International conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Causes of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh

Armenian soldiers in positions in Nagorno-Karabakh

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict became one of the ethno-political conflicts of the second half of the 1980s on the territory of the then Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to large-scale structural shifts in the sphere of ethno-national relations. The confrontation between the national republics and the union center, which caused a systemic crisis and the beginning of centrifugal processes, revived the long-standing processes of ethnic and national character. State-legal, territorial, socio-economic, geopolitical interests intertwined into one knot. The struggle of some republics against the union center in a number of cases turned into a struggle of autonomies against their republican "mother countries". Such conflicts were, for example, the Georgian-Abkhazian, Georgian-Ossetian, Transnistrian conflicts. But the most large-scale and bloody, which escalated into an actual war between two independent states, was the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAO), later the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). In this confrontation, a line of ethnic confrontation of the parties immediately arose, and the warring parties were formed along ethnic lines: Armenian-Azerbaijanis.

The Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation in Nagorno-Karabakh has a long history. It should be noted that the territory of Karabakh was annexed to the Russian Empire in 1813 as part of the Karabakh Khanate. Interethnic contradictions led to major Armenian-Azerbaijani clashes in 1905-1907 and 1918-1920. In May 1918, in connection with the revolution in Russia, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic appeared. However, the Armenian population of Karabakh, whose territory became part of the ADR, refused to obey the new authorities. Armed confrontation continued until the establishment of Soviet power in the region in 1920. Then the units of the Red Army, together with the Azerbaijani troops, managed to suppress the Armenian resistance in Karabakh. In 1921, by decision of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh was left within the boundaries of the Azerbaijan SSR with broad autonomy granted. In 1923, the regions of the Azerbaijan SSR with a predominantly Armenian population were united into the Autonomous Region of Nagorno-Karabakh (AONK), which since 1937 became known as the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAO). At the same time, the administrative boundaries of the autonomy did not coincide with the ethnic ones. The Armenian leadership from time to time raised the issue of transferring Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, but in the center it was decided to establish the status quo in the region. Socio-economic tensions in Karabakh escalated into riots in the 1960s. At the same time, the Karabakh Armenians felt infringed on their cultural and political rights in the territory of Azerbaijan. However, the Azeri minority, both in the NKAR and within the Armenian SSR (which did not have its own autonomy), made counter accusations of discrimination.

Since 1987, the dissatisfaction of the Armenian population with their socio-economic situation has increased in the region. There were accusations against the leadership of the Azerbaijan SSR of maintaining the economic backwardness of the region, of infringing on the rights, culture and identity of the Armenian minority in Azerbaijan. In addition, the existing problems, previously hushed up, after Gorbachev came to power, quickly became the property of wide publicity. At the rallies in Yerevan, caused by dissatisfaction with the economic crisis, there were calls to transfer the NKAO to Armenia. Nationalist Armenian organizations and the nascent national movement fueled the protests. The new leadership of Armenia was openly opposed to the local nomenklatura and the ruling communist regime as a whole. Azerbaijan, in turn, remained one of the most conservative republics of the USSR. Local authorities, headed by H. Aliyev, suppressed all kinds of political dissent and remained loyal to the center to the last. In contrast to Armenia, where most of the party functionaries expressed their readiness to cooperate with the national movement, the Azerbaijani political leadership was able to retain power until 1992 in the fight against the so-called. national democratic movement. However, the leadership of the Azerbaijan SSR, state and law enforcement agencies, using the old levers of influence, were not ready for the events in the NKAO and Armenia, which, in turn, provoked mass demonstrations in Azerbaijan, which created conditions for uncontrolled crowd behavior. In turn, the Soviet leadership, who feared that the speeches in Armenia on the annexation of the NKAR, could lead not only to a revision of the national-territorial borders between the republics, but could also lead to the uncontrolled collapse of the USSR. The demands of the Karabakh Armenians and the public of Armenia were considered by him as manifestations of nationalism, contrary to the interests of the working people of the Armenian and Azerbaijan SSR.

During the summer of 1987 - winter of 1988. On the territory of the NKAR, mass protests of Armenians were held, demanding secession from Azerbaijan. In a number of places, these protests escalated into clashes with the police. At the same time, representatives of the Armenian intellectual elite, public, political and cultural figures tried to actively lobby for the reunification of Karabakh with Armenia. Signatures were collected from the population, delegations were sent to Moscow, representatives of the Armenian diaspora abroad tried to draw the attention of the international community to the aspirations of Armenians for reunification. At the same time, the Azerbaijani leadership, which declared the unacceptability of revising the borders of the Azerbaijan SSR, pursued a policy of using the usual levers to regain control over the situation. A large delegation of representatives of the leadership of Azerbaijan and the republican party organization was sent to Stepanakert. The group also included the heads of the Republican Ministry of Internal Affairs, the KGB, the Prosecutor's Office and the Supreme Court. This delegation condemned "extremist-separatist" sentiments in the region. In response to these actions, a mass rally was organized in Stepanakert on the reunification of the NKAO and the Armenian SSR. On February 20, 1988, the session of people's deputies of the NKAR addressed the leadership of the Azerbaijan SSR, the Armenian SSR and the USSR with a request to consider and positively resolve the issue of transferring the NKAR from Azerbaijan to Armenia. However, the Azerbaijani authorities and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU refused to recognize the demands of the regional council of the NKAR. The central authorities continued to state that the redrawing of borders was unacceptable, and calls for the entry of Karabakh into Armenia were declared the intrigues of "nationalists" and "extremists." Immediately after the appeal of the Armenian majority (Azerbaijani representatives refused to take part in the meeting) of the NKAR Regional Council about the separation of Karabakh from Azerbaijan, a slow slide to an armed conflict began. There were first reports of acts of inter-ethnic violence in both ethnic communities. The explosion of the rally activity of the Armenians provoked a response from the Azerbaijani community. It came to clashes with the use of firearms and the participation of law enforcement officers. The first victims of the conflict appeared. In February, a mass strike began in the NKAO, which lasted intermittently until December 1989. On February 22-23, spontaneous rallies were held in Baku and other cities of Azerbaijan in support of the decision of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on the inadmissibility of revising the national-territorial structure.

The pogrom of Armenians in Sumgayit on February 27-29, 1988 became a turning point in the development of the ethnic conflict. According to official figures, 26 Armenians and 6 Azerbaijanis were killed. Similar events took place in Kirovabad (now Ganja), where an armed crowd of Azerbaijanis attacked the Armenian community. However, the densely populated Armenians managed to fight back, which led to casualties on both sides. All this happened with the inaction of the authorities and the rule of law, as some eyewitnesses claimed. As a result of the clashes, flows of Azerbaijani refugees began to flow from the NKAR. Armenian refugees also appeared after the events in Stepanakert, Kirovabad and Shusha, when rallies for the integrity of the Azerbaijan SSR escalated into inter-ethnic clashes and pogroms. Armenian-Azerbaijani clashes also began on the territory of the Armenian SSR. The reaction of the central authorities was the change of party leaders in Armenia and Azerbaijan. On May 21, troops were brought into Stepanakert. According to Azerbaijani sources, the Azerbaijani population was expelled from several cities of the Armenian SSR, and as a result of the strike, obstacles were placed in the NKAR to local Azerbaijanis, who were not allowed to work. In June-July, the conflict took on an inter-republican orientation. The Azerbaijan SSR and the Armenian SSR unleashed the so-called "war of laws". The Supreme Presidium of the AzSSR declared unacceptable the decision of the regional council of the NKAO on secession from Azerbaijan. The Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR agreed to the entry of the NKAR into the Armenian SSR. In July, mass strikes began in Armenia in connection with the decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan SSR. The allied leadership actually took the side of the Azerbaijan SSR on the issue of maintaining the existing borders. After a series of clashes in the NKAO, on September 21, 1988, a curfew and a special situation were introduced. Rally activity on the territory of Armenia and Azerbaijan led to outbreaks of violence against the civilian population and increased the number of refugees who formed two counter streams. In October and the first half of November, the tension increased. Thousands of rallies were held in Armenia and Azerbaijan, in the early elections to the Supreme Council of the Republic of the Armenian SSR, representatives of the Karabakh party won, taking a radical position on the annexation of the NKAR to Armenia. The arrival in Stepanakert of members of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR did not bring any result. In November 1988, the accumulated discontent in society over the results of the policy of the republican authorities regarding the preservation of the NKAR resulted in thousands of rallies in Baku. The death sentence of one of the defendants in the Sumgayit pogrom case, Akhmedov, pronounced by the Supreme Court of the USSR, provoked a wave of pogroms in Baku, which spread throughout Azerbaijan, especially in the cities with Armenian population - Kirovabad, Nakhichevan, Khanlar, Shamkhor, Sheki, Kazakh, Mingachevir. The army and police in most cases did not interfere in the events. At the same time, shelling of border villages on the territory of Armenia began. A special situation was also introduced in Yerevan and rallies and demonstrations were banned, military equipment and battalions with special weapons were brought to the streets of the city. During this time, there is the most massive flow of refugees caused by violence both in Azerbaijan and in Armenia.

By this time, armed formations had begun to form in both republics. At the beginning of May 1989, the Armenians living north of the NKAO began to create the first combat detachments. In the summer of the same year, Armenia introduced a blockade of the Nakhichevan ASSR. As a response, the Popular Front of Azerbaijan imposed an economic and transport blockade on Armenia. On December 1, the Armed Forces of the Armenian SSR and the National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh at a joint meeting adopted resolutions on the reunification of the NKAR with Armenia. Since the beginning of 1990, armed clashes began - mutual artillery shelling on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. During the deportation of Armenians from the Shahumyan and Khanlar regions of Azerbaijan by the Azerbaijani forces, helicopters and armored personnel carriers were used for the first time. On January 15, the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces declared a state of emergency in the NKAR, in the regions of the Azerbaijan SSR bordering it, in the Goris region of the Armenian SSR, as well as on the line of the state border of the USSR on the territory of the Azerbaijan SSR. On January 20, internal troops were brought into Baku to prevent the seizure of power by the Popular Front of Azerbaijan. This led to clashes resulting in up to 140 deaths. Armenian militants began to penetrate into the settlements with the Azerbaijani population, committing acts of violence. Combat clashes between militants and internal troops became more frequent. In turn, units of the Azerbaijani OMON undertook actions to invade Armenian villages, which led to the death of civilians. Azerbaijani helicopters began shelling Stepanakert.

On March 17, 1991, an all-Union referendum on the preservation of the USSR was held, which was supported by the leadership of the Azerbaijan SSR. At the same time, the Armenian leadership, which adopted on August 23, 1990, the declaration of independence of Armenia, in every possible way prevented the holding of a referendum on the territory of the republic. On April 30, the so-called operation "Ring" began, carried out by the forces of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Internal Affairs and the internal troops of the USSR. The purpose of the operation was declared to be the disarmament of illegal armed formations of Armenians. This operation, however, led to the death of a large number of civilians and the deportation of Armenians from 24 settlements on the territory of Azerbaijan. Before the collapse of the USSR, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict escalated, the number of clashes grew, the parties used various types of weapons. From December 19 to 27, the internal troops of the USSR were withdrawn from the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. With the collapse of the USSR and the withdrawal of internal troops from the NKAO, the situation in the conflict zone became uncontrollable. A full-scale war began between Armenia and Azerbaijan for the withdrawal of the NKAO from the latter.

As a result of the division of the military property of the Soviet army, withdrawn from Transcaucasia, the largest part of the weapons went to Azerbaijan. On January 6, 1992, the declaration of independence of the NKAR was adopted. Full-scale hostilities began with the use of tanks, helicopters, artillery and aircraft. The combat units of the Armenian armed forces and the Azerbaijani OMON alternately attacked enemy villages, inflicting heavy losses and damaging civilian infrastructure. On March 21, a temporary week-long truce was concluded, after which, on March 28, the Azerbaijani side launched the largest offensive against Stepanakert since the beginning of the year. The attackers used the Grad system. However, the assault on the NKAO capital ended in vain, the Azerbaijani forces suffered heavy losses, the Armenian military took up their original positions and pushed the enemy back from Stepanakert.

In May, Armenian armed formations attacked Nakhichevan, an Azerbaijani exclave bordering Armenia, Turkey and Iran. From the side of Azerbaijan shelling of the territory of Armenia was carried out. On June 12, the summer offensive of the Azerbaijani troops began, which lasted until August 26. As a result of this offensive, the territories of the former Shahumyan and Mardakert regions of the NKAO came under the control of the Azerbaijani armed forces for a short time. But it was a local success of the Azerbaijani forces. As a result of the Armenian counter-offensive, strategic heights in the Mardakert region were recaptured from the enemy, and the Azerbaijani offensive itself ran out of steam by mid-July. During the hostilities, weapons and specialists of the former USSR Armed Forces were used, mainly by the Azerbaijani side, in particular aviation, anti-aircraft installations. In September-October 1992, the Azerbaijani army made an unsuccessful attempt to block the Lachin corridor - a small section of the territory of Azerbaijan, located between Armenia and the NKAO, controlled by Armenian armed formations. On November 17, a full-scale attack of the NKR army on Azerbaijani positions began, which made a decisive turning point in the war in favor of the Armenians. The Azerbaijani side refused to conduct offensive operations for a long time.

It is worth noting that from the very beginning of the military phase of the conflict, both sides began to accuse each other of using mercenaries in their ranks. In many cases, these accusations were confirmed. Afghan Mujahideen, Chechen mercenaries fought in the armed forces of Azerbaijan, including well-known field commanders Shamil Basayev, Khattab, Salman Raduyev. Turkish, Russian, Iranian and presumably American instructors also operated in Azerbaijan. Armenian volunteers who came from the Middle Eastern countries, in particular from Lebanon and Syria, fought on the side of Armenia. The forces of both sides also included former servicemen of the Soviet Army and mercenaries from the former Soviet republics. Both sides used weapons from the warehouses of the armed forces of the Soviet Army. In early 1992, Azerbaijan received a squadron of combat helicopters and attack aircraft. In May of the same year, the official transfer of weapons from the 4th Combined Arms Army to Azerbaijan began: tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery mounts, including Grad. By June 1, the Armenian side got tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and artillery also from the arsenal of the Soviet Army. The Azerbaijani side actively used aviation and artillery in the bombing of the settlements of the NKAR, the main purpose of which was the exodus of the Armenian population from the territory of the autonomy. As a result of raids and shelling of civilian objects, a large number of civilian casualties were noted. However, the Armenian air defense, initially rather weak, managed to withstand the air raids of the Azerbaijani aviation due to the increase in the number of anti-aircraft installations in the hands of the Armenians. By 1994, the first aircraft appeared in the armed forces of Armenia, in particular, thanks to Russia's assistance in the framework of military cooperation in the CIS.

After repulsing the Summer Offensive of the Azerbaijani troops, the Armenian side switched to active offensive operations. From March to September 1993, as a result of hostilities, Armenian troops managed to take a number of settlements in the NKAO controlled by Azerbaijani forces. In August-September, Russian envoy Vladimir Kazimirov secured a temporary ceasefire that was extended until November. At a meeting with Russian President B. Yeltsin, Azerbaijani President G. Aliyev announced his refusal to resolve the conflict by military means. Negotiations were held in Moscow between the Azerbaijani authorities and representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh. However, in October 1993, Azerbaijan violated the ceasefire and attempted an offensive in the southwestern sector of the NKAO. This offensive was repulsed by the Armenians, who launched a counteroffensive in the southern sector of the front and by November 1 occupied a number of key regions, isolating parts of the Zangilan, Jabrayil and Kubatli regions from Azerbaijan. The Armenian army, thus, occupied the regions of Azerbaijan to the north and south of the NKAO directly.

In January-February, one of the bloodiest battles took place at the final stage of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict - the battle for the Omar Pass. This battle began with the offensive in January 1994 of the Azerbaijani forces on the northern sector of the front. It is worth noting that the fighting took place in the devastated territory, where there were no civilians left, as well as in severe weather conditions, in the highlands. In early February, the Azerbaijanis came close to the city of Kelbajar, occupied a year earlier by Armenian forces. However, the Azerbaijanis failed to build on the initial success. On February 12, the Armenian units launched a counteroffensive, and the Azerbaijani forces had to retreat through the Omar Pass to their original positions. The losses of Azerbaijanis in this battle amounted to 4 thousand people, Armenians 2 thousand. The Kelbajar region remained under the control of the NKR defense forces.

On April 14, 1994, on the initiative of Russia and with the direct participation of the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia, the Council of CIS Heads of State adopted a statement clearly posing the issue of a ceasefire as an urgent need for a settlement in Karabakh.

In April-May, the Armenian forces, as a result of an offensive in the Ter-Ter direction, forced the Azerbaijani troops to retreat. On May 5, 1994, at the initiative of the Interparliamentary Assembly of the CIS, the Parliament of Kyrgyzstan, the Federal Assembly and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, a meeting was held, following which representatives of the governments of Azerbaijan, Armenia and the NKR signed the Bishkek Protocol calling for a ceasefire on the night of May 8-9, 1994 of the year. On May 9, Vladimir Kazimirov, Plenipotentiary Envoy of the President of Russia in Nagorno-Karabakh, prepared an "Agreement on an indefinite ceasefire", which was signed on the same day in Baku by Azerbaijani Defense Minister M. Mammadov. On May 10 and 11, the "Agreement" was signed respectively by the Minister of Defense of Armenia S. Sargsyan and the Commander of the NKR Army S. Babayan. The active phase of the armed confrontation is over.

The conflict was "frozen", according to the agreements reached, the status quo was preserved following the results of hostilities. As a result of the war, the actual independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic from Azerbaijan and its control over the southwestern part of Azerbaijan up to the border with Iran was proclaimed. This included the so-called "security zone": five regions adjacent to the NKR. At the same time, five Azerbaijani enclaves are also controlled by Armenia. On the other hand, Azerbaijan retained control over 15% of the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.

According to various estimates, the losses of the Armenian side are estimated at 5-6 thousand people killed, including among the civilian population. Azerbaijan lost between 4,000 and 7,000 people during the conflict, with the bulk of the losses falling on military units.

The Karabakh conflict has become one of the most bloody and large-scale in the region, yielding in terms of the amount of equipment used and human losses only to two Chechen wars. As a result of the hostilities, severe damage was inflicted on the infrastructure of the NKR and the adjacent regions of Azerbaijan, and caused an exodus of refugees, both from Azerbaijan and from Armenia. As a result of the war, the relationship between Azerbaijanis and Armenians was dealt a severe blow, and the atmosphere of hostility persists to this day. Diplomatic relations were never established between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the armed conflict was mothballed. As a result, isolated cases of combat clashes continue on the demarcation line of the warring parties at the present time.

Ivanovsky Sergey

In the first days of August, there was an escalation of the tension of the conflict in the zone of Nagorno-Karabakh, which led to human casualties.

This confrontation has been going on since 1988. At the same time, since the beginning of the 20th century, the region of Nagorno-Karabakh twice became the scene of bloody Armenian-Azerbaijani clashes. AiF.ru talks about the history and causes of the intercommunal Karabakh conflict, which has long historical and cultural roots, and what led to its aggravation today.

History of the Karabakh conflict

The territory of modern Nagorno-Karabakh in the II century. BC e. was annexed to Greater Armenia and for about six centuries formed part of the province of Artsakh. At the end of the IV century. n. e., during the division of Armenia, this territory was included by Persia in its vassal state - Caucasian Albania. From the middle of the 7th century until the end of the 9th century, Karabakh fell under Arab rule, but in the 9th-16th centuries it became part of the Armenian feudal principality of Khachen. Until the middle of the 18th century, Nagorno-Karabakh was under the rule of the union of Armenian melikdoms of Khamsa. In the second half of the 18th century, Nagorno-Karabakh with a predominantly Armenian population became part of the Karabakh khanate, and in 1813, as part of the Karabakh khanate, under the Gulistan peace treaty, it became part of the Russian Empire.

Karabakh Armistice Commission, 1918. Photo: Commons.wikimedia.org

At the beginning of the 20th century, the region with a predominantly Armenian population twice (in 1905-1907 and in 1918-1920) became the scene of bloody Armenian-Azerbaijani clashes.

In May 1918, in connection with the revolution and the collapse of Russian statehood, three independent states were proclaimed in Transcaucasia, including the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (mainly on the lands of the Baku and Elizavetpol provinces, the Zagatala district), which included the Karabakh region.

The Armenian population of Karabakh and Zangezur, however, refused to obey the ADR authorities. Convened on July 22, 1918 in Shusha, the First Congress of the Armenians of Karabakh proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh an independent administrative and political unit and elected its own People's Government (since September 1918 - the Armenian National Council of Karabakh).

Ruins of the Armenian quarter of the city of Shusha, 1920. Photo: Commons.wikimedia.org / Pavel Shekhtman

The confrontation between the Azerbaijani troops and the Armenian armed groups continued in the region until the establishment of Soviet power in Azerbaijan. At the end of April 1920, Azerbaijani troops occupied the territory of Karabakh, Zangezur and Nakhichevan. By mid-June 1920, the resistance of the Armenian armed groups in Karabakh was suppressed with the help of Soviet troops.

On November 30, 1920, Azrevkom, by its declaration, granted Nagorno-Karabakh the right to self-determination. However, despite the autonomy, the territory continued to remain the Azerbaijan SSR, which led to the tension of the conflict: in the 1960s, socio-economic tensions in the NKAO escalated into mass riots several times.

What happened to Karabakh during perestroika?

In 1987 - early 1988, the dissatisfaction of the Armenian population with their socio-economic situation intensified in the region, which was influenced by the policy of democratization of Soviet public life initiated by the President of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev and the weakening of political restrictions.

Protest moods were fueled by Armenian nationalist organizations, and the actions of the emerging national movement were skillfully organized and directed.

The leadership of the Azerbaijan SSR and the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, for its part, tried to resolve the situation by using the usual command and bureaucratic levers, which turned out to be ineffective in the new situation.

In October 1987, student strikes took place in the region demanding the secession of Karabakh, and on February 20, 1988, the session of the regional Council of the NKAR appealed to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR with a request to transfer the region to Armenia. Thousands of nationalist rallies were held in the regional center, Stepanakert, and Yerevan.

Most of the Azerbaijanis living in Armenia were forced to flee. In February 1988, Armenian pogroms began in Sumgayit, thousands of Armenian refugees appeared.

In June 1988, the Supreme Council of Armenia agreed to the entry of the NKAR into the Armenian SSR, and the Azerbaijani Supreme Council agreed to the preservation of the NKAR as part of Azerbaijan, with the subsequent liquidation of autonomy.

On July 12, 1988, the regional council of Nagorno-Karabakh decided to withdraw from Azerbaijan. At a meeting on July 18, 1988, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR came to the conclusion that it was impossible to transfer the NKAO to Armenia.

In September 1988, armed clashes began between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, which turned into a protracted armed conflict, as a result of which there were large casualties. As a result of the successful military actions of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh in Armenian), this territory got out of the control of Azerbaijan. The decision on the official status of Nagorno-Karabakh was postponed indefinitely.

Speech in support of the secession of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan. Yerevan, 1988 Photo: Commons.wikimedia.org / Gorzaim

What happened to Karabakh after the collapse of the USSR?

In 1991, full-fledged military operations began in Karabakh. Through a referendum (December 10, 1991), Nagorno-Karabakh tried to gain the right to full independence. The attempt failed, and this region became a hostage to the antagonistic claims of Armenia and Azerbaijan's attempts to retain power.

The result of full-scale military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1991 - early 1992 was the complete or partial capture of seven Azerbaijani regions by regular Armenian units. Following this, military operations using the most modern weapons systems spread to internal Azerbaijan and the Armenian-Azerbaijani border.

Thus, until 1994, Armenian troops occupied 20% of the territory of Azerbaijan, destroyed and plundered 877 settlements, while the death toll was about 18 thousand people, and more than 50 thousand were wounded and disabled.

In 1994, with the help of Russia, Kyrgyzstan, as well as the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the CIS in Bishkek, Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan signed a protocol, on the basis of which an agreement was reached on a ceasefire.

What happened in Karabakh in August 2014?

In the zone of the Karabakh conflict at the end of July - in August 2014, there was a sharp escalation of tension, which led to human casualties. On July 31 of this year, skirmishes took place between the troops of the two states on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, as a result of which servicemen from both sides died.

A stand at the entrance to the NKR with the inscription "Welcome to Free Artsakh" in Armenian and Russian. 2010 year. Photo: Commons.wikimedia.org / lori-m

What is Azerbaijan's version of the conflict in Karabakh?

According to Azerbaijan, on the night of August 1, 2014, the reconnaissance and sabotage groups of the Armenian army made an attempt to cross the line of contact between the troops of the two states in the territories of the Aghdam and Terter regions. As a result, four Azerbaijani servicemen were killed.

What is Armenia's version of the conflict in Karabakh?

According to official Yerevan, everything happened exactly the opposite. The official position of Armenia says that an Azerbaijani sabotage group entered the territory of the unrecognized republic and fired at the Armenian territory from artillery and small arms.

At the same time, Baku, according to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Edward Nalbandian, does not agree to the proposal of the world community to investigate incidents in the border zone, which means, therefore, in the opinion of the Armenian side, it is Azerbaijan that is responsible for the violation of the truce.

According to the Armenian Defense Ministry, only during the period of August 4-5 this year, Baku resumed shelling the enemy about 45 times, using artillery, including large-caliber weapons. There were no casualties from Armenia during this period.

What is the version of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) about the conflict in Karabakh?

According to the Defense Army of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR), in the week from July 27 to August 2, Azerbaijan violated the truce regime established since 1994 in the conflict zone in Nagorno-Karabakh 1.5 thousand times, as a result of actions on both sides, about 24 people died. human.

Currently, the exchange of fire between the parties is carried out, including with the use of large-caliber small arms and artillery - mortars, anti-aircraft guns and even thermobaric grenades. Shelling of border settlements also became more frequent.

What is Russia's reaction to the conflict in Karabakh?

The Russian Foreign Ministry regarded the aggravation of the situation, "which entailed significant human casualties," as a serious violation of the 1994 ceasefire agreements. The agency urged "to show restraint, refrain from using force and take immediate measures aimed at stabilizing the situation".

What is the US reaction to the conflict in Karabakh?

The US State Department, in turn, called for the ceasefire to be respected, and for the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to meet at the earliest opportunity and resume dialogue on key issues.

"We also urge the parties to accept the OSCE Chairman-in-Office's proposal to start negotiations that could lead to the signing of a peace agreement," the State Department said.

It is noteworthy that on August 2 Prime Minister of Armenia Hovik Abrahamyan stated that the President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan and the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev may meet in Sochi on 8 or 9 August this year.

Experts consider the strengthening of ethnic separatism to be one of the main factors negatively affecting the provision of regional and international security. A vivid example of this in the post-Soviet space for almost three decades has been the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Initially, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan was artificially provoked from outside, and the levers of pressure on the situation were in different hands, which needed confrontation first for the collapse of the USSR, and then for the Karabakh clan to come to power. In addition, the escalating conflict played into the hands of those major players who intended to strengthen their presence in the region. And, finally, the confrontation made it possible to put pressure on Baku to conclude more profitable oil contracts with it. According to the developed scenario, events began in the NKAO and in Yerevan - Azerbaijanis were fired from their jobs, and people were forced to leave for Azerbaijan. Then pogroms began in the Armenian quarters of Sumgayit and in Baku, which, by the way, was the most international city in Transcaucasia.

Political scientist Sergei Kurginyan said that when Armenians were brutally killed at first in Sumgayit, mocking them and performing certain ritual actions, it was not the Azerbaijanis who did it, but people from outside, hired representatives of international private structures. "We know these representatives by name, we know to which structures they belonged then, to which structures they belong now. These people killed Armenians, involved Azerbaijanis in this case, then killed Azerbaijanis, involved Armenians in this case. Then they pushed Armenians and Azerbaijanis , and this controlled tension began. We saw it all, we saw what was behind it, "the political scientist said.

According to Kurginyan, at that time, “demacratoid and liberoid myths, which had nothing to do with this, were already perceived as the ultimate truth, as something self-evident, as something absolutely correct, they already controlled consciousness. All these viruses had already bit into consciousness, and crowds fled in the right direction, towards their own end, towards their own misfortune, towards their own ultimate misfortune, in which they ended up later. This tactic was later used to stir up other conflicts.

Mamikon Babayan, a columnist for Vestnik Kavkaza, is looking for ways to resolve the conflict.

The Karabakh war has become one of the bloodiest in the post-Soviet space. Peoples with close languages ​​and cultures, who lived side by side for centuries, were divided into two warring camps. More than 18,000 people have died over the long period of the conflict, and this figure is constantly growing.

The population on both sides lives in constant tension due to frequent skirmishes, and the danger of a resumption of large-scale war still remains. And it is not only about the war with the use of firearms. The conflict manifests itself in the section of the common historical and cultural heritage, including national music, architecture, literature, and cuisine.

25 years have passed since the signing of the ceasefire in Karabakh, and every year it is more and more difficult for the Azerbaijani leadership to explain to their society why the richest country in the region continues to experience difficulties in resolving the issue of restoring territorial integrity. Today, a real information war is unfolding in the region. Although full-scale hostilities are no longer underway (with the exception of the escalation in April 2016), the war has become a mental phenomenon. Armenia and Karabakh live in tension, which is maintained by forces interested in destabilizing the region. The atmosphere of militarization is noticeable in the educational programs of school and preschool institutions in Armenia and the unrecognized "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic". The media do not stop talking about the threat they see in the statements of Azerbaijani politicians.

In Armenia, the Karabakh issue divides society into two camps: those who insist on accepting the de facto situation without any concessions, and those who agree on the need to make painful compromises that will help overcome the post-war crisis consequences, including the economic blockade Armenia. It is worth noting that the veterans of the Karabakh war, who are now in power in Yerevan and "NKR", do not consider the condition of surrendering the occupied regions. The ruling elites of the country understand that an attempt to transfer at least part of the disputed territories under the direct control of Baku will lead to rallies in the Armenian capital, and, perhaps, to civil confrontation in the country. Moreover, many veterans categorically refuse to return the "trophy" territories that they managed to win back in the 1990s.

Despite the obvious crisis in relations, both in Armenia and Azerbaijan there is a general awareness of the negative consequences of what is happening. Until 1987, peaceful coexistence was supported by interethnic marriages. There can be no talk of an "eternal war" between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, since throughout history there were no conditions in Karabakh itself due to which the Azerbaijani population could leave the NKAR (Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region).

Meanwhile, representatives of the Armenian diaspora, who were born and raised in Baku, do not pour negativity on their friends and acquaintances from Azerbaijan. "The people cannot be an enemy," - one can often hear from the lips of the older generation of Azerbaijanis when it comes to Karabakh.

Nevertheless, the Karabakh issue remains a lever of pressure on Armenia and Azerbaijan. The problem leaves an imprint on the mental perception of Armenians and Azerbaijanis who live outside the Transcaucasus, which, in turn, serves as a reason for the formation of a negative stereotype of the relationship between the two peoples. To put it simply, the Karabakh problem hinders life, hinders the close attention to the problems of the region's energy security, as well as the implementation of joint transport projects that are beneficial for the entire Transcaucasus. But not a single government dares to take the first step towards a settlement, fearing the end of its political career in case of concessions on the Karabakh issue.

In the understanding of Baku, the beginning of the peace process is concrete steps to liberate part of the lands that are currently seized. Azerbaijan considers these territories occupied, referring to the resolutions of the UN Security Council during the Karabakh war of 1992-1993. In Armenia, the prospect of returning land is an extremely painful topic. This is related to the issue of the safety of the local civilian population. During the post-war years, the occupied territories turned into a "security belt", therefore the surrender of strategic heights and territories is unthinkable for Armenian field commanders. But it was after the seizure of territories that were not part of the NKAR that the most massive expulsion of the civilian population took place. Almost 45% of Azerbaijani refugees come from Agdam and Fuzuli regions, and Agdam itself remains a ghost town today.

Whose territory is this? It is impossible to directly answer this question, since archeology, architectural monuments give every reason to believe that both the Armenian and Turkic presence in the region dates back centuries. It is a common land and a common home for many nations, including those that are in conflict today. For the Azerbaijanis, Karabakh is a matter of national importance, since expulsion and expulsion were carried out. Karabakh for Armenians is the idea of ​​the people's struggle for the right to land. It is difficult to find a person in Karabakh who is ready to agree to the return of the adjacent territories, because this topic is linked to the issue of security. The inter-ethnic tension has not been eliminated in the region, overcoming which it will be possible to say that the Karabakh issue will be resolved soon.

A military clash arose here, since the vast majority of the inhabitants inhabiting the region have Armenian roots. The essence of the conflict is that Azerbaijan makes quite reasonable demands on this territory, however, the inhabitants of the region gravitate more towards Armenia. On May 12, 1994, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh ratified a protocol that established a truce, which resulted in an unconditional ceasefire in the conflict zone.

Excursion into history

Armenian historical sources claim that Artsakh (the ancient Armenian name) was first mentioned in the 8th century BC. According to these sources, Nagorno-Karabakh was part of Armenia in the early Middle Ages. As a result of the aggressive wars of Turkey and Iran in this era, a significant part of Armenia came under the control of these countries. The Armenian principalities, or melikdoms, at that time located on the territory of modern Karabakh, retained a semi-independent status.

Azerbaijan has its own point of view on this issue. According to local researchers, Karabakh is one of the most ancient historical regions of their country. The word “Karabakh” in Azerbaijani is translated as follows: “gara” means black, and “bag” means garden. Already in the 16th century, together with other provinces, Karabakh was part of the Safavid state, and after that it became an independent khanate.

Nagorno-Karabakh during the Russian Empire

In 1805, the Karabakh khanate was subordinated to the Russian Empire, and in 1813, under the Gulistan peace treaty, Nagorno-Karabakh also became part of Russia. Then, under the Treaty of Turkmenchay, as well as an agreement concluded in the city of Edirne, Armenians were resettled from Turkey and Iran and settled in the territories of Northern Azerbaijan, including Karabakh. Thus, the population of these lands is predominantly of Armenian origin.

As part of the USSR

In 1918, the newly created Azerbaijan Democratic Republic gained control over Karabakh. Almost simultaneously, the Armenian Republic puts forward claims to this area, but the ADR claims these claims. In 1921, the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh with the rights of wide autonomy is included in the Azerbaijan SSR. Two years later, Karabakh receives the status (NKAR).

In 1988, the Council of Deputies of the NKAO petitioned the authorities of the AzSSR and the ArmSSR of the republics and proposed to transfer the disputed territory to Armenia. was not satisfied, as a result of which a wave of protest swept through the cities of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. Solidarity demonstrations were also held in Yerevan.

Declaration of Independence

In the early autumn of 1991, when the Soviet Union had already begun to fall apart, the NKAO adopted a Declaration proclaiming the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Moreover, in addition to the NKAR, it included part of the territories of the former AzSSR. According to the results of the referendum held on December 10 of the same year in Nagorno-Karabakh, more than 99% of the population of the region voted for complete independence from Azerbaijan.

It is quite obvious that the referendum was not recognized by the Azerbaijani authorities, and the act of proclamation itself was designated as illegal. Moreover, Baku decided to abolish the autonomy of Karabakh, which it enjoyed in Soviet times. However, the destructive process has already been launched.

Karabakh conflict

For the independence of the self-proclaimed republic, Armenian detachments stood up, which Azerbaijan tried to resist. Nagorno-Karabakh received support from official Yerevan, as well as from the national diaspora in other countries, so the militia managed to defend the region. However, the Azerbaijani authorities still managed to establish control over several regions, which were initially proclaimed part of the NKR.

Each of the opposing sides cites its own statistics of losses in the Karabakh conflict. Comparing these data, we can conclude that 15-25 thousand people died in the three years of sorting out the relationship. At least 25,000 were wounded, and more than 100,000 civilians were forced to leave their places of residence.

Peace settlement

Negotiations, during which the parties tried to resolve the conflict peacefully, began almost immediately after an independent NKR was proclaimed. For example, on September 23, 1991, a meeting was held, which was attended by the presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia, as well as Russia and Kazakhstan. In the spring of 1992, the OSCE established a group for the settlement of the Karabakh conflict.

Despite all the attempts of the international community to stop the bloodshed, it was not until the spring of 1994 that a ceasefire was achieved. On May 5, the Bishkek Protocol was signed, after which the participants ceased fire a week later.

The parties to the conflict have not been able to agree on the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan demands respect for its sovereignty and insists on maintaining its territorial integrity. The interests of the self-proclaimed republic are protected by Armenia. Nagorno-Karabakh is in favor of a peaceful resolution of controversial issues, while the authorities of the republic emphasize that the NKR is able to stand up for its independence.

After the Black January tragedy, tens of thousands of Azerbaijani communists publicly burned their party cards during those hours when a million-strong crowd in Baku followed the funeral procession. Many PFA leaders were arrested, but they were soon released and were able to continue their activities. Vezirov fled to Moscow; Ayaz Mutalibov succeeded him as party leader of Azerbaijan. Mutalibov's rule from 1990 to August 1991 was "calm" by Azerbaijani standards. It was characterized by the "enlightened authoritarianism" of the local nomenclature, which exchanged communist ideology for national symbols and traditions in order to strengthen their power. May 28, the anniversary of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic of 1918-1920, became a national holiday and official tribute was paid to the Islamic religion. Furman notes that the Baku intelligentsia supported Mutalibov during this period. An advisory council was established with the participation of opposition leaders, and it was with the consent of this council that Mutalibov was elected president for the first time by the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan in the fall of 1990. Of the 360 ​​delegates, only 7 were workers, 2 collective farmers and 22 intellectuals. The rest were members of the party-state elite, directors of enterprises and law enforcement officials. The PFA received 31 mandates (10%), and according to Furman, it had little chance of getting more in an environment of relative stability.

After the Black January crisis in Azerbaijan, which led to military clashes between units of the Soviet Army and units of the PFA in Nakhichevan, something like a compromise was reached between Mutalibov and the allied leadership: communist rule is restored in Azerbaijan, but in exchange, the Center provides political support to Mutalibov - for account of Armenia and the Armenian movement in Nagorno-Karabakh. The allied leaders, in turn, sought to support Mutalibov, fearing to lose not only Georgia and Armenia, but the entire Transcaucasus. Attitudes towards Nagorno-Karabakh became even more negative after the ANM won the elections in Armenia in the summer of 1990.

The state of emergency in Nagorno-Karabakh was in fact a regime of military occupation. 157 out of 162 "passport check" operations carried out in 1990, the true purpose of which was to terrorize the civilian population, were carried out in ethnically Armenian villages.

By the autumn of 1990, after elections in all the republics of Transcaucasia, the Communists retained power only in Azerbaijan. Support for the Mutalibov regime became even more important for the Kremlin, which sought to preserve the unity of the USSR (in March 1991, Azerbaijan voted in favor of preserving the USSR). The blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh was strengthened. The strategy, jointly developed by Azerbaijan and high-ranking Soviet military and political figures (especially the future organizers of the August 1991 putsch), provided for the deportation of at least part of the population from the NKAO and adjacent Armenian villages.

The deportation operation was codenamed "Ring". It lasted four months, until the August coup of 1991. During this period, about 10 thousand people were deported from Karabakh to Armenia; military units and riot police devastated 26 villages, killing 140-170 Armenian civilians (37 of them died in the villages of Getashen and Martunashen). Residents of the Azerbaijani villages of the NKAR, speaking to independent observers, also spoke about the massive violations of human rights by Armenian militants. The operations of the Soviet army in Karabakh only led to the progressive demoralization of the troops themselves. Nor did they stop the spread of armed struggle in the region.

Nagorno-Karabakh: declaration of independence

After the failure of the August coup in Moscow, almost all the organizers and inspirers of Operation Ring lost their power and influence. In the same August, military formations in the Shaumyan (Azerbaijani name: Goranboy) region received an order to cease fire and withdraw to their places of permanent deployment. On August 31, the Supreme Council of Azerbaijan adopted a declaration on the restoration of the independent Republic of Azerbaijan, i.e. the one that existed in 1918-1920. For Armenians, this meant that the legal basis for the autonomous status of the Soviet-era NKAO was now being revoked. In response to the declaration of independence of Azerbaijan, the Karabakh side proclaimed the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). This was done on September 2, 1991 at a joint meeting of the regional council of the NKAO and the regional council of the Shaumyan region populated by Armenians. The NKR was proclaimed within the borders of the former Autonomous Okrug and the Shaumyanovsky region (which had not previously been part of the NKAO). On November 26, 1991, the Supreme Council of Azerbaijan adopted a law abolishing the autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh. On December 10, the NKR Supreme Council, consisting exclusively of representatives of the Armenian population, declared its independence and secession from Azerbaijan based on the results of a referendum held among the Armenian population. Armenian legislators have still not resolved the apparent contradiction between the declaration of independence of the NKR and the still pending resolution of the Supreme Council of Armenia of December 1, 1989, according to which Nagorno-Karabakh was reunited with Armenia proper. Armenia stated that it has no territorial claims against Azerbaijan. This position allows Armenia to view the conflict as a bilateral one, in which Azerbaijan and the NKR are involved, while Armenia itself does not directly participate in the conflict. However, Armenia, following the same logic and for fear of worsening its own position in the world community, does not officially recognize the independence of the NKR. In recent years, debates have continued in Armenia on the topic: will the cancellation of the “annexationist” decision of the Armenian parliament of December 1, 1989 and the official recognition of the NKR make a full-scale war with Azerbaijan inevitable (Ter-Petrosyan), or will such recognition help convince the world community that that Armenia is not an aggressor country? The latter point of view, in particular, was defended in June 1993 by Suren Zolyan, secretary of the commission on Artsakh (Karabakh) of the Supreme Council of Armenia. Suren Zolyan argued that until the NKR is recognized as a subject of international relations, the full responsibility for its actions lies with Armenia, which lends some validity to the thesis of Armenian aggression. In Nagorno-Karabakh itself, a certain ambiguity about whether it should be independent, whether to enter Armenia, or whether to ask Russia to join it, is emphasized by the fact that at the end of 1991 the then chairman of the NKR Supreme Council G. Petrosyan sent a letter to Yeltsin with a request for the entry of the NKR into Russia. He did not receive an answer. On December 22, 1994, the NKR parliament elected Robert Kocharyan, who was previously the chairman of the State Defense Committee, as the president of the NKR until 1996.

Armenia and Azerbaijan: the dynamics of the political process

In autumn 1990 Ter-Petrosyan, head of the ANM, won the general elections and became the president of the republic. The ANM, unlike the Armenian opposition, seeks to prevent the republic's direct participation in the Karabakh conflict and is trying with all its might to limit the scope of the conflict. One of the main concerns of the ANM is to establish good relations with the West. The leadership of the ANM is aware that Turkey is a member of NATO and the main ally of the United States in the region. It recognizes the reality, refraining from making claims to the lands of historical Armenia (now located in Turkey), and wishes to develop Armenian-Turkish contacts.

Unlike the ANM, the Dashnaktsutyun (Armenian Revolutionary Federation) party, which is mainly based abroad, among the Armenian diaspora, is predominantly an anti-Turkish party. Currently, its efforts are focused on organizing public pressure in the West to force Turkey to officially condemn the 1915 genocide. The party has a strong position in Karabakh due to its image of a firm, heroic and uncompromising organization, emphasis on military discipline, numerous connections and significant funds abroad . However, there is a sharp rivalry between the Dashnaktsutyun and President Ter-Petrosyan. In 1992, the latter expelled the Dashnak leader Hrayr Marukhyan from Armenia; in December 1994 he suspended the activities of the party, accusing it of terrorism.

Nevertheless, the efforts of the Armenian diaspora have borne fruit. Her lobby in the US Congress in 1992 secured a provision banning any non-humanitarian aid to Azerbaijan until it took "demonstrable steps" to end its blockade of Armenia. In 1993, the United States allocated $195 million to help Armenia (Armenia is in second place, after Russia, in the list of aid recipients among all post-Soviet states); Azerbaijan received 30 million dollars.

Seven opposition parties - including, in addition to the Dashnaks, the National Self-Determination Union, led by former dissident Paruyr Hayrikyan, and the Ramkavar-Azatakan (liberals) - have criticized what they see as Ter-Petrosyan's arbitrariness and arbitrariness in governing the country and the concessions made by the Armenian leadership under pressure from foreign powers and the UN (non-recognition of the NKR, principled consent to the withdrawal of the NKR troops from the occupied ethnically Azerbaijani regions). Despite relative political stability in Armenia, the ANM's popularity is declining, largely due to the economic deprivation caused by the Azerbaijani blockade. The total volume of industrial production in the first nine months of 1993 decreased by 38% compared with the corresponding period in 1992. The hardships of life in besieged Armenia led to mass emigration, estimated at 300-800 thousand in 1993, mainly to South Russia and Moscow. The wide discrepancy in the numbers of emigrants is explained by the fact that many of those leaving have retained their propiska in Armenia.

In Azerbaijan, the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh also determines the rise and fall of the fortunes of politicians. Until mid-1993, defeats in the course of the war or political crises accompanying the various ups and downs of the struggle for Karabakh led to the fall of four first secretaries of the Communist Party and presidents in a row: Bagirov, Vezirov, Mutalibov (with the interim presidency of Mammadov and Gambar in May - June 1992. ), again Mutalibov and Elchibey.

The August 1991 coup in Moscow undermined the legitimacy of President Mutalibov in Azerbaijan. During the coup, he made a statement condemning Gorbachev and indirectly supporting the Moscow putschists. The PFA launched rallies and demonstrations demanding new parliamentary and presidential elections. Mutalibov urgently organized presidential elections (September 8, 1991); 85.7% of those included in the lists took part in the voting, of which 98.5% voted for Mutalibov. This result was considered by many to be rigged. The Communist Party was officially dissolved, and on October 30, the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan, under pressure from the Popular Front, was forced to transfer part of its powers to the Milli Majlis (National Council) of 50 members, half of which consisted of former communists and the other half from the opposition. The PFA campaign to remove Mutalibov continued, with the latter blaming Russia for abandoning him to his fate. The final blow to Mutalibov came on February 26-27, 1992, when Karabakh forces captured the village of Khojaly near Stepanakert, killing many civilians in the process. Azerbaijani sources claim that the massacre, allegedly carried out with the help of Russian troops (a fact denied by the Armenian side), led to the death of 450 people and 450 were injured. The very fact of the massacres was later confirmed, among others, by a fact-finding mission of the Moscow human rights center Memorial. On March 6, 1992, Mutalibov resigned. Shortly thereafter, ex-president Mutalibov questioned the Armenians' responsibility for Khojaly, hinting that some of the Azerbaijani civilians may have actually been killed by Azerbaijani forces in order to discredit him. Yagub Mammadov, chairman of the Supreme Council, became interim head of state. The election campaign was in full swing when on May 9, 1992 the news of the fall of Shushi arrived. This made it possible for the ex-communist Supreme Soviet to annul Mutalibov's resignation, removing the blame for Khojaly from him (May 14). The Milli Majlis was dissolved. The next day, PFA supporters stormed the building of the Supreme Council and seized the presidential palace, forcing Mutalibov to flee to Moscow. On May 18, the Supreme Council accepted Mammadov's resignation, elected PFA member Isa Gambar as interim president, and transferred his powers back to the parliament, which he abolished three days ago. In the new elections held in June 1992, the leader of the PFA, Abulfaz Elchibey, was elected president (76.3% of those who took part in the vote; 67.9% in favor).

Elchibey promised to solve the Karabakh problem in favor of the Azerbaijanis by September 1992. The main points of the PFA program were as follows: pro-Turkish, anti-Russian orientation, upholding the independence of the republic, refusing to join the CIS and advocating a possible merger with Iranian Azerbaijan (a trend that alarmed Iran). Although the Elchibey government included a large number of brilliant intellectuals who had never been part of the nomenklatura, the attempt to purge the government apparatus of old corrupt officials failed, and the new people brought to power by Elchibey were isolated, and some of them corrupted in their turn. In early May 1993, popular discontent culminated in anti-government rallies in a number of cities, including Ganja, after which many members of the opposition Milli Istiglal (National Independence Party) were arrested. The popularity of Heydar Aliyev, a former member of the Politburo and later head of Nakhichevan, who managed to keep peace on the border of his autonomous region with Armenia, increased. Aliyev's "New Azerbaijan" party, founded in September 1992, became the focus of the opposition, bringing together a wide variety of groups - from neo-communists to members of small national parties and societies. Defeats in battle and covert Russian maneuvers against Elchibey led to an uprising in June 1993 led by a wealthy wool factory director and field commander Suret Huseynov (hero of Azerbaijan). The latter's triumphal peaceful campaign against Baku ended with the overthrow of Elchibey and his replacement by Aliyev. Suret Huseynov became prime minister. Aliyev revised the PFA policy: he brought Azerbaijan into the CIS, abandoned exclusively pro-Turkish orientation, restored broken ties with Moscow and strengthened the country's international positions (contacts with Iran, Great Britain and France). He also suppressed separatism in the south of the republic (the proclamation of Talysh autonomy by Colonel Aliakram Gumbatov in the summer of 1993).

Nevertheless, internal instability continued in Azerbaijan even after Aliyev came to power. The relations of the latter with Suret Huseynov soon deteriorated. Aliyev removed Huseynov from negotiating oil (and hence from appropriating future proceeds from its sale). Huseynov also appeared to be opposed to Aliyev's exit from the Russian orbit that took place during 1994. In early October 1994, after the signing of an oil contract with a Western consortium on September 20, an attempted coup d'état took place in Baku and Ganja, with some conspirators belonged to the circle of supporters of Suret Huseynov. Aliyev suppressed this coup attempt (if there was one: a number of observers in Baku describe it as an intrigue by Aliyev himself) and shortly thereafter relieved Huseynov of all duties.

Russian policy towards the conflict (August 1991 - mid-1994)

As the collapse of the USSR became a reality from August 1991 (ending in December), Russia found itself in the position of a country without a definite mission in the zone of the military conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, which, moreover, did not have common borders with this zone. The end of 1991 was marked by the collapse of the (temporary?) imperial ideology and the weakening of control over the army. In the conflict zones in the Soviet / Russian troops, almost all decisions were made solely by an individual officer, at most a general. The processes that began in the army as a result of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the collapse of the USSR and the Gaidar reforms - mass demobilization, the withdrawal of troops from near and far abroad (including Azerbaijan, from where the last Russian troops were withdrawn at the end of May 1993), division as military contingents, and armaments between the various republics and the conversion of the military industry - all this exacerbated the general chaos in the conflict zones. In Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and Moldova, ex-Soviet mercenaries and filibusters appeared on both sides of the front. Under these conditions, what can be called Russian policy in the region had an accidental, reactive character, which it remained until in 1992-1993. the slow increase in the manageability of the state apparatus has led to some restoration of Russia's ability to formulate and achieve its goals in relations with neighboring countries (although the factor of "hungry and angry" officers waging their local wars "on the edge of the former Soviet empire" still cannot be discounted ).

Beginning in August 1991, Russian policy towards the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh developed in the following main directions: attempts at mediation, such as those made by B. Yeltsin and Kazakh President N. Nazarbayev in September 1991, and later participation in the work of the Minsk the CSCE group, the tripartite initiative (USA, Russia and Turkey) and the conduct of independent missions, such as the one carried out by Ambassador-at-Large V. Kazimirov in 1993 and 1994; the withdrawal of Russian armed forces from the conflict zone and the distribution of the weapons left behind among the newly formed republics; an attempt to maintain a military balance in the region and prevent third-party players (Turkey and Iran) from entering their Caucasian zone of influence. With the development of economic reforms in Russia, the economic factor began to play an increasingly important role in the country's relations with the new republics. In 1993, Russia showed increasing interest in bringing Azerbaijan and Georgia into the CIS and playing the role of sole peacemaker in the former Soviet republics.

Since the Russian troops in Karabakh, which had lost their combat mission after August 1991, were in serious danger of demoralization, the withdrawal of Soviet internal troops from Karabakh (except for the 366th regiment in Stepanakert) began in November. In March 1992, the 366th regiment literally fell to pieces, as part of its non-Armenian contingent deserted, and the other part, especially Armenian soldiers and officers, captured light and heavy weapons and joined the units of the NKR.

In the field of diplomacy, Russia tried to maintain a balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan, preventing one of the parties from achieving decisive superiority. According to the bilateral agreement of 1992, Russia was obliged to protect Armenia from external (it was understood: Turkish) intervention, but this agreement was never ratified by the Supreme Soviet of Russia, which was afraid of drawing Russia into the Caucasian conflicts.

According to the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992, signed among other countries by Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, any attack on any of the parties will be regarded as an attack on all. However, less than a month later, power in Azerbaijan passed into the hands of the pro-Turkish government of Elchibey. When threats were heard against Armenia from Turkey in connection with the crisis in the Nakhichevan region in mid-May 1992, Russian State Secretary G. Burbulis and Defense Minister P. Grachev paid a visit to Yerevan to discuss concrete ways of implementing the collective bargaining agreement. security: it was a clear signal that Russia would not leave Armenia alone. The United States issued a corresponding warning to the Turkish side, and the Russian authorities warned Armenia against invading Nakhichevan. Turkish intervention plans were cancelled.

Another incident, in September 1993, led to a dramatic increase in Russia's role in the region. When fighting broke out again in Nakhichevan, Iranian troops entered the autonomous region to guard the jointly operated reservoir; they also entered the Goradiz point in the "continental" part of Azerbaijan, ostensibly to provide assistance to Azerbaijani refugees. According to Armen Khalatyan, an analyst at the Moscow Institute for Humanitarian and Political Studies, the appeal of the Azerbaijani authorities for military assistance to Turkey could provoke an armed conflict between the Turkish and Russian units guarding the Armenian border, as well as a clash with the Iranians who had already entered Nakhichevan. Baku was thus faced with a choice: either allow the conflict to escalate to uncontrollable proportions, or turn to face Moscow. Aliyev chose the latter, thereby allowing Russia to restore its influence along the entire perimeter of the Transcaucasian border of the CIS, which effectively took Turkey and Iran out of the game.

On the other hand, condemning each subsequent seizure of even more territory of Azerbaijan by the NKR troops, Russia continued to supply Azerbaijan with weapons, while at the same time quietly using Armenian victories on the battlefield to ensure the coming to power of a government in Azerbaijan that would better listen to Russian interests ( i.e., the Aliyev government instead of the Elchibey government) - a calculation that justified itself only in the short term, and not in the long term. At the end of June 1993, Aliyev suspended a deal between Baku and a consortium of eight leading Western firms (including British Petroleum, Amoco and Pennsoil) to develop three Azerbaijani oil fields. The route of the proposed oil pipeline, which was previously supposed to go to the Turkish Mediterranean coast, now had to go through Novorossiysk - at least the Russians hoped so. The Russian press assumed that the laying of this oil pipeline, if it bypassed Russia, could actually free Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and possibly even the oil-rich Muslim republics of Russia itself from Russian influence, whereas earlier the oil wealth of these regions came to the world market only through Russia.