Western Russia), from which the name appears for the subsequent period of Russian history the state of Moscow-Lithuania.
From the very beginning of Russia, according to chronicle tradition, three brother-princes appear in 862, and only after the death of Sineus and Truvor (apparently without offspring) Rurik takes possession of their lands, but, sitting himself in Novgorod, distributes other cities to control men from their squad. Two of his princes, Askold and Dir, rule in Kyiv. Oleg, having killed them, unites the principalities of Novgorod and Kiev in his hands and reigns in Kyiv, while in other cities (Chernigov, Pereyaslavl, Polotsk, Rostov, Lyubech, etc.) "the bright and great princes that exist under him" or boyars, although somewhat dependent on the main prince, but, as far as can be judged from the terminology of the agreements with the Greeks of 907 and 912, set quite independently.
As the princely family multiplies, the governors or posadniks from the squad are replaced by relatives - sons, brothers and nephews of the senior prince, who receive volosts during the life of the latter. The land is considered the fatherland (property) of the entire princely family as a whole, and everyone in the family seeks to get their share in it. As long as the father is at the head of the family, directly distributing volosts to his sons and moving them from place to place, relations are built solely on the basis of parental authority.
Sons, as posadniks of their father, are obliged to obey him and pay tribute from their volosts, although sometimes disobedience and even open resistance to the authority of their father is manifested (Yaroslav I in Novgorod before the death of St. Vladimir).
Subsequently, when an elder brother or even an older relative becomes the father, and when the number of younger ones increases immoderately, ties weaken, the authority of the elder tends to decline, and individual volosts acquire more and more political independence. Maintaining unity in actions and subordinating the younger ones is possible only for a while to especially energetic, gifted and popular personalities, like Vladimir Monomakh or his eldest son Mstislav I. Already in the first half of the 12th century, the payment of tribute by junior princes to Kyiv ceased or, at least, was replaced by a voluntary and random gift. The power of the oldest prince of Kyiv, who is obliged to "think and guess" about the entire Russian land, ceases to serve as a unifying principle for the Russian land.
Another such manifestation of unity turns out to be no stronger bond - the princely congresses on important issues, like the Lyubetsky in 1097, which are not periodic, but purely random. The mutual relations of the princes during this period (XII - XIII centuries) are built on various foundations: they inherit each other in turn of tribal seniority. But then the tribal relations are confused to an extreme degree. Other principles appear on the stage (not excluding the former): an agreement (not always reliable and lasting between princes), obtaining (i.e., violent capture), an agreement with the city council (based on the will of the people) and, fixing the dying will of the prince, his will.
In the 11th century, the development of the veche principle, relatively weak, was noticeable only in Novgorod alone. But even in Kyiv and other older cities, the strengthening of the veche element is noted in parallel with the weakening of the princely power. In the 11th century, the Kiev veche appeared only occasionally, in dangerous moments, in the form of a violent, rebellious crowd. In the XII century, it already arbitrarily called Vladimir Monomakh to the throne, installed his sons one by one (in 1125 and 1132), drove out the Olgovichi princes and called Izyaslav Mstislavich in 1146.
Thus, the princes get the opportunity to refer not to seniority, but to the will of the people, or even directly to the fact of a successful capture ("not the place goes to the head, but the head to the place"). Separate branches of the princely family settled in the regions. Local princely dynasties appear (with the exception of Kyiv and Novgorod): the Monomakhovichi, Olgovichi, etc. lines. The principle of seniority is still supported somehow, but more and more limited to the known princely branch and region.
New orders begin to take shape from the end of the 12th century in the north, where it quickly rises, being built up with cities and populated at the expense of the weakening and emptying Russia of the Dnieper, Russia of Rostov-Suzdal or Vladimir. It rises thanks to the smart colonial and economic activities of its princes - Yuri Dolgoruky and his successors. Now the son of Dolgorukiy, Andrei Bogolyubsky, wants to be an autocrat, does not give a share in his land to either brothers or nephews, reigns alone and gives his power an unlimited character, establishes new relations with the squad. But autocracy is not soon established between the descendants of Vsevolod Yuryevich Big Nest.
The Vladimir land is again divided into parts, which over time increasingly acquire the character of hereditary possessions, passing in a straight line from father to sons and dividing between them into small shares, but not passing into extraneous lines of the princely family. Only from that time (XIII - XIV centuries) did the name appanage appear, meaning not tribal, but personal or family property, hereditary "patrimony" on the basis of civil law. As private property, inheritances are transferred by will, acquired by purchase, in the form of a dowry for the wife. The mutual relations of the princes are determined by treaty charters, which uphold the principle of equality between the princes.
Only one grand-ducal city of Vladimir continues, according to the old custom, to pass to the eldest in the family. The Tatar yoke makes this custom more and more fictitious. Over time, one of the destinies, Moscow, rises above the others, becomes the ecclesiastical and political center of all northeastern Russia.
With the material and moral-ecclesiastical strengthening of Moscow, petty appanage princes pass into the category of service, dependent assistants, so that later, having finally lost their appanages, they become titled boyars of the Grand Duke of Moscow. And the Moscow princes are still faithful to the old view of their land as a private patrimony, and divide their inheritance, giving each son a special inheritance, but at the same time more and more noticeably strengthen the power and income of the elder, giving him the "oldest path" more than others, so that in the end the elder alone receives almost everything, and the younger ones are insignificant, through striped islands in the middle of his kingdom and are increasingly deprived of their property rights - independent international relations, collection of taxes by their own power in their destinies, minting coins, etc. If even before the younger brothers were obliged under contracts to keep the elder "honestly and menacingly", then by the end of the 15th century they directly turned into his servants. in the face