The reason for the start of the Chechen war. Chechen war (briefly)

Since the end of the 18th century, when Russia began to establish itself in the North Caucasus, this region of the country could not be called calm. The nature of the area, as well as the peculiarities of the local mentality, led to disobedience and war against Russian troops, to banditry. The culmination of the confrontation between the highlanders, who wanted to live according to Sharia, and the Russians, who sought to push the borders of their empire to the south, was the Caucasian War, which lasted 47 years - from 1817 to 1864. This war was won by the Russian army due to its numerical and technical superiority, as well as due to a number of local internal factors (for example, enmity between clans in the Caucasian Imamate).

However, even after the end of the Caucasian War, this region did not become calm. Uprisings broke out here, but as the Russian borders moved south, their number began to decrease. By the beginning of the 20th century, a relative calm was established in the Caucasus, which was interrupted by the October Revolution and the Civil War that followed it. Nevertheless, at that time the North Caucasian region, which became part of the RSFSR, was quickly “put out” without unnecessary losses and clashes. But it is worth noting that rebel morals have always reigned among part of the population.

During the collapse of the USSR, nationalist and separatist sentiments intensified in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. Especially their growth intensified after Yeltsin announced a kind of "doctrine" for the subjects of the USSR "Take as much sovereignty as you can!" And as long as there was power behind the back of the Supreme Soviet of the CHIASSR, albeit not so strong, but still, there could be no open speech. Only in October 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union became obvious, the Provisional Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic decided to divide the republic directly into Chechen and Ingush.

unrecognized state

On October 17, 1991, presidential elections were held in the Chechen Republic, in which Dzhokhar Dudayev, Hero of the Soviet Union, General of Aviation, won. Immediately after these elections, the independence of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-Cho was unilaterally declared. However, the leadership of the RSFSR refused to recognize both the results of the elections and the independence of the rebellious region.

The situation in Chechnya was heating up, and already in the late autumn of 1991, a real threat of conflict arose between the federals and the separatists. The new leadership of the country decided to send troops into the rebellious republic and stop attempts at secession in the bud. However, Russian troops, deployed on November 8 of the same year by air to Khankala, were blocked by Chechen armed formations. Moreover, the threat of their encirclement and destruction has become real, which the new government did not need at all. As a result, after negotiations between the Kremlin and the leadership of the rebellious republic, it was decided to withdraw Russian troops, and transfer the remaining equipment to local armed groups. Thus, the Chechen army received tanks and armored personnel carriers ...

Over the next three years, the situation in the region continued to deteriorate, and the gap between Moscow and Grozny widened. And although since 1991 Chechnya has been essentially an independent republic, in fact it has not been recognized by anyone. However, the unrecognized state had its own flag, coat of arms, anthem, and even a constitution adopted in 1992. By the way, it was this constitution that approved the new name of the country - the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

The formation of "independent Ichkeria" was closely connected with the criminalization of its economy and power, which made it clear that in fact Chechnya would live at the expense of Russia, while absolutely not wanting to be part of it. On the territory of the republic and in the border regions of Russia, robbery, robbery, murder and kidnapping flourished. And the more crimes were committed in the region, the clearer it became that this could not continue.

However, this was understood not only in Russia, but also in Chechnya itself. The years 1993-1994 were marked by the active formation of opposition to the Dudayev regime, especially noticeable in the northern, Nadterechny region of the country. It was here that in December 1993 the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic was formed, relying on Russia and setting the goal of overthrowing Dzhokhar Dudayev.

The situation escalated to the limit in the autumn of 1994, when supporters of the new, pro-Russian administration of Chechnya took possession of the north of the republic and began to move towards Grozny. There were also Russian servicemen in their ranks, mostly from the Guards Kantemirovskaya division. November 26 troops entered the city. Initially, they did not meet resistance, but the operation itself was planned just terribly: the troops did not even have Grozny's plans and moved towards its center, often asking for directions from local residents. However, soon the conflict turned into a “hot” stage, as a result of which the Chechen opposition was completely defeated, the Nadterechny region again came under the control of Dudayev’s supporters, and the Russian fighters were partly killed, partly captured.

As a result of this short-term conflict, Russian-Chechen relations have escalated to the limit. In Moscow, it was decided to send troops into the rebellious republic, disarm illegal armed gangs and establish full control over the region. It was assumed that the majority of the population of Chechnya would support the operation, which was planned exclusively as a short-term one.

The beginning of the war

On December 1, 1994, Russian aircraft bombed airfields under the control of Chechen separatists. As a result, a few Chechen aviation, represented mainly by An-2 transport aircraft and obsolete Czechoslovak L-29 and L-39 fighters, was destroyed.

Ten days later, on December 11, President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin signed a decree on measures to restore constitutional order on the territory of the Chechen Republic. The start date for the operation was Wednesday 14 December.

To bring troops into Chechnya, the United Group of Forces (OGV) was created, which included both military units of the Ministry of Defense and troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The OGV was divided into three groups:

• Western grouping, the purpose of which was to enter the territory of the Chechen Republic from the west, from the territory of North Ossetia and Ingushetia;
• Northwestern group - its goal was to enter Chechnya from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia;
• Eastern group - entered the territory of Chechnya from Dagestan.

The first (and main) goal of the united group of troops was the city of Grozny, the capital of the rebellious republic. After capturing Grozny, it was planned to clean up the southern, mountainous regions of Chechnya and complete the disarmament of the separatist detachments.

Already on the first day of the operation, on December 11, the forces of the Western and Eastern groupings of Russian troops were blocked near the borders of Chechnya by local residents, who hoped in this way to prevent a conflict. Against the background of these groupings, the North-Western Group operated most successfully, whose troops, by the end of December 12, came close to the settlement of Dolinsky, located just ten kilometers from Grozny.

Only by December 12-13, having come under fire and using force, did the Western group, as well as the Eastern one, nevertheless break through into Chechnya. At this time, the troops of the North-Western (or Modzdok) grouping were fired upon by Grad rocket launchers in the Dolinsky area and were drawn into fierce battles for this settlement. It was possible to capture Dolinsky only by December 20.

The movement of all three groups of Russian troops towards Grozny took place gradually, albeit in the absence of constant fire contact with the separatists. As a result of this advance, by the end of the 20th of December, the Russian army almost came close to the city of Grozny from three sides: north, west and east. However, here the Russian command made a serious mistake - although it was initially assumed that the city should be completely blocked before the decisive assault, in reality this was not done. In this regard, the Chechens could easily send reinforcements to the city from the southern regions of the country controlled by them, as well as evacuate the wounded there.

Assault on Grozny

It is still unclear what actually prompted the Russian leadership to begin the assault on Grozny on December 31, when there were almost no conditions for this. Some researchers attribute the reason to the desire of the country's military-political elite to take Grozny "on the move" for their own benefit, not taking into account and even ignoring the bandit formations of the rebels as a military force. Other researchers point out that in this way the commanders of the troops in the Caucasus wanted to make a "gift" for the birthday of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Pavel Grachev. The words of the latter are widespread, that, "Grozny can be taken in two hours by one airborne regiment." However, it must be remembered that in this statement the minister said that the capture of the city is possible only if the army is fully supported and ensured (artillery support and complete encirclement of the city). In reality, there were no favorable conditions, alas.

On December 31, Russian troops advanced to storm Grozny. It was here that the commanders made the second glaring mistake - tanks were brought into the narrow streets of the city without proper reconnaissance and infantry support. The result of such an “offensive” was very predictable and sad: a large number of armored vehicles were burned or captured, some units (for example, the 131st separate Maikop motorized rifle brigade) were surrounded and suffered significant losses. At the same time, a similar situation unfolded in all directions.

The only exception is the actions of the 8th Guards Army Corps under the command of General L. Ya. Rokhlin. When the corps troops were drawn into the capital of Chechnya, posts were set up at key points in close proximity to each other. Thus, the danger of cutting off the grouping of the hull was somewhat reduced. However, soon the troops of the corps were also surrounded in Grozny.

Already on January 1, 1995, it became clear that the attempt of Russian troops to take Grozny by storm had failed. The troops of the Western and Northwestern groups were forced to retreat from the city, preparing for new battles. The time has come for protracted battles for every building, for every quarter. At the same time, the Russian command made quite the right conclusions, and the troops changed tactics: now the actions were carried out by small (no more than a platoon), but very mobile air assault groups.

In order to carry out the blockade of Grozny from the south, the Southern Group was formed in early February, which soon managed to cut the Rostov-Baku highway and interrupt the supply and reinforcements to the militants in Grozny from the southern mountainous regions of Chechnya. In the capital itself, Chechen bandit formations gradually retreated under the blows of Russian troops, suffering noticeable losses. Grozny finally came under the control of Russian troops on March 6, 1995, when the remnants of the separatist troops retreated from his last region - Chernorechye.

Fighting in 1995

After the capture of Grozny, the Joint Group of Forces was faced with the task of occupying the flat regions of Chechnya and depriving the militants of the bases located here. At the same time, Russian troops sought to have good relations with the civilian population, persuading them not to provide assistance to the militants. Such tactics very soon brought results: by March 23, the city of Argun was taken, and by the end of the month - Shali and Gudermes. The most fierce and bloody were the battles for the settlement of Bamut, which was never taken until the end of the year. However, the results of the March battles were very successful: almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya was cleared of the enemy, and the morale of the troops was high.

After taking control of the flat territories of Chechnya, the command of the United Forces declared a temporary moratorium on the conduct of hostilities. This was due to the need to regroup the troops, put them in order, as well as the possible start of peace negotiations. However, it was not possible to reach any agreement, therefore, already on May 11, 1995, new battles began. Now Russian troops rushed to the Argun and Vedeno gorges. However, here they encountered the stubborn defense of the enemy, as a result of which they were forced to begin maneuvering. Initially, the direction of the main attack was the settlement of Shatoy; soon the direction was changed to Vedeno. As a result, Russian troops managed to defeat the separatist forces and take control of the main part of the territory of the Chechen Republic.

However, it became clear that with the transfer of the main settlements of Chechnya under Russian control, the war would not end. This was especially clear on June 14, 1995, when a group of Chechen fighters under the command of Shamil Basayev managed to seize the city hospital in the city of Budyonnovsk, Stavropol Territory (which is located about 150 kilometers from Chechnya) in a daring raid, taking about one and a half thousand people hostage. It is noteworthy that this terrorist act was carried out exactly when the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin announced that the war in Chechnya was practically over. Initially, the terrorists put forward conditions such as the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, but then, over time, they demanded money and a bus to Chechnya.

The effect of the seizure of the hospital in Budyonnovsk was like a bombshell: the public was shocked by such a daring and, most importantly, successful terrorist attack. It was a serious blow to the prestige of Russia and the Russian army. In the following days, the hospital complex was stormed, resulting in heavy losses among both the hostages and the security forces. Ultimately, the Russian leadership decided to comply with the terrorists' demands and allowed them to take buses to Chechnya.

After the hostage-taking in Budyonnovsk, negotiations began between the Russian leadership and the Chechen separatists, at which on June 22 they managed to achieve a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period. However, this moratorium was systematically violated by both sides.

So, it was assumed that local self-defense units would take control over the situation in Chechen settlements. However, under the guise of such detachments, militants with weapons often returned to the villages. As a result of such violations, local battles went on throughout the territory of the republic.

The peace process continued, but it ended on October 6, 1995. On this day, an attempt was made on the life of the commander of the United Group of Forces, Lieutenant General Anatoly Romanov. Immediately after that, "retaliation strikes" were inflicted on some Chechen settlements, and there was also some intensification of hostilities on the territory of the republic.

A new round of escalation of the Chechen conflict took place in December 1995. On the 10th, Chechen detachments under the command of Salman Raduev suddenly occupied the city of Gudermes, which was held by Russian troops. Nevertheless, the Russian command assessed the situation in a timely manner, and already during the battles on December 17-20, they again returned the city to their hands.

In mid-December 1995, presidential elections were held in Chechnya, in which the main pro-Russian candidate, Doku Zavgaev, won with a huge advantage (gaining about 90 percent). The separatists did not recognize the results of the elections.

Fighting in 1996

On January 9, 1996, a group of Chechen fighters raided the city of Kizlyar and a helicopter base. They managed to destroy two Mi-8 helicopters, as well as take a hospital and 3,000 civilians as hostages. The requirements were similar to those in Budyonnovsk: the provision of transport and a corridor for the unimpeded escape of terrorists to Chechnya. The Russian leadership, taught by the bitter experience of Budyonnovsk, decided to fulfill the conditions of the militants. However, already on the way, it was decided to prevent the terrorists, as a result of which they changed the plan and made a raid on the village of Pervomayskoye, which was captured by them. This time it was decided to take the village by storm and destroy the separatist forces, but the assault ended in complete failure and losses among the Russian troops. The stalemate around Pervomaisky was observed for several more days, but on the night of January 18, 1996, the militants broke through the encirclement and left for Chechnya.

The next high-profile episode of the war was the March raid of militants on Grozny, which came as a complete surprise to the Russian command. As a result, the Chechen separatists managed to temporarily take over the Staropromyslovsky district of the city, as well as seize considerable stocks of food, medicines and weapons. After that, the fighting on the territory of Chechnya flared up with renewed vigor.

On April 16, 1996, near the village of Yaryshmardy, a Russian military convoy was ambushed by militants. As a result of the battle, the Russian side suffered huge losses, and the column lost almost all of its armored vehicles.

As a result of the fighting in early 1996, it became clear that the Russian army, which managed to inflict significant defeats on the Chechens in open battles, turned out to be fatally unprepared for a guerrilla war, similar to the one that took place some 8-10 years ago in Afghanistan. Alas, the experience of the Afghan war, invaluable and obtained with blood, was quickly forgotten.

On April 21, near the village of Gekhi-Chu, an air-to-ground missile fired by a Su-25 attack aircraft killed Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev. As a result, it was expected that the decapitated Chechen side would become more accommodating, and the war would soon be stopped. The reality, as usual, was more complicated.

By the beginning of May, a situation had matured in Chechnya when it was possible to start negotiations on a peaceful settlement. There were several reasons for this. The first and main reason was the general weariness from the war. The Russian army, although it had a fairly high morale and enough experience to conduct hostilities, still could not ensure full control over the entire territory of the Chechen Republic. The militants also suffered losses, and after the elimination of Dudayev, they were determined to start peace negotiations. The local population suffered the most from the war and, naturally, did not want to continue the bloodshed on their land. Another important reason was the upcoming presidential elections in Russia, in order to win in which B. Yeltsin simply needed to stop the conflict.

As a result of peaceful negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides, an agreement was reached on a ceasefire from June 1, 1996. Ten days later, an agreement was also reached on the withdrawal of Russian units from Chechnya, except for two brigades, whose task was to maintain order in the region. However, after Yeltsin won the election in July 1996, hostilities resumed.

The situation in Chechnya continued to worsen. On August 6, the militants launched Operation Jihad, the purpose of which was to show not only Russia, but the whole world that the war in the region is far from over. This operation began with a massive separatist attack on the city of Grozny, which again came as a complete surprise to the Russian command. Within a few days, most of the city fell under the control of the militants, and the Russian troops, having a serious numerical advantage, did not manage to hold a number of points in Grozny. Part of the Russian garrison was blocked, part was driven out of the city.

Simultaneously with the events in Grozny, the militants managed to capture the city of Gudermes practically without a fight. In Argun, Chechen separatists entered the city, occupied it almost completely, but ran into stubborn and desperate resistance from Russian military personnel in the area of ​​the commandant's office. Nevertheless, the situation was truly threatening - Chechnya could easily "blaze".

Results of the First Chechen War

On August 31, 1996, an agreement was signed between representatives of the Russian and Chechen sides on a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya and the actual end of the war. However, the final decision on the legal status of Chechnya was postponed until December 31, 2001.

The opinions of various historians regarding the correctness of such a step as signing a peace treaty in August 1996 are sometimes diametrically opposed. There is an opinion that the war was over at the very moment when the militants could be completely defeated. The situation in Grozny, where the separatist troops were surrounded and methodically destroyed by the Russian army, indirectly proves this. However, on the other hand, the Russian army is morally tired of the war, which just confirms the rapid capture by militants of such large cities as Gudermes and Argun. As a result, the peace treaty signed in Khasavyurt on August 31 (better known as the Khasavyurt agreements) was the lesser of two evils for Russia, because the army needed a respite and reorganization, the state of affairs in the republic was close to critical and threatened with major losses for the army. However, this is the subjective opinion of the author.

The result of the First Chechen War can be called a classic draw, when none of the warring parties can be firmly called a winner or a loser. Russia continued to put forward its rights to the Chechen Republic, and as a result, Chechnya managed to defend its “independence”, albeit with numerous nuances. In general, the situation has not changed dramatically, except that in the next few years the region has undergone even more significant criminalization.

As a result of this war, Russian troops lost approximately 4,100 people killed, 1,200 missing, and about 20 thousand wounded. The exact number of militants killed, as well as the number of dead civilians, is not possible to establish. It is only known that the command of the Russian troops calls the figure of 17,400 killed separatists; the chief of staff of the militants A. Maskhadov announced the loss of 2,700 people.

After the First Chechen War, presidential elections were held in the rebellious republic, in which Aslan Maskhadov quite naturally won. However, the elections and the end of the war did not bring peace to the Chechen land.

If you have any questions - leave them in the comments below the article. We or our visitors will be happy to answer them.

Corpses in the back of a truck in Grozny. Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Exactly 23 years ago, on December 11, 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree "On measures to ensure the rule of law, law and order and public security on the territory of the Chechen Republic." On the same day, units of the Joint Group of Forces (Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Internal Affairs) began hostilities in Chechnya. Maybe some of the participants in the first clashes were mentally prepared for death, but it is unlikely that any of them suspected that they would get stuck in this war for almost two years. And then it will come back again.

I would not like to talk about the causes and consequences of the war, about the behavior of the main actors, about the number of losses, about whether it was a civil war or an anti-terrorist operation: hundreds of books have already been written about this. But many photographs must be shown so that you never forget how disgusting any war is.

Russian Mi-8 helicopter shot down by Chechens near Grozny. December 1, 1994


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Despite the fact that the Russian army officially began hostilities in December 1994, back in November, the first Russian soldiers were captured by the Chechens.


Photo: AP Photo / Anatoly Maltsev

Dudayev's militants pray in front of the Presidential Palace in Grozny


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

In January 1995, the palace looked like this:


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Dudayev's militant with a handicraft submachine gun in early January 1995. In Chechnya in those years, various types of weapons were collected, including small arms.

Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Padded BMP-2 of the Russian army


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Prayer against the backdrop of a fire caused by shrapnel falling into a gas pipe

Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Action


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Field commander Shamil Basayev rides in a bus with hostages


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev

Chechen fighters ambushed a column of Russian armored vehicles


Photo: AP PHOTO / ROBERT KING

On the eve of the new year 1995, the clashes in Grozny were especially cruel. The 131st Maykop motorized rifle brigade lost many soldiers.

The militants fire back from the advancing Russian units.


Photo: AP PHOTO / PETER DEJONG

Children play in the suburbs of Grozny


AP PHOTO / EFREM LUKATSKY

Chechen fighters in 1995


Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev / AFP

Photo: Christopher Morris

Minutka Square in Grozny. Evacuation of refugees.

Gennady Troshev at the stadium. Ordzhonikidze in 1995. The lieutenant general led the Joint Group of Forces of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Chechnya, during the Second Chechen War he also commanded Russian troops, then was appointed commander of the North Caucasus Military District. In 2008, he died in a Boeing crash in Perm.

A Russian serviceman plays a piano left in Grozny's central park. February 6, 1995


Photo: Reuters

Intersection of Rosa Luxembourg and Tamanskaya streets


Photo: Christopher Morris

Chechen fighters run for cover


Photo: Christopher Morris

Grozny, view from the Presidential Palace. March 1995


Photo: Christopher Morris

A Chechen sniper who has settled in a destroyed building is aiming at Russian servicemen. 1996


Photo: James Nachtwey

Chechen negotiator enters the neutral zone


Photo: James Nachtwey

Children from the orphanage play on a damaged Russian tank. 1996


Photo: James Nachtwey

An elderly woman makes her way through the ruined center of Grozny. 1996


Photo: Piotr Andrews

Chechen militant holding a machine gun while praying


Photo: Piotr Andrews

A wounded soldier in a hospital in Grozny. 1995


Photo: Piotr Andrews

A woman from the village of Samashki is crying: during the operation of the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, helicopters or RZSO shot her cows.


Photo: Piotr Andrews

Russian checkpoint near the Council of Ministers, 1995


Photo: AP Photo

People left homeless after the bombing of Grozny are cooking on a fire in the middle of the street


Photo: AP Photo / Alexander Zemlianichenko

People are fleeing the war zone

Photo: AP Photo / David Brauchli

The CRI command stated that at the height of the conflict, up to 12 thousand fighters fought for it. Many of them were in fact children who went to war after their relatives.


Photo: AP Photo / Efrem Lukatsky

On the left is a wounded man, on the right is a Chechen teenager in military uniform


Photo: Christopher Morris

By the end of 1995, most of Grozny was a ruin


Photo: AP Photo / Mindaugas Kulbis

Anti-Russian demonstration in the center of Grozny in February 1996


Photo: AP Photo

A Chechen with a portrait of separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev, who was killed in a rocket attack on federal troops on April 21, 1996


Photo: AP Photo

Before the 1996 elections, Yeltsin visited Chechnya and in front of the soldiers signed a decree on the reduction of military service.

Photo: AP Photo

Election campaign

Photo: Piotr Andrews

On August 19, 1996, the commander of the grouping of Russian troops in Chechnya, Konstantin Pulikovsky, issued an ultimatum to the militants. He suggested that civilians leave Grozny within 48 hours. After this period, the assault on the city was to begin, but the commander was not supported in Moscow, and his plan was thwarted.

On August 31, 1996, agreements were signed in Khasavyurt under which Russia undertook to withdraw troops from the territory of Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed for 5 and a half years. In the photo, General Lebed, who was then the presidential envoy in Chechnya, and Aslan Maskhadov, field commander of Chechen fighters and the future "president" of the CRI, are shaking hands.

Russian soldiers drink champagne in the center of Grozny

Russian soldiers are preparing to be sent home after the signing of the Khasavyurt Accords

According to human rights activists, up to 35,000 civilians died during the First Chechen War.


Photo: AP PHOTO / ROBERT KING

In Chechnya, the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements was perceived as a victory. In fact, that's what she was.


Photo: AP Photo / Misha Japaridze

The Russian troops left with nothing, losing many soldiers and leaving ruins behind them.

In 1999, the Second Chechen War will begin ...

The first and second Chechen wars, otherwise known as the "First Chechen conflict" and the "counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus" became, perhaps, the bloodiest pages in Russia's recent history. These military conflicts are striking in their cruelty. They brought terror and explosions of houses with sleeping people to the territory of Russia. But, in the history of these wars, there were people who, perhaps, can be considered criminals no less terrible than terrorists. These are traitors.

Sergei Orel

He fought in the North Caucasus under a contract. In December 1995, he was taken prisoner by militants. They released him a year later and sent the rescued "prisoner of the Caucasus" to Grozny. And then the unbelievable happened: a Russian soldier, languishing in cruel captivity and happily freed, stole a Kalashnikov assault rifle, uniforms and personal belongings from the military prosecutor's office, stole a Ural truck and sped off towards the militants. Here, in fact, it became clear that in captivity Orel was by no means in poverty, but allowed himself to be recruited without much trouble. He converted to Islam, studied sapper business in one of the Khattab camps, and took part in the hostilities. In 1998, with a fake passport in the name of Alexander Kozlov, he showed up in Moscow, where he controlled the construction markets. He transferred the proceeds through special contacts to the Caucasus, to support his “brothers in arms”. This business stopped only when the special services came on the trail of Orel-Kozlov. The defector was tried, and he received a serious sentence.

Limonov and Klochkov

Privates Konstantin Limonov and Ruslan Klochkov in the fall of 1995 decided to somehow go for vodka. They left their checkpoint and went to the village of Katyr-Yurt, where the militants tied them up without any problems. Once in captivity, Limonov and Klochkov did not think for a long time and almost immediately agreed to become guards in the federal POW camp. Limonov even took the name Kazbek. They performed their duties very diligently, surpassing even the Chechens themselves in cruelty. One of the captives, for example, was smashed in the head with a rifle butt. Another was thrown onto a red-hot furnace. The third was beaten to death. Both participated in the execution of sixteen Russian soldiers condemned to death by the Islamists. One of the militants personally showed them an example by cutting the throat of the first convict, and then handed the knife to the traitors as well. Those carried out the order, and then finished off the agonizing soldiers from the machine gun. All this was recorded on video. When in 1997 the federal troops cleared the area where their gang operated, Limonov and Klochkov tried to impersonate the released hostages and hoped that the most serious thing that threatened them was a term for desertion. However, the investigation made their "exploits" known to Russian justice.

Alexander Ardyshev - Seraji Dudayev

In 1995, the unit in which Ardyshev served was transferred to Chechnya. Alexander had very little to serve, just a few weeks. However, he decided to drastically change his life and deserted from the unit. It was in the village of Vedeno. By the way, it cannot be said about Ardyshev that he betrayed his comrades, since he had no comrades. During his service, he was distinguished by the fact that he periodically stole things and money from his fellow soldiers, and there was not a single one among the soldiers of his unit who would treat Ardyshev as a friend. First, he got into the detachment of the field commander Mavladi Khusain, then fought under the command of Isa Madaev, then in the detachment of Khamzat Musaev. Ardyshev converted to Islam and became Seraji Dudayev. Seraji's new job was to guard captives. Stories about how yesterday's Russian soldier Alexander, and now the warrior of Islam Seraji subjected his former colleagues to bullying and torture, are simply terrible to read. He beat the prisoners, shot the unwanted on the orders of his superiors. One soldier, wounded and exhausted by captivity, was forced to memorize the Koran, and when he made a mistake, he was beaten. Once, for the amusement of the militants, he set fire to gunpowder on the back of the unfortunate. He was so sure of his impunity that he did not even hesitate to show up to the Russian side in his new guise. Once he arrived in Vedeno with his commander Mavladi to settle the conflict between local residents and federal troops. Among the federals was his former boss, Colonel Kukharchuk. Ardyshev approached him to show off his new status and threatened him with reprisals.

When the military conflict ended, Seraji got his own house in Chechnya and began to serve in the border and customs service. And then one of the Chechen bandits Sadulayev was convicted in Moscow. His comrades and associates in Chechnya decided that a respected person should be exchanged. And they exchanged for ... Alexander-Seradzhi. The deserter and traitor was completely uninteresting to the new owners. To avoid unnecessary trouble, Seraji was drugged with tea with sleeping pills, and when he passed out, they handed over to the authorities of the Russian Federation. Surprisingly, once outside of Chechnya, Seraji immediately remembered that he was Alexander and began to ask to return to the Russians and Orthodox. He was sentenced to 9 years of strict regime.

Yuri Rybakov

This man, too, was by no means wounded and unconscious in captivity by the militants. He defected to them voluntarily in September 1999. Having undergone special training, he became a sniper. I must say that Rybakov was a good sniper. In just one month, he made 26 notches on the butt of his rifle - one for each “removed” fighter. Rybakov was taken in the village of Ulus-Kert, where federal troops surrounded the militants.

Vasily Kalinkin - Wahid

This man served as an ensign in one of the parts of Nizhny Tagil, and he was stealing big. And when it smelled of fried food, he ran away and joined the army of "free Ichkeria". Here he was sent to study at an intelligence school in one of the Arab countries. Kalinkin converted to Islam, became known as Wahid. They took him in Volgograd, where the newly-minted spy appeared for reconnaissance and preparation of acts of sabotage.

Exactly 20 years ago, the First Chechen War began. On December 11, 1994, President of Russia Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 "On measures to ensure lawfulness, law and order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic." Later, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation recognized most of the decrees and resolutions of the government, which justified the actions of the federal government in Chechnya, as consistent with the Constitution.

On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), which consisted of parts of the Ministry of Defense and the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three different sides - from the west from North Ossetia through Ingushetia, from the northwest from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, which directly borders Chechnya, and from the east from the territory of Dagestan.

Why did the First Chechen War start? I discussed this topic in my book Russian Ideas and Russian Business. You can't blame everything on personal hostile relations between Yeltsin and Khasbulatov, and then Dudayev. Some suggest that they fought because of "black gold", but this is not true, because large reserves of oil are produced in Siberia and processed in the Urals. Moreover, in those days there was a shortage of oil in the Chechen Republic, so it was brought to Grozny even during the war.

What are the real causes of the war?! In my opinion, everything is simple and tragic. The year was 1994, Parliament was shot down last fall, the American dictatorship reigns in the country - dozens of omniscient and omniscient Washington advisers sat in each ministry. What was their problem? It was necessary to finally dispose of the Russian state. But how can this be achieved if Russia still has powerful armed forces capable of challenging the United States?! Let me remind you that in those days China was weak, although even now it is not so strong. And Saddam Hussein was given a demonstrative flogging back in 1991. What should the American advisers do, because it will not be possible to simply disband the powerful armed forces. Therefore, it was decided to carry out a reform that would destroy the Russian army, but present it as a necessary and urgent solution. What is needed for this?! Little dirty shamefully lost war! As a result of this action, to demand reforms, since supposedly everything is bad and wrong in the army. In addition, a defeat in Chechnya would herald a "parade of sovereignties" and then the collapse of Russia. Chechnya would be followed by the remaining republics of the country. It was precisely such deep-reaching plans that American advisers hatched.

Until then, Dudayev's Ichkeria had been fed for three years already, starting in the autumn of 1991, when the Maidan took place in Grozny and the former head of the republic was overthrown, and Dudayev seized power. For all three years, Chechnya did not recognize itself as part of Russia, although money was regularly flowing into the republic for the social needs of the population - salaries, pensions, benefits. In turn, Russia did not receive a penny from Chechnya, oil was driven to an oil refinery in Grozny. The republic became in those days a zone where the mafia had its own territorial and political entity. The puppeteers understood that the Chechens are courageous and excellent warriors. It was in Latvia in August 1991 that 140 Riga riot police calmly established Soviet power on the territory of the republic. However, such a scenario will not work in Chechnya. The Americans counted on the military impulse of the Chechens, stuffing them with weapons and choosing the right time - the sunset of 1994. Military operations began in winter, when the numerical and technical superiority of the federal forces, otherwise they were called "federals", came to naught in the mountains. Starting a war in December in the mountains is very difficult. But, nevertheless, it was for this reason that the war was started. The puppeteers counted on the shameful defeat of the Russian army, after which they would sign a peace treaty and the purge of the armed forces would begin. The Chechen war was conceived as a huge defeat for Russia, so it began in December, at the most inopportune time. For unknown reasons, not only Yeltsin, who was operated on, but also the generals were absent from the post of Commander-in-Chief. The guys who were drafted into the army in the spring and autumn of 1994 were thrown into the war! The calculation was based on the defeat of the armed forces, but as always, when the headquarters calculate how to defeat Russia, it turns out not at all what was intended.

From a military point of view, there were no defeats in the First Chechen War. Of course, there were failures at the beginning of the assault on Grozny, but, albeit with heavy losses, the city was taken and cleared of terrorists. At that time, there were also suspicious nuances when they demanded that the military take off their bulletproof vests, etc. If there were private military failures, then all of them were explained by betrayal in the headquarters, because the Chechens knew almost everything. A special forces officer who participated in the First Chechen War told me a story about how the Chechens put up a banner with congratulations on the birthday of the commander of the unit, his last name, first name, patronymic, the name of the military unit that had just arrived in Grozny. They knew not only secret information, but also the personal data of the commanders.

The most important headquarters was the first traitor in that war, which was started with the aim of shamefully losing the federal forces. But it didn't. As General Lebed said, it was a custom-made military campaign. The Kremlin sometimes declared a truce in order not to defeat the Chechens so quickly. At one time he announced the introduction of a moratorium on aviation flights, although from the point of view of common sense it was possible in the spring, when there was no dense greenery, to destroy bandit formations with the help of air bombardments. Human rights activists were let loose on the military like dogs. The entire Russian “fourth power” fought for Dudaev, and the soldiers were called “federals”. This word has an ironic connotation, while the population was not yet accustomed to this term. Puppeteers also created legends about bandits, they were sung about as freedom fighters, constantly spitting in the back of Russian soldiers!

This is an indicator of how our society has changed because of that war. Many people began to move away from the intoxication that had been going on since the times of "glasnost" and perestroika. An attempt to create an anti-war movement failed. Government figures - Gaidar, Yavlinsky - suddenly began to speak at rallies against the war in Chechnya! One of two things - if you are against the war, then resign, if you are for it, then do not interfere. The calculation was for the emergence of an anti-war movement along with the dispersal of the army, which would have thrown a tantrum, which would have led to the collapse of the army. But the eighteen-year-old conscripts took it and broke the spines of the Chechen wolves. What about military generals? Let's remember Rokhlin, Babichev, Kvashnin! All these generals of the First Chechen War showed extraordinary abilities, fighting against the Chechens.

After the start of finishing off the bandits, the famous strange provocation followed - the Chechens captured Grozny while our troops went on maneuvers, and only the police remained in the city. Newspapers write at lightning speed about the imminent capture of Grozny by the Chechens. But when General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov blockaded the city, intending to destroy the militants with artillery fire, General Lebed flew in and signed the capitulation in Khasavyurt. There was only one defeat in the First Chechen War - political. Militarily, despite a series of frequent setbacks, the war was won. The capitulation in Khasavyurt was signed after the almost complete destruction of the gang. The shameful role in this case was played by the media and traitors at the top.

From 1996 to 1999, Chechnya was again stewing in its own juice. By this time, after a decade of frantic glorification of liberalism, “Russification” had taken place in Russia. The press covered the beginning of the Second Chechen War (1999-2000) in a completely different way. Has this war ended, given the recent terrorist attack in Chechnya? Unfortunately, wars have been going on in the Caucasus for tens and hundreds of years.

To some extent, the opinion that the Kremlin feeds the Caucasus is partly true. Masses of people with weapons were busy with something in these small conditions. No matter how we finance Chechnya, where over 90% of the revenue comes from the federal budget, no matter how it sounds, it is still cheaper than war.

Now an interesting situation has developed in the Caucasus. On the one hand, they were well beaten, but, on the other hand, they began to be appeased and respected. After a certain time, they will forget how they got hit in the neck. Appeasing sooner or later will lead to what they say - not enough, let's have more money! In order to avoid war, the Kremlin pursued a policy that at first was effective and brought good results - it relied on local figures, including Akhmat and Ramzan Kadyrov. As long as it's effective. He managed to quite calmly integrate many militants into the normal life. In the Caucasus, as the tsarist and Soviet experience shows, the most effective was the governor-general headed by a Russian general. Why precisely Russian?! Chechens are people of a clan society, and when one of the Chechens is in power, other clans may feel offended. So far, the current policy in Chechnya is producing a good result, but it cannot be continued for a long time. Care must be taken to avoid a war that could flare up with renewed vigor!

The security forces drew conclusions from the two Chechen wars. Vladimir Putin came to power in 1999-2000 with considerable support, primarily from the security forces. Among them there were many people associated with the Chechen war, so they were determined to prevent formations like Ichkeria from appearing on Russian territory. It is impossible not to admit that a number of military leaders who made their careers in both Chechen wars entered the military-political elite. Of course, there are not many of them, but they are. Recall that Shamanov was not very effective, but still the governor, and General Troshev was engaged in the revival of the Cossacks. These are the promoters of two Chechen wars.

The Kremlin made a conclusion about the media and about public organizations, such as "Soldiers' Mothers". The conclusions drawn are correct - it is impossible to completely ban and close such organizations, creating an aura of martyrdom for them, otherwise the Kremlin will be suspected of hiding something. The Kremlin put them on a short leash. Now a certain citizen Vasilyeva is trying to repeat the experience of human rights activists of the 90s. She created the “Gruz-200” society, gives interviews and tries to prove something about the huge number of soldiers who died in the Donbass. Vasilyeva's fantasies have dried up, so she lists all sorts of football teams, where all the dead, or simply takes the numbers from the lantern. Such personalities must be deftly neutralized, directing them to a marginal sphere.

If we compare the information field of 1994 and the current one, it is heaven and earth. Of course, the victory is not final, but Putin's rating is known, which is recognized with gnashing teeth by Western figures who speak from the position of Chechen terrorists, "white ribbons", liberals and other anti-Putin opposition. Who are these pussies, writers, who have declared their desire to emigrate?! For example, Akunin wants to be expelled from the country in disgrace, as Solzhenitsyn did in his time. Akunin was told to go! Who needs him over the hill?! It is very awkward to leak the opposition, showing what it is, without forbidding it.

In Soviet times, everything was forbidden, many people spoke in enthusiastic tones about Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov. But then they read what Sakharov writes. Some daredevils who are trying to overcome the burden of Solzhenitsyn's novels are perplexed, what did these authors want to say, did they really have such an influence on the minds?! Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov would not have had that influence if they had not been silenced, but had been allowed to speak, as they say, aside.

The Kremlin learned the lessons of the First Chechen War. It was with the reliance on the security forces that the regime changed with the advent of Putin. The Kremlin has realized the role of the media, and the fight against them should be conducted not so primitively, in the spirit of "take it and close it." Speaking in pathetic language, the guys who died in Chechnya did not die in vain! In Russia, it was possible to overcome the real disintegration of the country, to preserve the armed forces, which received a certain hardening and experience. As often happens, Russia was eager to destroy, but everything turned out the other way around, the country grew stronger in spite of its enemies.

Armed conflict in 1994-1996 (the first Chechen war)

The Chechen armed conflict of 1994-1996 - hostilities between the Russian federal troops (forces) and the armed formations of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, created in violation of the legislation of the Russian Federation.

In the autumn of 1991, in the context of the beginning of the collapse of the USSR, the leadership of the Chechen Republic announced the state sovereignty of the republic and its secession from the USSR and the RSFSR. The bodies of Soviet power on the territory of the Chechen Republic were dissolved, the laws of the Russian Federation were canceled. The formation of the armed forces of Chechnya began, headed by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief President of the Chechen Republic Dzhokhar Dudayev. Defense lines were built in Grozny, as well as bases for waging a sabotage war in mountainous regions.

The Dudayev regime had, according to the calculations of the Ministry of Defense, 11-12 thousand people (according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, up to 15 thousand) regular troops and 30-40 thousand armed militia, of which 5 thousand were mercenaries from Afghanistan, Iran, Jordan, the republics of the North Caucasus and etc.

On December 9, 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2166 "On Measures to Suppress the Activities of Illegal Armed Groups on the Territory of the Chechen Republic and in the Ossetian-Ingush Conflict Zone." On the same day, the Government of the Russian Federation adopted Decree No. 1360, which provided for the disarmament of these formations by force.

On December 11, 1994, the advance of troops began in the direction of the Chechen capital - the city of Grozny. On December 31, 1994, troops, on the orders of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, began the assault on Grozny. Russian armored columns were stopped and blocked by Chechens in different parts of the city, combat units of the federal forces that entered Grozny suffered heavy losses.

(Military encyclopedia. Moscow. In 8 volumes 2004)

The further course of events was extremely negatively affected by the failure of the eastern and western groupings of troops, and the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs also failed to complete the task.

Fighting stubbornly, federal troops took Grozny by February 6, 1995. After the capture of Grozny, the troops began to destroy illegal armed formations in other settlements and in the mountainous regions of Chechnya.

From April 28 to May 12, 1995, in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, a moratorium was implemented on the use of armed force in Chechnya.

Illegal armed formations (IAF), using the negotiation process that had begun, carried out the redeployment of part of the forces from the mountainous regions to the locations of Russian troops, formed new groups of militants, fired at checkpoints and positions of federal forces, organized terrorist attacks on an unprecedented scale in Budyonnovsk (June 1995), Kizlyar and Pervomaisky (January 1996).

On August 6, 1996, after heavy defensive battles, federal troops left Grozny, having suffered heavy losses. The illegal armed formations also entered Argun, Gudermes and Shali.

On August 31, 1996, ceasefire agreements were signed in Khasavyurt, ending the first Chechen war. After the conclusion of the agreement, the troops were withdrawn from the territory of Chechnya within the shortest possible time from September 21 to December 31, 1996.

On May 12, 1997, the Treaty on Peace and Principles of Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was concluded.

The Chechen side, not observing the terms of the agreement, took a line towards the immediate withdrawal of the Chechen Republic from Russia. Terror in relation to the employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and representatives of local authorities intensified, attempts to rally around Chechnya on an anti-Russian basis the population of other North Caucasian republics intensified.

Counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya in 1999-2009 (second Chechen war)

In September 1999, a new phase of the Chechen military campaign began, which was called the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus (CTO). The reason for the start of the operation was the massive invasion of Dagestan on August 7, 1999 from the territory of Chechnya by militants under the overall command of Shamil Basayev and the Arab mercenary Khattab. The group included foreign mercenaries and Basayev's militants.

For more than a month there were battles between the federal forces and the invading militants, which ended with the fact that the militants were forced to retreat from the territory of Dagestan back to Chechnya.

On the same days - September 4-16 - in several Russian cities (Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buynaksk) a series of terrorist acts were carried out - explosions of residential buildings.

Given Maskhadov's inability to control the situation in Chechnya, the Russian leadership decided to conduct a military operation to destroy the militants in Chechnya. On September 18, the borders of Chechnya were blocked by Russian troops. On September 23, the President of the Russian Federation issued a Decree "On Measures to Increase the Efficiency of Counter-Terrorist Operations on the Territory of the North Caucasus Region of the Russian Federation", which provides for the creation of a Joint Group of Troops (Forces) in the North Caucasus to carry out counter-terrorist operations.

On September 23, Russian aviation began bombing the capital of Chechnya and its environs. On September 30, a ground operation began - armored units of the Russian army from the Stavropol Territory and Dagestan entered the territory of the Naur and Shelkovsky regions of the republic.

In December 1999, the entire flat part of the territory of the Chechen Republic was liberated. The militants concentrated in the mountains (about 3,000 people) and settled in Grozny. On February 6, 2000, Grozny was taken under the control of federal forces. To fight in the mountainous regions of Chechnya, in addition to the eastern and western groups operating in the mountains, a new grouping "Center" was created.

On February 25-27, 2000, the "West" units blocked Kharsenoy, and the "Vostok" group closed the militants in the area of ​​Ulus-Kert, Dachu-Borzoy, Yaryshmardy. On March 2, Ulus-Kert was liberated.

The last large-scale operation was the liquidation of Ruslan Gelaev's group in the area of ​​the village. Komsomolskoye, which ended on March 14, 2000. After that, the militants switched to sabotage and terrorist methods of warfare, and the federal forces countered the terrorists with the actions of special forces and operations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

During the CTO in Chechnya in 2002, a hostage-taking took place in the Theater Center on Dubrovka in Moscow. In 2004, a hostage-taking took place at school number 1 in the city of Beslan in North Ossetia.

By the beginning of 2005, after the destruction of Maskhadov, Khattab, Baraev, Abu al-Walid and many other field commanders, the intensity of the sabotage and terrorist activities of the militants had significantly decreased. The only large-scale operation of the militants (a raid on Kabardino-Balkaria on October 13, 2005) ended in failure.

From midnight on April 16, 2009, the National Anti-Terrorist Committee (NAC) of Russia, on behalf of President Dmitry Medvedev, abolished the CTO regime on the territory of the Chechen Republic.

The material was prepared on the basis of information from open sources