Russia: return to Transcaucasia. Transcaucasia: current history and its lessons

V.V. Degoev
Russian policy in Transcaucasia in the first half of the 19th century: some
results
As the annexation or conquest of the Transcaucasian territories in the first third of the XIX century.
Russia faced the problem of managing them. It was necessary to find such a form of imperial
presence in this region, which, first of all, will ensure social and
political stability, which is necessary, among other things, to address current and future
foreign policy issues. The case was complicated by a number of factors. In terms of language,
religions, cultures, internal structure, Transcaucasian state and
semi-state formations were heterogeneous. Inside them often reigned
fragmentation and strife, and between them - enmity and rivalry, most often for the "local"
hegemony. Administrative and judicial uniformity, and even then sometimes conditional, existed
only within one territorial-political unit - whether it be a kingdom, a principality,
khanate, union of communities (etc.). However, the benefit of such uniformity has generally been
a little, due to the arbitrariness of rulers and feudal lords, chaos in land relations and
taxation, internecine strife and robbery.
These circumstances both created problems for Russia and helped them
allow. Local social elites and common people gradually began to see in the empire
supreme power, arbiter, supra-class and supra-national instrument of organization
living according to rational rules. Almost all social strata, sooner or later
come to realize the conveniences of existence in the conditions of the new, imperial order,
put an end to the "war of all against all." It is order, organization, system, how
synonyms for peace, security and well-being, gradually become key for people,
vital ideas. The universal and ever-increasing need for this way of being
forced Petersburg to look for ways to satisfy it and suggested that strategic
the direction in which Russian policy in Transcaucasia was to develop.
However, this does not in the least detract from the complexity and scale of the problems facing Russia.
tasks, and in no way justifies the miscalculations she made.
It immediately became clear to the Russian authorities in Transcaucasia that the unification of this region according to
imperial-provincial model - a risky, expensive and ineffective occupation. In
In any case, such a process—historical in its content—required time.
Petersburg was in no hurry to force it, although different views were expressed on how
speed and in what forms should the involvement of the Transcaucasus in the imperial
system.
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The Russian administration in the annexed territories was predominantly
military and emergency. Generals and officers involuntarily had to deal with
civil affairs, reconcile socio-political elites, improve cities,
build roads, etc. Russian soldiers were used as a cheap and highly qualified
work force.
The notorious “divide and conquer” principle, which is habitually, although often
unreasonably, is associated with Russia's policy in the Transcaucasus, lost its rational
meaning. Before, for example, in the 18th century, he - and even then in certain situations - was at hand
Petersburg. Now that this mosaic region is under the scepter of the king, the task
consisted not in a split, but in the combination of heterogeneous elements in the name of achieving stability and
manageability.
The problem of non-violent integration faced Russia the more acutely, the more clearly
there was a lack of Russian troops in the Transcaucasus and a lack of management experience
newly acquired lands. It can be said that flexible and cautious approaches to this
problems arose partly spontaneously, under the influence of the realities of life, which did not favor the method
cutting intra-Caucasian Gordian knots. On the part of Russia, understanding was visible
the detrimental consequences of the rapid breakdown of the traditional socio-economic, political
and cultural setting. Hence the tolerance for local administrative diversity.
Imperial power was introduced far from everywhere, but even where it was introduced, it often wore
nominal character, making itself felt only by those who openly demonstrated
disloyalty to her.
The motives of such a policy were based not only on objective difficulties, but also on
instinctive and quite understandable unwillingness of the Caucasian governors to delve deeply and
get involved in the complex intricacies of local life. Ultimately, this is what
circumstance has become, oddly enough, a common source for two opposing concepts
integration strategy, which received the conditional names "centralism" and "regionalism".
The "centralists" advocated the speediest imperial-administrative unification of Transcaucasia;
"regionalists" proposed to act gradually, not in a hurry to abolish those local
features that over time will either die off by themselves, or will be relatively
painlessly and organically replaced by new political forms.
These two approaches have never existed in their pure form, and therefore should not be
exaggerate the intensity of the struggle between them. What is stated as the "victory of centralism" in
second half of the 19th century, is actually a much more ambiguous
phenomenon. The "regionalist" component, as an inevitable product of sound opportunism,
has always been present and is still present in Russian policy in the Caucasus.
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The introduction of imperial administration into Russian possessions in Transcaucasia (wherever
took place) did not mean that Russian provinces were made from the annexed territories. Life
forced to look for flexible approaches. For the state service, civil and military,
representatives of local peoples were recruited, and not necessarily belonging to
social leadership or the Christian faith. The main criteria were loyalty to Russia and
professional suitability. They received the privileges of the ruling class, thanks to which
the formation of a new Transcaucasian political elite proceeded relatively smoothly. Tem
this was the beginning of the process of the emergence among the non-Russian population of the imperial
identity. This trend developed in parallel with the growth of national self-consciousness,
most often coexisting with him, but sometimes replacing him. In socio-psychological terms
the willingness of the local elite to identify themselves with the empire was determined by the desire
belong to a corporation of the elect, share its spirit and values, enjoy its benefits and
symbolism. Ground for moral doubts associated with the problem of responsibility to
their own peoples, was practically non-existent. The fact is that for part of the new ruling class
this problem never existed. The more scrupulous could console their consciences by saying
that they do not betray the people's interests, but protect them.
Co-optation of Georgians and Armenians into the "colonial" administrative system and education in them
imperial outlook was facilitated by religious community with the Russians. In the case with
Muslim Turks achieved the same goal through the religious tolerance of Russians.
Moreover, in relation to Islam, the Russian government took an emphatic
defensive stance, with the express intention of drawing the Muslim clergy to
implementation of the imperial political course. Later, in the light of the events of the Caucasian War, many
statesmen in Russia and the Caucasus will regard this as an erroneous social bet,
brought negative results.
However, the main work of the integration mechanism still took place in the secular
sphere. In the first half of the XIX century. in Transcaucasia, an influential layer of the enlightened
"colonial" bureaucracy, represented by people who were filled with high,
sincere sense of moral responsibility for the “civilizing” task entrusted to him,
state mission. Among them there were many who understood, appreciated and even admired
before the Caucasian culture, recognizing its right to original development under the imperial
auspices. Far ahead of their time, they abandoned the arrogant culture-trager look
on the "native" spiritual life, from the crafty temptation to compare it with Russian-European
values ​​in the context of the categories "higher-lower", "better-worse". They already then all their
course of action raised the question not of absorption, but of the cultivation of a phenomenon that was
aptly named by the Canadian historian G. Rhinelander as a national-imperial culture. And in
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Ultimately, this and no other formula - despite the mass of objective and
subjective obstacles - will triumph in the second half of the 19th century and, moreover, in the century
twentieth.
There is both a paradox and logic in that an enlightened bureaucracy is born and begins
his active civic activity under the toughest, most imperial-minded
(in the eyes of many - the most odious) Caucasian governors - P. D. Tsitsianov and A. P.
Yermolov. Professional soldiers, brought up in the appropriate spirit, these generals
saw their mission primarily in restoring internal order in the region and protecting it
from external threats, which from now on becomes a problem for Russia's security, that is -
priority problem of any state. Hence the widespread use of
methods. However, they were not an end in themselves and were used only in cases where peaceful
means did not work, although, of course, the question remains far from an idle question - to what extent this or that
otherwise the situation was really hopeless.
P. D. Tsitsianov and A. P. Ermolov realized that, in addition to the army, another
clutter control toolkit. It is for this pragmatic purpose that they
created a very close-knit colonial bureaucratic corporation in Transcaucasia, guided by
the message that its effectiveness will be directly proportional to its enlightenment. special
patronage was enjoyed by those "cadres" who, with their views and creative
potential most of all corresponded to the ideas of the governors about the essence and form of civilizing
Russian missions.
At the same time, P. D. Tsitsianov and A. P. Ermolov could not always fully control
the process of formation of an enlightened type of bureaucracy. He often took spontaneous
character. So, the “proconsul of the Caucasus”, of course, had nothing to do with the appearance in
subordinate to him the region of the brilliant galaxy of exiled figures of the Decembrist
movement. But it cannot be denied that, largely thanks to A.P. Ermolov, the Decembrists
got the opportunity to realize their talents in a new field for them and play
colossal role in the Russian-Transcaucasian spiritual rapprochement. Their labors were laid
the foundations for the great cultural synthesis that brought such vivid results in the second half of
19th century and especially in the twentieth century.
To a large extent, thanks to the high patronage of A.P. Ermolov,
that special spiritual environment in which the formation of the brilliant Transcaucasian
intelligentsia. The viceroy put the system of public education in
Transcaucasia. Before the Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani youths - regardless of their
social status and religion - the prospects for obtaining a beautiful
education, and not only in Tiflis (then the cultural capital of the Caucasus), but also in
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Petersburg and Moscow. Along with the prestige of the imperial education system, the
demand for it. According to G. Rhinelander, by the beginning of the 1830s. Transcaucasian intelligentsia
experienced an increased appetite for everything Russian.
The decade of M. S. Vorontsov in the position of the Caucasian governor was in a well-known
sense of the "golden age" for Transcaucasia. An experienced general and a talented administrator with
a rich list of merits in the development of southern Russia, he actually received complete freedom
actions in the Caucasus and was subordinate only to Nicholas I. This region acquired something similar to
the status of a “state within a state”, which was recognition from St. Petersburg
the need to take into account its specifics and not speed up the process of its “gubernization” according to
standard imperial pattern. Few people understood this most difficult task and were able to
deal with it better than M. S. Vorontsov.
In the social, inter-corporate and inter-ethnic conflicts that took place in
Transcaucasia, M. S. Vorontsov invariably took the position of an arbitrator, an impartial
conciliator, supra-class instance. It concerned disputes between Christians and
Muslims, Georgians and Armenians, Russians and non-Russians, aristocracy and merchants,
officials and the public. The viceroy instilled in the opposing sides and
Transcaucasian society as a whole has a broader, imperial view of things. He saw in this
a way to moderate antagonisms, resolve (or prevent) a conflict situation, educate
people have a rationally selfish understanding that the benefit for the empire is the benefit for
each of her subjects.
M. S. Vorontsov - thanks to his personal qualities and dedication, infected
universalistic spirit of most of the Transcaucasian social elites. They are sincere and
voluntarily accepted the imperial ideals and readily offered their help in the field
putting them into practice.
M. S. Vorontsov left behind in Transcaucasia a whole “colonial-bureaucratic”
a class consisting of representatives of different peoples, confessions, social classes and
cultures. All of them were united not only by corporate solidarity, but also by the growing imperial
self-consciousness with elements of sovereign patriotism, on the one hand, and “internal Russian
cosmopolitanism, on the other.
Under M. S. Vorontsov, the national-imperial culture in Transcaucasia entered the stage
heyday. One of the main prerequisites for this was a personal, deeply respectful
MS Vorontsov's attitude to the spiritual heritage of the Transcaucasian peoples. Entrusted to him
The region experienced guardianship from 1845 to 1854. an entire era in which elements of the Renaissance
intertwined with completely new cultural phenomena.
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The question of whether the famous Uvarov triad - "autocracy,
Orthodoxy, nationality" - for the Transcaucasus, and to what extent, was very relevant. This formula
contained the idea of ​​a strong individual power, uniting a heterogeneous society and standing
above him. It was this kind of power that deeply impressed those Caucasian peoples who once
knew it, but lost it, and those who, never having anything like it, strove for
autocracy as a kind of political ideal. (In this, by the way, one of the sources is hidden
temporary success of Shamil's authoritarian project.)
The second component of the triad - "Orthodoxy" - had a more limited area
applications. Sympathetically perceive it - under certain conditions - could only
Christian Georgians, Armenians and part of the North Caucasian population.
As for "nationality", this concept was generally inappropriate in relation to
multiethnic Caucasus.
Nevertheless, the Russian authorities - when voluntarily, and sometimes involuntarily - carried out a large and
not unsuccessful work to adapt the "theory of official nationality" to the Caucasian
specificity, or rather, precisely that in this theory that lends itself to adaptation.
With regard to the Caucasus, the Uvarov triad is appropriately rethought and
adapted - was, in principle, a universal ideological means of education
imperial supra-ethnic and supra-confessional identity. Loyalty
Russian tsar, combined with a sense of belonging to a "superpower", slowly but surely
penetrated into all strata of the Transcaucasian society. Imperial identity served as a common
in a sense, a protective, shell for those born (or reborn)
"national" self-consciousness, to the emergence of which socio-cultural policy
Russia had the most direct concern. This policy is often labeled less
correct, at least very conditional, term "Russification". In fact
a much broader, more capacious and complex civilizational process was taking place, deserving,
in our opinion, a different name. We can talk more about "imperial
self-identification" of a person, class, society, formed under the influence of specific
material and spiritual incentives, a certain cultural and ideological environment and
suggesting a conscious and voluntary choice (otherwise what kind of
"self-identification"?).
The merit of M. S. Vorontsov is that he understood this himself and taught his
subordinates, many of whom, however, were no less insightful than their boss.
The Caucasian governor, unlike some predecessors, did not believe that the local
nations should take the benefits of joining the empire as self-evident. He
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made it possible to see this in practice through the active involvement of Georgians, Armenians,
Azerbaijanis in the economic, social and cultural life of Russia.
At the same time, M. S. Vorontsov was a resolute opponent of artificial planting
imperial forms, preferring to give the process of integration a natural, gradual and
organic character. It got to the point that the most zealous Georgian adherents
"Russifications" were begged to preserve, at least temporarily, useful local laws and customs.
The viceroy created an atmosphere among his subordinates, which by itself formed
something like "Caucasian patriotism", uniting people of non-ethnic origin
or religion, but a sense of belonging to the great cause of creating something unprecedented. In
thanks largely to M. S. Vorontsov, both the Russians and the Caucasians came to understand that
The Caucasus is their common concern and common destiny, that Russia is not a temporary worker and has come here forever.
Perhaps one of the most beneficial results of this "discovery" was a certain
moral mood that equally inspired both Russians and non-Russians with a simple idea: everything that
they do (or don't) in the Caucasus belongs and will belong to them and their descendants.
It was this mood that forced the Transcaucasian "governors general" to create
material and spiritual environment for a prosperous life.
* * *
Being essentially a deep "tectonic" shift, the process of integration of Transcaucasia with
Russia had a complex dialectic and proceeded not without costs for both sides - inevitable and,
often tragic. For the Russian authorities to study the local situation and to adapt
sometimes it took too much time. And before they could grope
the best way, they managed to make blunders that caused a negative
social reaction. In a sense, the knowledge of the Caucasus by Russia took place throughout
throughout the 19th century. and continued into the 20th century. Among those Russian military and administrators,
who, on duty, had to deal with this region, not everyone was given
get really deep into it. People with such a gift should be sought soon
among those who rushed to the Caucasus at the behest of their hearts and their creative nature.
In the course of establishing Russia in the Transcaucasus, a certain period of difficult
mutual adaptation of different cultures. Russian generals, considering their "civilizing
missionary" as an absolute good, sometimes identified it with the absolute right to carry to
Caucasian peoples "the light of reason and enlightenment." They did not always have enough understanding of what
ignorance of Russian and French, inability to use a fork and knife, custom
sitting cross-legged on the floor, and other "wildness" - there is not barbarism, but only evidence
belonging to another culture, in its own way no less, if not richer, than European.
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The impression of "lack of culture" became the more intrusive, the more clearly
the dissimilarity of the Caucasian world to Russian, including due to that chaotic
state of the local socio-political and economic life.
Hence - the desire to quickly restore order, presented as another
indispensable attribute of civilization. This desire gave rise to haste and thoughtless
actions in the sphere of social, educational and confessional policy.
The divide-and-conquer strategy was by no means always successful: in the long run, it
increased the disorganization of Caucasian societies, preventing their evolution in a "civilized"
direction.
Petersburg, and after him the Caucasian administrators clearly underestimated
economic component of integration. Local “system” (“systems”) of management
was either patriarchal or feudal in nature, which in reality was almost the same
same. The main merit of Russia was that this "system" received protection from external
danger and internal lawlessness. However, such favorable conditions in themselves do not
gave impetus to development, they rather conserved this sphere of social life on that
level, which was quite enough for a habitual existence, but too little for
the emergence of an economic need in Russia and for the transformation of Transcaucasia into
organic part of the empire.
Until the end of the Caucasian War, the economic potential of the region actually
remained unclaimed, even to the extent that it could be mastered by an underdeveloped,
compared with the West, the Russian industry. Transcaucasia was a "colony" that did not know
colonial exploitation, which made it an unprofitable acquisition for the Russian economy.
However, the geostrategic importance of the region paid off all the costs of its maintenance, raising
in the eyes of St. Petersburg to such a valuable or, rather, "super-valuable" category,
which spared neither imperial money nor imperial troops. Already in the first third of the XIX century.
conditions were gradually being prepared so that in the future - albeit not close -
the geopolitical significance of Transcaucasia was converted into a specific economic
a result that successfully patched up one of the "black holes" that drained Russian finances for
for a long time.
The personnel and conceptual support of Russian politics left much to be desired.
in the Caucasus. During the period from 1801 to 1830, nine governors were replaced there. Of these, perhaps
only two - P. D. Tsitsianov and A. P. Yermolov - had a clear military and political
strategy, but they did not have enough time and funds to implement their plans. Other
the governors did not have a consistent and long-term program, acting rather situationally,
as problems of greater or lesser complexity arise here and there. They are not
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burdened themselves with creative tasks, preferring to carefully carry out often inappropriate
or the hopelessly belated instructions of St. Petersburg, where they knew little of the nuances of the Transcaucasian
situation and, perhaps, were waiting for initiative proposals from the scene. Eventually -
the lack of a systematic approach, against which illusions, experiments, miscalculations and
disappointment.
Although in the second echelon of the army (aka civilian) leadership in the Transcaucasus
there were many capable people, yet the adoption of the most important
decisions and development of strategic ideas for the long term. Concerning
the rest of the military and bureaucratic apparatus, then there were all sorts of people in it: and those who
conscientiously fulfilled his duty, imbued with deep respect for the "native" world and
thirst to understand it, and those who came to Transcaucasia "to catch happiness and ranks" are careerists,
bribe takers, daredevils and outcasts of various stripes, who despised both the region and its inhabitants, and,
sometimes themselves. Many crimes are on their account - theft, murder, violence,
betrayal, sacrilege, insult to national feelings. It would be too much
beautiful delusion to believe that their deeds did not in the least tarnish the image
Russia in the minds of the Transcaucasian peoples.
* * *
Despite these and other gross miscalculations that always accompany the "colonial"
politics, the process of imperial integration in Transcaucasia was gaining momentum and
fundamental and unique phenomenon. This happened largely because in Russia
the image of the empire symbolized not at all the domination of one nation over others and not typical
relationship between the mother country and its colonies. He embodied a super-ideology,
voluntary self-identification, the state of mind and soul of a person, regardless of his faith,
ethnic origin, social affiliation, level of education and culture. And in
in this sense, there were enough people with an “imperial identity” among non-Russians and non-Orthodox,
among gentlemen and common people, among bourgeois and Bolshevik politicians.
With all the excesses, the transformation of form and essence in Transcaucasia was carried out gradually -
even where the social receptivity to the new was extremely high. National
the coloring was not forced out or suppressed, but organically merged with imperial culture,
complementing and enriching it. Not only Caucasians borrowed from Russians, but vice versa: Russians
willingly flaunted Caucasian paraphernalia, were proud of their "Caucasian" as a kind of special
identity. The "Russian" theme penetrated deeply into the Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani
literature, and the Caucasus became an irresistible source of inspiration for Russian poets and
writers.
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Due to its syncretic nature, Russian imperial culture (in a broad sense
sense of the word) served in the Caucasus as a kind of relay of European ideas and
values. In this regard, Russia's policy was a kind of Westernization. In the old
Caucasian house "window to Europe" was cut through by the Russian "imperialists" and turned to
north.
By the beginning of the 60s. XIX century, despite a number of fruitful results of the presence of Russia
in the Caucasus, before it still stretched a huge front of "colonial" work -
political, cultural and economic, from which there was no longer any
capabilities. Having created a foothold for further imperial construction in the Caucasus,
Russia could not afford to leave to the mercy of fate a case that required so many
effort and sacrifice. The accumulated experience made it possible to protect oneself from some mistakes, but did not insure against
others. Has irreversible dynamics been achieved in the Russian-Caucasian integration
process is hard to say. Contemporaries who answered this question in the negative may
seem overly pessimistic. Those who gave an optimistic answer probably
would have refrained from it if they had known in advance that in the future Russia in the Caucasus would face difficult
tests.

At the end of May, three states of Transcaucasia celebrate significant dates - the next anniversaries of the proclamation of the national independence of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Let's talk right away. We are not talking about the ancient states of the ancient era, proto-state formations of the Middle Ages, principalities, khanates or melikdoms.

Nation-state building

In May 1918, after two revolutions and the collapse of the Russian Empire, the experience of creating nation-states based on European models began to be realized in Transcaucasia.

Today, the study of the political experience of the "first republics" is extremely important not only for academic reasons. Numerous problems and contradictions (unresolved border disputes and ethnic conflicts, the relations of the nationalizing republics to Russia) were formed in their current form precisely during that period. And in the state symbols and memorial policy of today's countries of Transcaucasia, the events of 1918-1921. are of great importance.

On May 26, 1918, the last meeting of the Transcaucasian Seim took place. At this meeting, the disintegration of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (a project that involved the creation of a federation of three state entities in the region) was officially announced. At the same time, another meeting was opened, the National Council of Georgia, at which the "Act on Independence" of this republic was read out.

Two days later, on May 28, 1918, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR), the first republican state of the Islamic East, appeared.

On the same day, the Armenian National Council in Tiflis was given the powers of government with unlimited powers. The council declared the independence of Armenia, and on May 29 its first prime minister was appointed, and Yerevan was elected the republican capital.

In the emergence of national statehood in Transcaucasia in 1918, it is impossible not to see objective reasons and patterns. The Russian Empire, carrying out the modernization of its "Caucasian outskirts", without having its own direct interest, in fact became the creator of future national personnel. The development of cities, industrialization, and integration projects (which inevitably posed problems of the relationship between the state and "their own", the national) were the environment in which the Transcaucasian intellectuals discussed the problems of their own identity, constructed images of the national future. As a result, the establishment of the discourse of nationalism, the formation of ideas about "one's own land", "ideal borders", and "enemies of the nation".

Meanwhile, the experience of national statehood after the imperial collapse in all three countries was short-lived. The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic lasted only twenty-three months. The first republican Armenia lasted only seven months longer. Independence lasted the longest in Georgia - a little less than three years. Moreover, this country became the only independent republic of Transcaucasia, which managed to adopt the Basic Law: in Azerbaijan and Armenia, their constitutions did not appear during the period of the "first republics".

In 1918-1920, all independent states of Transcaucasia put forward territorial claims to each other. Armenia and Azerbaijan argued over the ownership of Karabakh, Zangezur and Nakhichevan (later Karabakh and Nakhichevan would be transferred to Azerbaijan, and Zangezur to Armenia). At the end of 1918, a Georgian-Armenian conflict broke out over the Lori region. In the Georgian-Azerbaijani conflict, Tiflis claimed the Zagatala region of Azerbaijan, inhabited by Ingiloy Georgians, and Baku - the Marneuli and Gardabani regions of Georgia, which were a region densely populated by ethnic Azerbaijanis.

Let's add here internal conflicts (Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian, as well as Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontations in Armenia and Azerbaijan). All these clashes took place with the intervention of Turkey and the "Central Powers", and then the Entente countries.

Finally, let's add to this the military-political confrontations between the first republics and the Russian Bolsheviks and White Guards, who were perceived as defenders of different versions of the imperial project.

At the same time, thanks to the first national-state experience, such concepts and elements as parliamentarism, freedom of speech and civil rights were introduced into the political circulation of all three Caucasian republics, which, however, often coincided with ethnic boundaries.

The leaders of the first republics of Transcaucasia put a very high value on the role of education (considering it a guarantee of freedom and independence). It is no coincidence that at a meeting of the ADR Parliament on September 1, 1919, a law on the establishment of the Baku State University was adopted.

Thus, the political experience of the first republics cannot be reduced to border disputes and ethnic cleansing, although these practices crossed out all the democratic impulse that the politicians of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia demonstrated in 1918-1921.

The political evolution of the first republics of the Transcaucasus was interrupted by Sovietization (not only external and "Russifier", as they often say today in Baku, Yerevan and especially in Tbilisi, but also internal, since each of the republics had its own Bolshevik forces).

The development of nation-states in Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan was not completely stopped. It has been translated into a different format. It was within the framework of the Soviet national project that the Transcaucasian inter-republican borders were determined, which became interstate borders after the collapse of the USSR, and the attributes of the future post-Soviet statehood were formed.

An interesting paradox should be noted. Parting with the "cursed Soviet past," the newly independent states of Transcaucasia are by no means always ready to give up those territorial configurations that were provided to them precisely during the time of the "indestructible Union."

Meanwhile, the whole point of the problem lies in the fact that today's independent states of the South Caucasus have not yet developed mechanisms for ensuring national peace and security in the region.

But if "territorial integrity" is no longer ensured with the help of the CPSU and the KGB, then new approaches must be developed! However, even timid attempts to raise the issue of federalization (in the Georgian and Azerbaijani contexts) do not find political support. On the contrary, the delegation of national sovereignty is seen as an attack on the unity of the country.

At the same time, all three of today's Transcaucasian states have developed their own special attitude towards the heritage of the first republics. If Georgia and Azerbaijan talk about succession with the Georgian Democratic Republic and the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, then Armenia emphasizes that it has secession from the USSR in accordance with the Union legislative base.

However, the Georgian and Azerbaijani approaches also have their differences. While official Tbilisi is pursuing a consistent policy of symbolic de-Sovietization, Baku (taking into account the huge role played by Heydar Aliyev, who held high positions in the party-Soviet hierarchy in the creation of modern Azerbaijan), acts more selectively and tries to integrate the experience of the first independent republic and the Azerbaijan SSR within a single national historiography.

Against this background, one should note the insignificant interest of today's Transcaucasian establishment in the leaders of the first republics, be it Noe Zhordania, Mammad Emin Rasulzade, Hovhannes Kachaznuni. None of them has become a truly sacred figure for the new states.
paradoxical situation. The first republics are regarded as a historical model, and their leaders are in the shadows.

In the Georgian case, this is explained by the unwillingness to do extra PR for the left forces (and the ruling party in Georgia in 1918-1921 was the Social Democrats), in the Azerbaijani situation, emphasizing the role of Heydar Aliyev pushes the ADR leaders into the shadows. And although the authorities of post-Soviet Armenia respect the experience of the first republic, it is not perceived as a predecessor state.
Thus, the experience of state building in Transcaucasia at the beginning of the 20th century still retains its relevance. And above all, due to the fact that the lessons from it have not yet been fully learned.

The southern direction, and in particular the Caucasus, has always been for Russia its soft underbelly. So, the leadership of the Russian Empire paid much attention to it, because the main Caucasian ridge, reliably closed to enemies, was the key to the security of the European part of the country from the south. In addition, Russia in Transcaucasia is an opportunity to actively influence Middle Eastern policy and a “nail in the ass” of any Turkish and Anglo-Saxon government.

It is no coincidence that they didn’t let her in there for hundreds of years, and then, at the first opportunity, they tried in every possible way to remove her from there. One hundred years ago, it almost happened once. But Russia is back. And if you look closely, the current situation in the region sometimes resembles the events of that era to the smallest detail.

History 1920-1921

By the beginning of 1920, it became completely clear that Russia could not be crushed. The civil war went through it with a powerful scar, but society was able to consolidate around one of the political forces. By the end of the difficult year of 1919, she was able to inflict a decisive defeat on all her internal enemies, and the question of who would rule Russia no longer arose. As soon as this became clear, the Bolsheviks immediately turned their gaze to the Transcaucasus, which in the three post-imperial years turned into a tangle of contradictions and an arena of uninterrupted battles.

At that time, Georgian nationalists unsuccessfully tried to solve the Abkhazian issue. They also had conflicts with the Ossetians who lived on the southern slopes of the Caucasus Range. Armenians and Azerbaijanis seized each other in a stranglehold in Karabakh. Against the backdrop of historical events in Transcaucasia, everyone was quietly and almost imperceptibly slaughtering each other. By this time, Turkey, defeated in the First World War, left there. She was not up to territorial expansion. She was surrounded on all sides by enemies who were preparing a division for herself, and therefore could no longer help her Azerbaijani brothers in creating their national army either financially or with instructors. Its influence on Georgia and pressure on Armenia also disappeared.

So, by the beginning of 1920, no one in the region could globally interfere with Russia. In the spring, the RSFSR struck at Azerbaijan, bringing its proteges to power in the republic with the help of the army. It would seem that this should have led Baku to the final loss of Karabakh, but then the Russians helped to resolve this issue, while at the same time preventing the Azerbaijanis from organizing the genocide of the indigenous population.

Few people know, but Mustafa Kemal, the father of all Turks, also blessed the invasion of Soviet troops in Azerbaijan. April 26, 1920 he wrote a letter, in which he promised to help Moscow so that Baku would not interfere with the return under the wing of Moscow, and at the same time hoped for Russia's help in its struggle against the Western "imperialists". On April 27, the Soviet units crossed the border and the next day they were in Baku, where they proclaimed the Azerbaijan SSR.

In the autumn of the same 1920, Soviet Armenian units, including those recruited from the inhabitants of Karabakh, and Russian troops entered Armenia. The Nationalists fled after several defeats.

It's Georgia's turn. She was defeated (occupied) for 10-12 days at the end of February - beginning of March 1921. In Abkhazia, everything went even faster and easier, and then it was time to formalize the status quo.

Already 10 days after the solution of the Caucasus issue, the final Moscow Treaty between the RSFSR and Turkey on the division of the Caucasus was concluded in the capital of Russia. What is remarkable about it?

Firstly, signing speed. Obviously, such decisions are not made within a few days, especially in the conditions of those times. Just to get to Moscow, the Turkish delegation needed several days. It is very likely that on March 16 some “secret protocols” discussed and adopted earlier (since the spring of 1920) were simply “legalized”.

Secondly, The RSFSR at that time did not have a common border with Turkey. Even the USSR will be created in almost two years, but it was the Russian Federation that then drew a demarcation line between its future territories and Turkey.

She, in the person of her army, became an arbiter for Transcaucasia. Thus, Abkhazia eventually concluded a union treaty with Georgia after several years of war.

It is noteworthy that for ten years it was in this status, and then in 1931 it was reduced to autonomy.

Karabakh remained formally a part of Azerbaijan, but the Russian army made sure that no one offended the Armenians there.

In the end, he received autonomy, the leadership of which was the former field commanders of the Armenian militia.

And this status quo lasted for almost 60 years, until Russia found itself again on the brink of death, because of which it was forced to leave the Transcaucasus.

Transcaucasia today or a hundred years later

In the late 1980s, even before the collapse of the USSR, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict flared up with renewed vigor. A little later, combat reports from Abkhazia and South Ossetia began to appear. Turkey, developing its concept of pan-Turkism, began to establish very close relations with Azerbaijan, turning it into its main ally in the region. Georgia also did not remain aloof from her attention.

Everything is back to normal. Even the Chechen conflict proceeded along the lines of the 1917-1920s. Russia has entered intertime, and the question of its very existence has reappeared on the agenda. And just like 100 years ago, when it seemed to everyone that the end had come, it did not come.

It makes no sense to describe the ups and downs of events in Russia, we will only touch on that part of them that concerns the Caucasus. Slowly at first, then faster and faster, the country's patriots began to group around Putin's course (as did post-imperial Russian society after the decisive Bolshevik victories in 1919). By the mid-2000s, the Chechen problem was solved by an exact repetition of the plan of the 1920s, when part of the local elite was allowed into power and received material support from the center. It became clear that very soon Russia would return to the Transcaucasus.

The Russian military base in Gyumri turned into a powerful outpost in Armenia, and Saakashvili's adventure on 08.08.08 made it possible not only to strengthen his authority in the region, but also to finally smash the plans of Western imperialists to expel Russia from the territory of the former Georgian SSR - Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The initiative finally passed to Moscow, and it remains only to create / wait for such a moment, as in 1920, when Turkey will be forced to get out of the region and deal with its internal problems.

Will the Bolshevik plan work again?

The essence of the plan of the RSFSR in 1920 was to create some kind of pro-Russian centers of power in each of the republics and, seizing the opportunity, bring them to power. Then it was necessary to use the military forces of the Soviet Republic, but today, at the beginning of the 21st century, wars have taken on different forms. Hybrid wars are fought even when the guns are not firing, and therefore it is not worth waiting for tank columns on Tbilisi or Baku. Everything will be decided in the spirit of the times.

The Russian leadership probably does not yet have an exact plan of action, but the main outlines of how the Transcaucasian tangle can be untangled are already visible.

In mid-June 2016, Moscow received letter from Ankara from the second Ataturk, and on August 9, 2016, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan arrived on a “historic”, as the press wrote, visit to St. Petersburg, where he was received in the Greek Hall of the Konstantinovsky Palace by Russian President Vladimir Putin. As a result, both parties looked satisfied. They talked about historicity, but at first glance, nothing historical happened.

Meanwhile, a few days later, suddenly, for no reason, a conflict arose between the Syrian government forces and the Kurds in Hasakah. In the Russian media, the rhetoric regarding the Kurdish self-defense forces and their plans to build Kurdistan, even within the framework of the Syrian state, was sharply changed.

Meanwhile, the "April war" between Azerbaijan and Armenia was stopped with the personal participation of the President of Russia. Both sides were forced to recognize Russia as an arbitrator in this matter, and Turkey, after several on-duty statements "in favor" of Baku, stepped aside, leaving Vladimir Putin to decide the fate of the conflict himself!

A certain formula was worked out, after which the conflict was extinguished. And then, almost immediately, a strange “uprising” of the Armenian veterans of Karabakh took place. They claimed that the country's leadership had betrayed national interests and was preparing to "surrender" Karabakh to Azerbaijan.

So, a lot of circumstantial evidence suggests that an agreement in principle has been reached with Turkey, according to which, in exchange for Russia's help in the fight against the Kurdish threat, Turkey recognizes its interests in the Transcaucasus and does not interfere when it establishes its own rules there.

It is very likely that as a result, Karabakh, as in the 1920s, will return to Azerbaijan, but only legally. Local authorities will have a very broad autonomy. Russian troops will be the guarantor of this and will probably increase their presence in the region.

And then it will be Georgia's turn, where big changes have taken place over the past few years.

In 2012, Mikheil Saakashvili's United National Movement party failed miserably in the parliamentary elections. After this defeat, power in the country passed to the Georgian Dream - Democratic Georgia party, created by Georgian businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili.

Ivanishvili's personality is very ambiguous. Much can be written about it, and we will briefly judge it by its results.

In fact, the work of Ivanishvili's party has greatly changed Georgia itself. After Mikheil Saakashvili, who turned the country into one big Russophobic camp, he managed to create a tolerant society in which it became possible for parties with any views, including pro-Russian ones, to appear.

In early October 2016, regular parliamentary elections will be held in Georgia. The party created by Ivanishvili, although it has lost its former support of society, but, judging by the polls, Saakashvili will not give up power in the country to the “nationalists”.

A remarkable moment of the campaign will be the high passivity of the population. About half of the population does not yet support any of the main forces, each of which adheres to the course to the West, which has become the norm over the past 10 years.

Just like in Ukraine, where the pro-Maidan forces are already tired of half of the population, but there is no force capable of mobilizing these citizens. In general, the processes in the two former Soviet republics are similar.

And then there is a chance for forces professing a different worldview (not Eurocentric). For example, such as the openly pro-Russian leader of the socialists Valery Kvaratskhelia, who suddenly appeared out of nowhere in the lenses of the central media and began a very active election campaign. Also, the third political force in the country, the “Democratic Movement” Nino Burjanadze, who recently became persona non grata in Ukraine for her statements about Crimea, began to take a position that is strange for Georgia.

Political opponents do not rule out that pro-Russian Georgian forces may enter parliament, which means that Russia will have a political force in Georgia that can be relied upon in the future, especially if Burjanadze's neutrals occupy the political center.

conclusions

So, with some variations, explained by somewhat different initial data, we see in Transcaucasia a repetition of the events of a hundred years ago. Russia is gradually restoring its influence and presence in the region and, taking advantage of Turkey's problems, is preparing to induce mine order. At the same time, it will rely on "understanding" on the part of Ankara and Tehran and on the political prerequisites being created.

In the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan, an additional argument will be the consensus of the three main players: Russia, Turkey, Iran - which is not only possible, but also likely to be adopted very soon (if it has not yet been reached). Yes, not everyone will like it, but the alternative for the region means an endless war to destroy everyone against everyone. Just what the West was able to instill in 25 years of its Caucasian policy.

Andrey Ryabov

Corresponding member of the International Academy of Informatization, member of the Russian Association of Political Science, editor-in-chief of the journal "World Economy and International Relations"

Russian Policy in the South Caucasus: Goals and Interests

Russian policy towards the countries of the South Caucasus over the course of 20 years of their independent existence has undergone a complex evolution, which to a large extent reflected the different stages of the formation of post-communist Russia as a new state, changes in the ideas of its leaders about the place and role of the country in the world and the region. This policy was influenced by a wide range of different factors - ideological, military-strategic, economic. It was influenced by differences in views between group and departmental interests within the ruling elite of Russia, changes in its foreign policy priorities, both at the global and regional levels. However, the main priority, both in the days of the Tsarist Empire and the Soviet Union, remained security. Approaches and relations with individual countries of the region changed, but the goals remained unchanged.

If in the 90s the Russian Federation (RF) considered it a priority to carry out democratic reforms, support them in neighboring republics, and sought to become part of the West, then in the next decade it positioned itself as a state that considers itself an independent pole of influence in the world and tries to maintain dominating positions in the space of the former USSR. At the same time, anti-Western features have noticeably increased in the ideological component of foreign policy, in particular in the South Caucasus.

Depending on these factors, the general state of the country, and this, Russia's strategies in relation to the states of the South Caucasus were built in different ways. If at the beginning of the period the desire to protect itself from the threats of instability that came to Russia from the South prevailed, then Moscow’s intention to build such a system of security and international relations in the region that would allow the Russian Federation to maintain its leading position in the long term came to the fore.

The "Circassian factor" in modern politics in the Caucasus region has a long history. In the early 1990s, when practically all the national republics within Russia sought to achieve greater autonomy from Moscow, the Russian ruling circles seriously feared the ethno-separatism of the Circassian peoples. There are sufficient grounds to believe that one of the main reasons that in mid-1992, in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, Russia reoriented itself to support Abkhazia, lies precisely in the influence of the "Circassian factor". At the time, Moscow considered that Circassian separatism posed an even greater threat to Russia's national integrity than Chechen separatism. And therefore, at the moment when the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict turned into a war, it was considered a convenient moment to channel the energy of Circassian separatism towards Abkhazians ethnically close to the Circassians. Thus, Moscow strengthened its position among the Circassians in the North Caucasus.

During the August 2008 war with Georgia, Russian support and eventual diplomatic recognition of the independence of Abkhazia also served to strengthen the loyalty of the national republics with a Circassian component to the federal government in Moscow. However, after the war, Georgia tried to put the Circassian factor on its side. In connection with the approach of the Winter Olympics in Sochi, the topic of responsibility of modern Russia for the so-called. "Circassian genocide" in the former Russian Empire. Despite the death of the Circassians in that period, the term "genocide" in the international legal sense is hardly applicable to this phenomenon. However, to disrupt the Olympics, the Georgian parliament adopted a special resolution on the "genocide of the Circassians."

Georgia has made efforts to persuade the parliaments of other countries to adopt similar resolutions. After that, these states, the bodies of the international Olympic movement, had to come to the conclusion that it was inappropriate to hold the Olympics at the places of death of the Circassians. The idea found support among some organizations of the Circassian diaspora. However, this idea failed. The parliaments of the countries addressed by their Georgian counterparts left the topic of the "Circassian genocide" unattended. There was no desire in international political circles to use this topic to disrupt the Olympics. After the government of the Georgian Dream coalition headed by Bidzina Ivanishvili came to power in Georgia in October 2012, Tbilisi set a course for a gradual normalization of relations with Russia and therefore decided to abandon the use of the “Circassian genocide” topic for foreign policy purposes. . The idea of ​​a boycott of the Olympics by Georgia was also rejected.

An important role in the failure of the attempt to politicize the idea of ​​"Circassian genocide" was played by the resolute refusal of the authorities of Abkhazia to somehow participate in the promotion of this topic. At present, internationally, the threat of disruption to the Sochi Olympics should be recognized as minimal. The Russian authorities have made significant efforts to secure the Games from terrorist attacks from both various international terrorist organizations and armed radical groups from the North Caucasus. Theoretically, only a sharp deterioration in relations between Russia and Western countries can interfere with the Olympics, but not the topic of the "Circassian genocide". However, despite all the difficulties in relations between Russia and the United States, including on the Syrian problem, such a scenario seems extremely unlikely.

As for Russian-Georgian relations, by now the parties have formed an agenda for their normalization. It is being carried out slowly and mainly touches on secondary issues, since the positions of the parties on the main issue of disagreement - the fate of Abkhazia and South Ossetia - are opposite. Under no circumstances is Russia ready to refuse recognition of their independence. And Georgia still considers Abkhazia and South Ossetia an integral part of its territory. And yet, cooperation between Georgia and Russia in ensuring the normal holding of the Games in Sochi can play a very important role - in restoring and strengthening trust between the two countries.

Ethno-political conflicts in Transcaucasia (as the South Caucasus was then called) played an important role in accelerating the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, they had a strong influence on the formation of the foreign policy line of the leadership of post-communist Russia in this region in the first years of its existence. Preserving the country's stability and protecting its territorial integrity from potential threats that could come from the South by discarding the imperial legacy have become one of the most important priorities of Russia's international policy and ensuring its national security. Thus, from the very beginning, Moscow's attitude towards the new states of the South Caucasus was dominated by security considerations. In this sense, the initial situation in which the new Russia found itself strongly resembled the positioning of the Russian Empire to the Transcaucasus region in the 10th century. IX - the beginning of the twentieth century. As A. Malashenko and D. Trenin rightly noted, in an effort to learn lessons from the collapse of the USSR, “the Kremlin and the Foreign Ministry tried to solve the security problem of the “southern flank” in a simple way: away from the “hot spots” . However, the strategy of withdrawing from the conflict areas was not implemented in practice. The Russian presence in the South Caucasus and political influence on the situation in the region was initially carried out through the support of those parties in ethnic and interstate conflicts, the victory of which, it was believed, would be more in line with the long-term interests of Russia both in the world as a whole and in this region. . This approach was largely determined by the general ideologization of Russian foreign policy at that time. In the early 1990s, the Kremlin and the Foreign Ministry believed that it was necessary to support those post-communist countries and political regimes that, hand in hand with Russia, were ready to move towards a democratic future, decisively breaking with the Soviet past. Therefore, in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, in contrast to the leadership of the USSR, which relied on official Baku as more loyal to the allied Center than Yerevan, Russia initially supported Armenia, and in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, Georgia. But already in the second half of 1992, under the influence of fears of a worsening situation in the North Caucasus, Moscow radically changed its position, moving to support the Abkhazians.

However, in the future, during the interethnic conflicts that unfolded in the countries of the South Caucasus, Russia significantly corrected its position. The political leadership of the country came to the conclusion that in the context of unfinished conflicts, the most effective form of maintaining Russian influence and presence in the region would be peacekeeping. The international situation also contributed to the implementation of such a choice at that time. The United States and the states of the European Community at that time actively supported the internal political line of President B. Yeltsin and his government, aimed at building democracy and a market economy in Russia, and therefore, on the whole, favored the fact that the Russian Federation assumed a significant share of responsibility for ensuring stability in the post-Soviet space. Largely due to the then dominant role of the West in world politics, this attitude was also supported by international institutions - the UN and the OSCE. Already in the summer of 1992, the Joint Control Commission (JCC) was created to maintain peace in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. After the Georgian-Abkhaz agreement on a ceasefire and separation of troops was signed in Moscow in May 1994, Russian units under the flag of CIS peacekeepers took up positions on both sides of the conflict line. This peacekeeping operation was sanctioned by the UN, which extended the status of Russian peacekeepers every 5 years. Russia became a member of the OSCE Minsk Group (MG) established in 1992 to resolve the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

This new line fit well into the general context of the course that Moscow pursued in international affairs in the 1990s. Experiencing enormous difficulties and tension in the course of implementing internal political reforms, gradually moving away from the line of the West, starting from 1993, Russia could not claim any significant role in the formation of a new, post-Yalta world, even in the limited space of the former USSR. The only task that turned out to be within the power of Moscow was to preserve the results of the collapse of the Soviet Union in those forms and at the stage at which the processes of disintegration were suspended, and their actual results were recorded in 1992-1994. And, of course, Moscow reserved the role of a guarantor of the stability of this "temporary" order. Russia in world politics, thus, turned into a power status quo.

At the same time, peacekeeping, which required the Russian Federation (RF) to adhere to the principles of impartiality and equidistance in relation to the conflicting parties, continued to be combined in Moscow's policy with the preservation of exclusive relations with one of the partners.

At the same time, the understanding by the Russian Federation of its role in the South Caucasus as the main force capable of maintaining stability in the region partly led to the reproduction of the same approaches that tsarist Russia had previously used in the region. Government in Saint Petersburg XIX - early XX century believed that to ensure the country's security, it is necessary to maintain two lines of defense: one along the line of the Main Caucasian Range, and the other along the perimeter of the empire's borders in the South Caucasus. Compared to that period, the tasks of Russian security policy in the region at the end of the 20th century changed only partially.They were aimed at preventing the penetration of extremism and terrorism into the country's territory from the South, including the Middle East. And for this, as in X IX and the beginning of the twentieth century, two lines of security were required. As subsequent events in the North Caucasus showed - the two Chechen wars, the spread of the military conflict to the neighboring territories of Chechnya - Ingushetia and Dagestan - this line of security turned out to be really critical for ensuring the security and stability of the new Russian state. Having failed to resolve the conflicts in the North Caucasus, Moscow faced the problem of the penetration of terrorism and crime from this region into the interior of the country for the long term. In the South Caucasus, the concept of the security line has changed. Now it ran through the lines of contact between the parties in interethnic and interstate conflicts. Russia tried to maintain the stability of these lines.

In the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, Moscow, by and large, tried to adhere to the line of equidistance from both sides of the conflict until, in August 2004, Georgian President M. Saakashvili tried to forcefully resolve the conflict with South Ossetia. Since that time, while continuing its efforts to maintain peace, Moscow has become more active in strengthening the de facto independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Russia adhered to the same line aimed at maintaining stability in the region and cautious rapprochement of the positions of the parties with regard to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, although it would seem that the very logic of bilateral relations with these countries should have pushed Moscow to make a tough choice in favor of one of them. . In order to maintain these two most important foreign policy positions in the South Caucasus - Armenia as the only military ally and Azerbaijan as a key economic partner in the crucial issue of energy transit, Russia was forced to balance. At the same time, Moscow was well aware that the resumption of the armed conflict in and around Karabakh would inevitably lead to the collapse of Moscow's positions, both in Yerevan and in Baku.

In the 2000s XXI century, the role of the Caspian-Black Sea region in world politics begins to change gradually. It is turning into a territory through which corridors can pass for the transit of energy carriers from the countries of Central Asia and Azerbaijan to Europe. This adds another important task to Russian policy in the South Caucasus: to preserve the role of the key oil transit country for the Russian Federation. The Kremlin reacted painfully to projects of alternative routes for delivering hydrocarbons to Europe, considering it a threat to Russia's role as the most important transit country for energy resources. However, in fact, the growth of competition in the issue of energy transit routes objectively forced Russian policy in the South Caucasus to look for more flexible approaches to the states of the region. This affected Russia's attitude towards Azerbaijan to the greatest extent.

And although at present the problem of future energy transit routes is still acute and relevant for the South Caucasus, it, apparently, can no longer seriously affect the change in the configuration of international relations in the region and the balance of power that has developed in it. Moreover, in the political and expert circles of Russia, the opinion is currently growing that in the near future, under the influence of the restructuring of world energy markets that has begun, the importance of the South Caucasus as a transit region will decrease, and the impact of the energy factor on regional politics will significantly decrease.

In the 2000s, the situation around the South Caucasus began to noticeably change. In connection with the growing role of interest in this region on the part of global actors - the United States and the European Union. In the military-political circles of the West, ideas about the expansion of NATO to the east began to be discussed, which also meant the inclusion in the alliance of two post-Soviet Black Sea countries - Ukraine and Georgia. Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007. In Russia, which, unlike the US and the EU, could not offer the countries of the South Caucasus an attractive project of social order, this was perceived as a serious factor weakening its influence in the region. In connection with the expansion of the presence of the United States and the European Union in the South Caucasus, the states located here began to pin hopes that these global players will help resolve the frozen conflicts. The growth of such expectations in the states of the South Caucasus also worried Moscow, which was afraid that over time it would lose its monopoly on peacekeeping.

On the whole, the activity of Western countries in the South Caucasus began to be perceived in the Kremlin as an attempt to limit Russia's influence in this important region of the post-Soviet space.

In the new situation, the South Caucasus became for the ruling circles in Moscow one of the most important lines of defense of the interests of the Russian Federation. In September 2006, Tbilisi, which by that time had already taken a course towards joining NATO, regained control over the upper part of the Kodori Gorge and announced the relocation of the government of the Abkhaz autonomy, which had previously been located in the Georgian capital.

The development of a new policy towards Georgia and the conflicts on its territory caused serious discussions in Russian political circles and took time. As a result, a new Russian policy towards the former Georgian autonomies was defined, which received the unofficial name "rapprochement without recognition." Back in August 2006, Moscow withdrew from the ban on trade, economic and financial ties with Abkhazia. On April 16, 2008, Russian President V. Putin instructed the government to develop measures to provide substantive assistance to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This order actually recognized the legal personality not only of the authorities of the former Georgian autonomies, but also of legal entities registered on their territory, including industrial, commercial and financial enterprises. But at the same time, the Kremlin refused to officially recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, realizing how serious the international consequences of such a step could be for Russian foreign policy.

Tensions in Russian-Georgian relations were constantly growing. After the expulsion from Georgia of Russian military personnel accused of spying for Moscow, the Russian Federation responded by introducing a visa regime in 2006 against Georgian citizens, mass expelling them from the country under various pretexts.

And yet, the August 2008 war between Georgia and South Ossetia, in which Russia provided military assistance to the South Ossetians, was not an inevitable way out of the current situation. Several circumstances contributed to the fact that tense bilateral relations moved to the stage of armed conflict. From the George Bush administration on the eve of the war, apparently, ambiguous signals were received in Tbilisi, which were perceived by the government of M. Saakashvili as some kind of guarantee of American support in the event of a military clash with Russia. Neither the US nor the EU could, and, apparently, did not really try to convince Moscow of their readiness to take Russia's interests into account in the process of resolving conflicts around the former Georgian autonomies, provided that this process goes into a multilateral format. On the contrary, the statements and actions of some American and European diplomats have contributed to downplaying the importance of Russian interests in the region in the perception of Georgian politicians. In Moscow, all this was perceived as a disturbing symptom that the West once again intends to ignore Russian interests. Moscow also feared that if Russia did not take active measures to protect the Abkhaz and Ossetian population of the former Georgian autonomies from Tbilisi's attempts to force territorial reintegration with Georgia on them, this could lead to a noticeable aggravation of the political situation in the North Caucasus, primarily in the republics. with a Circassian (Adyghe) ethnic component in North Ossetia. Therefore, the Russian leadership came to the conclusion that it is possible to use military force against Georgia to ensure status quo in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts.

An important question, which is still the subject of various assumptions and interpretations, concerns the reasons that prompted the Russian leadership to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, contrary to Moscow’s earlier policy towards “rapprochement without recognition”. Apparently, this decision was determined to a large extent by the fact that, as a result of the post-war settlement, Russia would inevitably lose the status of a peacemaker. Its armed forces would be forced to leave the territory of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On the contrary, the recognition of these territories as independent states opened up for Russia the possibility of consolidating the results of the war and its presence, including military presence, in the former Georgian autonomies. At the same time, Moscow was well aware of the negative consequences of recognition for Russia's position in the international arena.

The August war certainly became a milestone in Russian policy towards the South Caucasus. After it, for some time, it seemed that Russia completely changed its role in the region, becoming instead of a country that adhered to the preservation status quo , a revisionist power. However, it soon became clear that Moscow had neither the ideas nor the resources to create a new international order in the region and a new regional security structure. To demonstrate their allegiance to the policy of statu s quo, Russia has sharply stepped up mediation efforts for a peaceful settlement of the Karabakh conflict. At the same time, the global financial and economic crisis that began shortly after the war in September 2008 changed a lot in world politics. The United States and the European Union, for various reasons, were forced to sharply limit their activity in the post-Soviet space, including the South Caucasus. In this regard, they have lost the opportunity to act as global players capable of offering the region a new model of development and international relations. In Moscow, it was considered that its main goals were resolved as a result of the conflict. The issue of Georgia's accession to NATO has been postponed indefinitely. Russia's military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia has been strengthened and acquired a new, legally stronger and more durable basis for bilateral agreements.

Moscow did not object to the normalization of relations with Georgia, but only on the condition that the "territorial issue" should not be raised in the negotiations. At the same time, in the long term, it was assumed that if Tbilisi managed to establish a direct dialogue with the former autonomies, then Moscow would not object to the creation of a confederation of Georgia with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

However, President M. Saakashvili and his government did not like this approach at all. Tbilisi believed that the basis for starting the process of normalizing bilateral relations should be Russia's refusal to recognize the independence of the former autonomies and confirmation of the territorial integrity of Georgia.

The situation in Russian-Georgian relations began to noticeably change after the October parliamentary elections in Georgia, which led to the actual change of power in that country. The new government of the victorious Georgian Dream coalition announced its intention to seek normalization of relations with Russia. Soon, a dialogue between the countries was launched at the level of special representatives of governments. In order to ensure progress in the negotiations, the parties agreed to withdraw from discussion the most acute problem on which their positions drastically diverge - the territorial one. In the six months that have passed since the beginning of the dialogue, it was possible to agree on the resumption of exports of Georgian goods to Russia, primarily agricultural, on the resumption of full-fledged air traffic between the countries. There are good chances to establish cooperation between Russia and Georgia in ensuring security in the region and combating terrorism. All this can create a basis for the weakening and further abolition of the visa regime for Georgian citizens.

In the next few years, Russia's policy in the South Caucasus, aimed at preserving the new status quo , which developed after the August war of 2008, most likely will not undergo significant changes. In the longer term, the return to an active policy in the South Caucasus of global players - the United States and the European Union, and the possible arrival of a new world actor - China, will significantly change the situation in the region. For the states located here, the space for foreign policy maneuver will expand, and new opportunities for international cooperation will appear.

The Russian administration in the annexed territories was predominantly

military and emergency. Generals and officers involuntarily had to deal with civil affairs, reconcile socio-political elites, improve cities, build roads, etc. Russian soldiers were used as cheap and highly skilled labor.

On the part of Russia, one could see an understanding of the detrimental consequences of the rapid breakdown of the traditional socio-economic, political and cultural way of life. Hence the tolerance for local administrative diversity. Imperial power was introduced far from everywhere, but even where it was introduced, it often had a nominal character, making itself felt only by those who openly demonstrated disloyalty to it.

Two opposing concepts of the integration strategy appeared, which received the conditional names "centralism" and "regionalism".

The "centralists" advocated the speediest imperial-administrative unification of Transcaucasia; The "regionalists" proposed to act gradually, not in a hurry to abolish local features.

In the Caucasus, in South Kazakhstan and the Crimea, Russia pursued a real colonial policy, brutally oppressing the large indigenous population, mostly Muslim or pagan.

Annexation of Georgia. The policy of tsarism in Georgia

The peculiarity of the situation in the Caucasus was that it was possible to annex Transcaucasia earlier than the mountainous North Caucasus. In 1783, Eastern Georgia (Kartlin-Kakheti kingdom) came under Russian patronage on the basis of the Treaty of Georgievsk, signed by Tsar Erekle II. Christian Georgia counted on Russian protection against neighboring Muslim powers: Turkey and Iran. The Treaty of Georgievsk guaranteed the kingdom of Kartlin-Kakheti inviolability and territorial integrity.

However, in 1801, after the death of Tsar George XII, Eastern Georgia was transformed into a province of the Russian Empire.

In 1803-1804. the principalities of Western Georgia became Russian vassals: Mingrelia and Imereti. Imeretia was finally annexed to Russia in 1810. In 1810, Abkhazia was annexed to Russia. In 1811, the Gurian principality submitted to Russia. Despite the attempts of the tsarist government, it was not possible to carry out a wide colonization of Georgia. Therefore, the Russian authorities sought to rely on the local nobility. A "Supreme Georgian Government" was created from Russian officials and Georgian nobles. General P.D. Tsitsianov. In 1827, the Georgian nobles received equal rights with the Russians.

At the same time, a Russification policy was being pursued in Georgia. All office work and teaching was conducted in Russian. At the same time, the Georgian nobility was given access to military and civil service in the empire. This is how a layer of service nobility, closely connected with the Russian autocracy, was formed.

In the 30s. 19th century Russia began to consider Transcaucasia as an important source of raw materials: cotton, mulberry, grapes, etc. The development of industry in Georgia was held back in order to ensure the supply of raw materials and a market for Russian enterprises.

After the Russian-Turkish war of 1828-1829, when it became possible not to be afraid of Turkish influence in the Transcaucasus, Russification policy intensified. The Russian administration strove to "force the inhabitants there to speak, think and feel in Russian."

In 1840, a new system of administration of Transcaucasia was introduced. The new provincial and district authorities practically did not include the local nobility. Legal proceedings began to be carried out only on the basis of Russian laws, and local customary law was no longer taken into account. In-kind duties were replaced by monetary ones, taxation increased.

The reforms aroused dissatisfaction with both the tax-paying population and the local nobility. The government commission investigating its causes admitted that the transformations carried out did not take into account the traditional way of life of the local population.

M.S. was appointed the new governor of the Transcaucasian Territory. Vorontsov, who returned to the policy of relying on the local nobility. He sought to interest the Georgian nobility in rapprochement with Russia. Over 30,000 Georgian landlords were approved in princely and noble ranks. Vorontsov convinced Nicholas I, who was thinking of softening the dependence of the Georgian countryside on the nobles, "to leave the question of the attitude of the landowners towards the peasants unchanged."

Accession of Azerbaijan and Armenia

If the accession of Christian Georgia was partly voluntary, then Muslim Azerbaijan was conquered by Russia during the wars with Shah's Iran (Persia). Part of Azerbaijan formally ceded to Russia under the Peace of Gulistan in 1813.

Already during the war with Iran, which began in 1804, Russia captured and liquidated four Azerbaijani khanates. The remaining khans retained their possessions, recognizing themselves as vassals of Russia. But in 1819-1826. Russian commander in chief in the Caucasus A.P. Yermolov destroyed a number of khanates, the power in which passed into the hands of Russian officers and officials. Even the Russian senators, who audited the region in 1830, recognized that the administration there was a regime of military occupation. The possessions of the khans hostile to Russia (3/4 of all land) were confiscated. The peasants who inhabited them had to bear duties in favor of the Russian treasury. The lands owned by the Azerbaijani beks began to be taken away in order to transfer them to the Russian nobles.

Only in 1846, under Vorontsov, this course was discontinued. The new governor convinced Nicholas I that it was unreasonable to turn the Azerbaijani nobility into a consistent enemy of Russia. All the lands that belonged to the beks at the time of the annexation of Azerbaijan to Russia were recognized as their hereditary possessions.

In 1828, after the conclusion of the Turkmenchay peace with Iran, Eastern Armenia went to Russia. In an effort to win over the Armenians who were under Turkish rule, the Russian government initially pursued a cautious policy in Armenia. The authorities of the "Armenian region" included representatives of the local nobility and clergy, the taxes levied from the local population were small. The Armenian Church was recognized for its land holdings. However, already in the 30s. taxation almost doubled. In the 1840s The Armenian region was turned into a province, and all-imperial laws were extended to its territory.

On the territory of Armenia, the cultivation of typical colonial crops was encouraged: cotton, tobacco, silk. The resulting raw materials were exported to Russia, the local processing industry did not develop.

Thus, Russian policy in Transcaucasia was aimed at creating a colonial-type economy, Russification, maintaining imperial domination over the indigenous population, with partial reliance on traditional local elites.

http://www.knowed.ru/index.php?name=pages&op=view&id=446

In 1801-1804. East Georgia, Mingrelia, Guria and Imeretia voluntarily joined Russia. At the same time, most of the possessions located on the Caucasian coast of Dagestan and Transcaucasia were annexed to Russia by peaceful means: the Sheki and Shirvan khanates and the Uragel sultanate. At the beginning of 1806 Russian troops entered Baku.

According to the peace treaty signed in October 1813, the entry into Russia of Dagestan, Georgia, Imeretia, Guria, Mingrelia and Abkhazia, as well as Karabakh, Derbent, Cuban, Baku and a number of other khanates was finally fixed. Russia has obtained the exclusive right to have a navy in the Caspian Sea. Russian merchants were now free to trade in Iran. A year earlier, Turkey, under the Bukhara peace treaty, recognized Russia's right to all the Caucasian lands that voluntarily became part of it.

According to the Turkmanchay peace treaty (February 1828), the Erivan and Nakhichevan khanates of Armenia became part of Russia.

The Turkmanchay (Russia-Iran, 1828) and Adrianople (Russia-Turkey, 1829) peace treaties finally secured the annexation of Transcaucasia to Russia. Thus, within a short period, almost all of Transcaucasia went to the Russian Empire, with the exception of the Akhaltsykh pashalyk and some Black Sea regions that were in the hands of Turkey, as well as the Yerevan and Nakhchevan khanates, which still remained under the rule of Iran.

http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgievsky_treatise

Agreement on the voluntary entry of the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti under the Russian protectorate

Treaty of St. George in 1783 - an agreement on the patronage and supreme power of the Russian Empire with the united Georgian kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti (otherwise the Kartli-Kakheti kingdom, Eastern Georgia) on the transition of Georgia under the protectorate of Russia. It was concluded on July 24 (August 4), 1783 in the Georgievsk fortress (Northern Caucasus).

At the end of 1782, King Erekle II of Kartli-Kakheti appealed to Empress Catherine II of Russia with a request to accept Georgia under the protection of Russia. In an effort to strengthen Russia's position in the Transcaucasus, Catherine II granted Pavel Potemkin broad powers to conclude an agreement with Tsar Heraclius. The representatives from the Georgian side were princes Ivane Bagration-Mukhransky and Garsevan Chavchavadze.

· Under the treaty, Tsar Heraclius II recognized the patronage of Russia and partly renounced independent foreign policy, pledging to serve the Russian Empress with his troops.

· Catherine II, for her part, acted as a guarantor of the independence and integrity of the territories of Kartli-Kakheti. Georgia was granted full internal independence. The parties exchanged envoys.

· The treaty equalized the rights of Georgian and Russian nobles, clergy and merchants (respectively).

Of particular importance were 4 secret articles of the treaty. According to them, Russia undertook to defend Georgia in case of war, and during peace negotiations to insist on the return to the Kartli-Kakheti kingdom of possessions that had long belonged to it (but were torn away by Turkey). Russia pledged to keep two battalions of infantry in Georgia and, in case of war, to increase the number of its troops. At the same time, the Georgians were urged to maintain unity and avoid internecine strife, for which Irakli II had to make peace with the king of Imereti Solomon I.

The main political significance of the Treaty of Georgievsk was the establishment of a Russian protectorate in relation to Eastern Georgia, sharply weakening the positions of Iran and Turkey in the Transcaucasus, formally destroying their claims to Eastern Georgia. In 1783, in connection with the conclusion of the Treaty of St. George, the construction of the Georgian Military Road between Georgia and Russia began, along which several fortifications were built, including the fortress of Vladikavkaz (1784).

On September 12, 1801, Alexander gave a manifesto in Moscow on accession. The “imperial” policy of the Zubov brothers won, and even the manifesto itself was written by Platon Zubov himself.

On April 12, 1802, the manifesto was officially read out at the Sioni Cathedral in Tbilisi. The princes were sworn in, the Catholicos and all the estates of the two kingdoms swore an oath of allegiance to the new order. Tuchkov writes that "This rite ended without the slightest confusion." V. A. Potto describes this process differently:

“Unfortunately, Knorring was not one of those people who have the gift of arousing the confidence of the people, and immediately distorted the very meaning of the voluntary annexation of Georgia, giving it the appearance of some kind of violence. Arriving in Tiflis, he gathered all the inhabitants of the city and, surrounding them with troops, ordered them to swear allegiance to the new sovereign. This rude measure and precautions, not caused by anything on the part of the people, deeply offended the Georgians, who did not want to swear under the threat of bayonets and went home.

In general, the consequences of the treaty for Georgia were twofold: on the one hand, the country was spared from raids from Turkey and Iran, on the other hand, it lost its independence (later even ecclesiastical). The unrest in the country subsided over time as it was mainly a protest against the methods and form of incorporation, but not against incorporation as such.