The largest Soviet-Chinese armed conflict: Damansky Island. Soviet-Chinese armed conflict: Damansky Island



Content:

The beginning and development of the border confrontation between the USSR-PRC in 1949-1969.

By the time the People's Republic of China was formed, the issue of the border line between the USSR and China was not raised at the official level. In accordance with the Treaty of Friendship, Union, Mutual Assistance (1950), the Soviet-Chinese border, before the revision of bilateral relations, was a border of good neighborliness, where active ties were maintained between the population of the border regions, lively trade was conducted, and cultural exchange was established. Agreements on cooperation were concluded in a number of border areas, including the "Agreement on the procedure for navigation along the border rivers Amur, Ussuri, Argun, Sungach, and Lake Khanka and on the establishment of a navigable situation on these waterways" (1951), on forestry , on the joint fight against forest fires in the border areas, etc. Within the framework of these agreements, the de facto protected border line was not questioned.
In the early 50s. The USSR handed over to the PRC topographic maps with the designation of the entire border line. There were no comments from the Chinese side regarding the line of the border. In the years when Soviet-Chinese relations were on the rise, and the economic development and security of China depended to a large extent on the USSR, border issues were not raised at the official level.
But since the second half of the 50s. Difficulties began to appear in relations between the USSR and the PRC. In 1957 Under the motto of the Maoist campaign "Let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools compete," there was dissatisfaction with the USSR's policy towards China, including in the form of claims for certain areas under the jurisdiction of the USSR. An interesting fact is that, in general, the positions of circles whose opinion was at odds with the official policy of the CPC were subjected to significant criticism, but their vision of the territorial-border problem was not affected.
Another indication of the existence of differences in the border issue was the so-called "cartographic aggression", carried out already in the 50s. In maps, textbooks and atlases, China's borders include territories under the actual jurisdiction of the USSR and other countries. In the "Atlas of the PRC Provinces", which was published in Beijing in 1953, a section in the Pamirs and several regions in the eastern section, including two islands near Khabarovsk, were designated as Chinese territories.
In 1956-1959. cases of border violations by Chinese citizens are becoming more frequent, but then these issues were successfully resolved at the level of local authorities. The general tone of bilateral relations remained benevolent.
In the mid 50s. The USSR offered China to settle border issues. However, due to the events in Poland and Hungary, this initiative was not developed.
Until 1960, the issue of the border was no longer raised at the interstate level. However, at the moment when the issue of the Soviet-Chinese border was again on the agenda, relations between the two countries were no longer so smooth. Late 50s, early 60s. there are a number of prerequisites for the deterioration of relations between the USSR and China.
China's unilateral military-political actions, carried out without consultation with the USSR, placed the Soviet Union, as an ally of the PRC, in a very difficult position. These actions include, first of all, the provocation against India (1959) and the incident in the Taiwan Strait (1958). During the same period, China's desire to gain a leading position in the international communist and workers' movement, as well as to get rid of the tutelage of the CPSU, intensifies.
In addition, starting from the 20th Congress of the CPSU (1956), ideological differences began to grow between the two countries. Later, on their basis, the CPC accused the CPSU of revisionism and the restoration of capitalist relations. The condemnation of Stalin's personality cult was perceived negatively by the Chinese leadership. Personal enmity between Khrushchev N.S. and Mao Zedong also played a role in the deterioration of bilateral relations.
Some foreign authors note the Chinese leadership's dissatisfaction with Soviet influence in Manchuria and especially in Xinjiang.
Recall that one of the first results of the flaring conflict between the CPSU and the CCP was the unexpected recall of Soviet specialists from China in 1960. Almost simultaneously, the first episode on the border occurred, which showed the existence of disagreements between the USSR and China on the issue of the border line and the ownership of those or other areas. We are talking about an incident in 1960, when Chinese pastoralists were grazing cattle in the territory under Soviet jurisdiction, in the area of ​​the Buz-Aigyr Pass in Kyrgyzstan. When the Soviet border guards arrived, the shepherds declared that they were on the territory of the People's Republic of China. Later it turned out that they acted on the directive of the authorities of their province.
On this occasion, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of China and the USSR sent several notes to each other and made oral statements, in which, for the first time since the formation of the PRC, at the official, diplomatic level, a different understanding of the border line with the Soviet Union was revealed. The parties never came to an agreement, but in 1960, at a press conference in Kathmandu, Zhou Enlai, when asked about the presence of unidentified sections on the Soviet-Chinese border, answered the following: "There are minor discrepancies on the maps ... peacefully it is very easy to resolve."
Nevertheless, since the autumn of 1960, systematic exits of Chinese citizens to the islands on the border rivers of the Far East, which are under Soviet control, began to conduct economic activities (mowing grass, collecting brushwood). They told the Soviet border guards that they were on Chinese territory. The reaction of Soviet border guards to incidents has changed. If earlier they ignored the crafts of Chinese peasants in a number of territories under Soviet jurisdiction, then, starting from 1960, they tried to suppress violations. It should be noted that during the demarcation of the border in the 80-90s. most of these islands, including about. Damansky, legally passed to the PRC.
In this situation, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU decided to create an interdepartmental commission of specialists from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the KGB and the Ministry of Defense, whose task was to select and study treaty acts on the border with the PRC. The commission identified 13 sites where there were discrepancies on the maps of the parties and 12 where the distribution of the islands was not carried out.
The border line itself did not have a clear designation on the ground, because. Of the 141 border markers, 40 were preserved in their original form, 77 were in a destroyed state, and 24 were absent altogether. It was also noted that the description of the border in treaty acts is often of a general nature, and many treaty maps are drawn up on a small scale at a primitive level. In general, according to the conclusion of the commission, it was noted that the entire border line with the PRC, except for the section in the Pamirs south of the Uz-Bel pass, was determined by agreements. In the case of border negotiations, the commission proposed to draw the border not along the banks of the rivers, but along the line of the middle of the main fairway on navigable rivers and along the line of the middle of the river on non-navigable rivers, and not as it was indicated by the red line on the map attached to the Beijing Treaty, according to which the border ran along the Chinese coast. Divination by Tarot cards, available online at gadanieonlinetaro.ru, will help you find out your fate.
The systematic violations by Chinese citizens of the guarded border line in the 1960s and the demonstrative conduct of economic activities were probably intended to consolidate the so-called "existing situation" in practice. Moreover, the statistics of violations showed that from 1960 to 1964 their number grew rapidly, and in the second half of the 60s the incidents became more acute.
Thus, in 1960 the number of violations was about 100, in 1962 it was already about 5,000. In 1963, more than 100,000 Chinese civilians and soldiers took part in the illegal crossing of the Soviet-Chinese border.
As the situation on the Soviet-Chinese border deteriorated, the exchange of notes and oral statements, in which the parties constantly accused each other, did not stop. The Soviet side expressed its dissatisfaction with the violation of the border by Chinese citizens, in Chinese documents, as a rule, it was said that the Soviet border guards did not allow economic activity, where it was carried out earlier or declared that this or that site belongs to the territory of the PRC. Despite the increase in the number of incidents at the borders, the case was not brought to wide publicity. So far, relations between the Soviet Union and China have also not moved from polemics to open confrontation. This is evidenced by reviews of the Chinese and Soviet central press for 1962-1963.
In 1963, the parties agreed to hold consultations to clarify the boundary line. They began on February 25, 1964. Negotiations were held at the level of deputy foreign ministers. At the head of the Soviet delegation was Colonel-General Zyryanov P.I., commander of the country's border troops. The Chinese delegation was headed by acting. Zeng Yongquan, Head of the Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. Negotiations continued until August 22 of the same year. During the meeting, different approaches of the parties to the problem of border settlement were revealed.
The Chinese position in the negotiations was reduced to three points, on which the Chinese side invariably insisted:

  • Only treaties should serve as the basis for negotiations.
  • The negotiations should consider the entire border, and not just its individual sections.
  • As a result of negotiations, a new treaty should be concluded with reference to existing treaties, which should be qualified as unequal.
The Soviet side had no fundamental objections to the first point. Moreover, against the backdrop of Chinese claims to have a large registry, this provision had some value. In confirmation of this, we cite the words of the head of the Soviet delegation Zyryanov P.I .: "... we say that the current border has developed historically and is fixed by life itself, and border agreements are the basis - and this, in essence, is recognized by the Chinese side - to determine the passage Soviet-Chinese border line.
It should be noted that this wording had a certain subtext. The fact is that, despite the results of the work of the interdepartmental commission, which spoke about the possibility of transferring individual sections to the PRC, there remained very extensive sections (Pamir), not included in the agreements, but developed by the Soviet Union and under the jurisdiction of the USSR for a long time. The transition of these sections to the PRC would be very sensitive for the Soviet Union in political terms and could receive undesirable local resonance. Therefore, in the words of Zyryanov P.I. the emphasis was on the fact that "the border has developed historically and is fixed by life itself."

Soviet border guards are preparing to oust Chinese violators. January 1969

The Chinese reacted rather sharply to tactics of this kind. They expressed bewilderment about how the historical border line was determined: "What do you mean by the historically established border line? Do you mean the line that developed in the 11th or 1111th century, or the line that took shape a minute before your speech?". The head of the Chinese delegation, Zeng Yongquan, commented on it: "In those areas where you have not crossed the border line defined by the treaties, you will apparently not mind acting in accordance with the treaties, but in those areas where you have crossed the boundary line defined by the treaties, border line, you will insist that the issue be resolved in accordance with the “actually guarded line.” According to him, the “actually guarded, historically established border line” appeared when there were not many more than 200 Chinese border guards on the border between China and the USSR and the Soviet side sent troops wherever it pleased.
At the same time, the Chinese side emphasized that, abandoning the "big register", it should return back what was "captured" by Russia and the Soviet Union in addition to it. It sounded like this: "You should know that we do not require you to give up 1,540 thousand square kilometers of Chinese territory, torn off by tsarist Russia. We have shown maximum generosity and goodwill. Apart from this territory torn from China, you will not be able to take over an inch of Chinese territory."
The Chinese side, moreover, insisted on recognizing the Russian-Chinese treaties that defined the border as unequal. It was pointed out that these agreements were concluded during the period of China's weakness and, as a result, more than 1,500 thousand square meters were rejected. km. Chinese territory in favor of Russia, including 1 million square meters. km. in Primorye and the Amur region and 0.5 million square meters. km. in Central Asia. So, according to the Aigun Treaty, 600 thousand square meters were transferred to Russia. km., in Beijing 400 thousand square meters. km., in Chuguchaksky more than 440 thousand square meters. km., in St. Petersburg more than 70 thousand square meters. km. The Chinese side also insisted that in the 1920s. Soviet Russia renounced all unequal treaties, and since the border treaties with Russia were considered in the PRC precisely as unequal, the Chinese delegation has repeatedly stated that it has the right to recognize their nullity.
At the same time, it was stipulated that the recognition of treaties as unequal would not lead to new territorial claims. However, Soviet experts saw a trap in such a proposal. The Chinese have repeatedly emphasized that although the treaties are unequal in nature, but, given the nature of relations between the socialist states, China will not demand the return of these lands, but only seeks recognition of the "unequal rights" of Russian-Chinese treaties. The problem was that China could in the future declare the Soviet Union a non-socialist state, which happened after a while, and therefore recognize the agreements as null and void and, thus, raise the issue of ownership of 1,500 thousand square meters. km.
On the issue of the "unequal rights" of Russian-Chinese treaties, both delegations were repeatedly drawn into unjustified polemics, which took up a lot of time and did not bring practical results. It is natural that in the end the Soviet side rejected this point.
Nevertheless, the Chinese were ready to recognize the Russian-Chinese treaties of the 19th century as the basis for negotiations. But at the same time, they argued that the Soviet Union did not comply with these treaties and was "biting" into Chinese territory.
The Chinese side insisted that the Soviet Union recognize the disputed areas, and demanded, according to their designation, to withdraw troops from there, including border troops. The total area of ​​"disputed areas" was approximately 40 thousand square meters. km., incl. 28 thousand sq. km. in the Pamirs. The total length of the "disputed" sections of the border line exceeded half the length of the border between the USSR and the PRC and mainly passed along the Amur and Ussuri rivers. Representatives of the USSR argued that we could only talk about clarifying the line of passage of the border (demarcation) in some areas and did not recognize the existence of "disputed areas."
During the negotiations, it was possible to reach a certain compromise on the eastern section of the border, 4200 km long, but with the exception of the issue of two islands (Bolshoi Ussuriysky and Tarabarov). In April 1964, the parties exchanged topographic maps indicating their understanding of the border line and created a working group, after which they proceeded directly to the consideration of the border line. As a result of studying Chinese maps and comparing them with Soviet ones, it was found that there are discrepancies in drawing the border line on these maps in 22 sections, of which 17 are located on the western part of the Soviet-Chinese border (now the Central Asian republics of the former USSR) and 5 sections - on eastern part of the border. These sections roughly coincided with the sections indicated in their note by the interdepartmental commission of 1960. On the Chinese maps, 3 more sections were indicated that did not appear in the materials of the commission, including a rather large section in the area of ​​the Bedel Pass (Kyrgyzstan), as well as the islands near Khabarovsk. The greatest discrepancies were identified for the Pamir section.
Based on the results of the examination of the maps in Moscow, it was concluded that it was possible to conduct negotiations not on individual sections, as previously assumed, but on the entire border, as the Chinese delegation insisted. This approach became possible because for the most part of the border line there were no vital divergences. According to the longest line, which required clarification - the river border in the Far East, the parties had the same understanding that the border should have passed along the main fairway. In this regard, the delegation was given an additional instruction to confirm the line of the border in areas where the parties understand it in the same way. Within the framework of this approach, the parties were able to come to an understanding along the entire eastern section of the border, with the exception of the issue of the Kazakevicheva channel.
When the Soviet delegation proposed to fix the results of clarifying the border in the eastern sector, leaving the issue of the Kazakevicheva channel for later, the Chinese side agreed to this option. However, the Soviet leadership showed integrity in this matter. General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU N.S. Khrushchev, insisted on the position of "either all or nothing."
Mao's statement, which was made during negotiations in the open press on a territorial register of 1.5 million square meters, did not contribute to reaching an agreement. km.
As a result of the consultations, no agreements were reached. After they ended, which did not continue, border incidents resumed. From October 1964 to March 1965 the Soviet-Chinese border was violated 36 times with the participation of 150 Chinese civilians and military personnel, and in 15 days of April 1965. the border was violated 12 times by more than 500 Chinese civilians and military personnel. The number of violations of the Soviet-Chinese border in 1967. it was noted about 2 thousand times. At the height of the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1969, Chinese border guards and Red Guard detachments rammed Soviet patrol vessels, tried to seize patrols, and fought with Soviet border guards.
According to some Chinese data, from October 15, 1964 to March 15, 1969, the number of border conflicts amounted to 4189 cases. At the same time, border violations by the Chinese side were, as a rule, provocative and well-organized. Chinese leaders openly declared the possibility of military action. The Chinese press continued to criticize the Soviet leadership. The entire domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union was attacked, which was defined as the policy of revisionism, hegemonism and social imperialism, and was placed on a par with American imperialism. Any actions of the USSR in the international arena, covered in the Chinese press, were subjected to a series of harsh attacks, and were viewed as hostile to the PRC.
Tensions also intensified because a number of islands on the Ussuri River, located on the Chinese side of the main channel, were under the actual control of the Soviet border troops, and the Chinese side, claiming their belonging to the PRC, indicated its presence on them by demonstrative conduct of economic activities and the presence of its own troops there. border patrols. The Soviet side quite often motivated its presence on the Chinese side of the fairway by the presence of a "red line" on the map of the Beijing border treaties of 1860, where it marked the line of the border and on river sections and walked along the Chinese coast. In addition, until an official agreement was reached and delimitation was not made, the USSR continued to extend its jurisdiction to the "historically established and actually protected" border line
In general, with the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, relations between the two states acquired a character that had rarely been seen before in the practice of international relations. Provocations against the USSR happened not only on the border. There were illegal detentions of Soviet courts of civilian courts "Svirsk" and "Komsomolets Ukrainy", provocations of Chinese citizens on Red Square and at the American embassy in Moscow, as well as at the Soviet embassy in Beijing.
In comparison with the 50s, two significant features of the situation on the border in the 60s. steel, firstly, military construction, and secondly, incessant incidents.
The peak of the confrontation was 1969. Starting from March 2, clashes between Soviet border guards and Chinese military personnel took place on the Ussuri River on Damansky Island (Zhenbaodao). Prior to this, clashes between Soviet and Chinese border guards also took place, however, they rarely went beyond hand-to-hand combat and did not lead to casualties. But during the fighting on March 2, 31 Soviet border guards were killed and 14 people were injured. Approximately 300 people took part in this action from the Chinese side. There was the use of artillery and mortars, as well as heavy machine guns and anti-tank guns. The Chinese armed forces also suffered heavy losses. The fighting continued on March 14-15. Only after the use by the Soviet side of the Grad volley fire systems, which covered Chinese territory for 20 square meters. km. in depth and inflicted serious losses on the Chinese armed forces clashes on about. Damansky stopped. To the notes of protest and the Statement of the Soviet government, the leadership of the PRC replied in the usual style that the USSR must recognize the unequal nature of the treaties defining the border between the USSR and the PRC and called the USSR an aggressor "encroaching" on Chinese territory. Participants in the fighting from the Chinese side at home were regarded as heroes.
It should be noted that formally the Chinese side had good reason to lay claim to Fr. Damansky (Zhenbaodao) and a number of other islands, because they were located on the Chinese side of the main fairway, which, according to international law, is taken as the border line on border rivers. However, the Chinese side knew that this and other islands had been under the jurisdiction of the USSR for many years. The Chinese side also knew that the Soviet Union, in principle, did not object to the transfer of these islands to China. As further negotiations showed, the issue of ownership of the islands was resolved, and in the face of confrontation, the actions of the PRC in relation to these islands were aimed at aggravating the situation and can be considered provocative, which indicates that the Chinese side was the initiator of the bloodshed.
Regarding the events on about. Damansky, there is a version that they were deliberately provoked by the Chinese armed forces on the orders of Lin Biao in order to strengthen his position at the 10th Congress and increase the role of the PLA in Chinese politics.
On March 29, the Soviet government made a tough statement in which it proposed resuming the negotiations begun in 1964. In this document, the PRC leadership was asked to refrain from actions on the border that could cause complications, and to resolve the differences that arose in a calm atmosphere. In conclusion, it was noted that "attempts to talk with the Soviet Union, with the Soviet people in the language of weapons, will meet with a firm rebuff." At the 9th Congress of the CPC, Marshal Lin Biao said in his speech that the proposals of the Soviet government of March 29 would be considered and answered. At the same time, it was said that "Our Party and Government (CCP) have always advocated and continue to advocate the resolution of these issues through diplomatic channels through negotiations in order to resolve them on a fair and rational basis." On April 11, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs again sent a note to the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which it was proposed to resume consultations between the plenipotentiary representatives of the governments of the PRC and the USSR "in ... the very near future." The reply was received in May 1969. It again contained allegations that Fr. Damansky (Zhenbao Dao) is Chinese territory, and the Ussuri incidents were deliberately provoked by the Soviet side. At the same time, it was confirmed that the PRC opposed the use of military force, and it was proposed to agree on the place and date of negotiations through diplomatic channels. These Soviet and Chinese statements indicated that both sides were trying to portray themselves as victims of aggression and to absolve themselves of responsibility for the bloodshed.
With a formal readiness to resume the negotiation process and reduce the level of tension, incidents at the borders did not stop until the end of the summer of 1969, and speeches at party meetings and in the press of both countries sounded more and more harsh. In July and the first half of August, there were more than 488 cases of border violations and armed incidents involving 2,500 Chinese citizens. On July 8, Chinese border guards attacked Soviet rivermen on about. Goldinsky. On August 13, in the Kazakh SSR in the Semipalatinsk region, in the area of ​​​​Lake Zhalanashkol, the largest armed incident after the March events took place, with casualties on both sides. Only after that the parties managed to agree on a meeting at a fairly high level.
On September 11, 1969, the head of the Soviet government A.N. Kosygin visited the People's Republic of China, having met with the Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Zhou Enlai. The result of the "meeting at the airport" was an agreement on the further conduct of negotiations on the border, starting from October 19, 1969, as well as on the implementation of a number of measures in order to normalize the situation on the border. During the conversation, which lasted 3.5 hours, they also discussed the exchange of ambassadors (instead of chargé d'affaires), the intensification of trade relations and the normalization of interstate relations.
The heads of government also agreed that during the negotiations any threat of the use of force should be excluded.
As a result, the Soviet border guards were instructed to guard the borders on the rivers up to the middle of the fairway. They were also charged with maintaining normal relations with the border troops and the PRC authorities; consider all border issues through consultations in a spirit of goodwill and taking into account the mutual interests of the population of the border regions of both countries in the field of economic activity.
Despite the fact that the situation on the border has stabilized, no significant progress has been made in relations between the two states, and the issues of border settlement have remained open.

After the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, a provision appeared that the borders between states should, as a rule (but not necessarily), run along the middle of the main fairway of the river. But it also provided for exceptions, such as drawing a border along one of the coasts, when such a border developed historically - by agreement, or if one side colonized the other coast before the other began to colonize it.


In addition, international treaties and agreements do not have retroactive effect. Nevertheless, in the late 1950s, when the PRC, seeking to increase its international influence, came into conflict with Taiwan (1958) and participated in the border war with India (1962), the Chinese used the new border provisions as an excuse to revise the Soviet -Chinese border.

The leadership of the USSR was ready to go for it, in 1964 a consultation was held on border issues, but ended to no avail.

In connection with ideological differences during the Cultural Revolution in China and after the Prague Spring of 1968, when the PRC authorities declared that the USSR had embarked on the path of "socialist imperialism", relations became especially aggravated.

Damansky Island, which was part of the Pozharsky district of Primorsky Krai, is located on the Chinese side of the main channel of the Ussuri. Its dimensions are 1500-1800 m from north to south and 600-700 m from west to east (an area of ​​about 0.74 km²).

During the flood period, the island is completely hidden under water and does not represent any economic value.

Since the early 1960s, the situation in the area of ​​the island has been heating up. According to the statements of the Soviet side, groups of civilians and military personnel began to systematically violate the border regime and enter Soviet territory, from where they were expelled each time by border guards without the use of weapons.

At first, at the direction of the Chinese authorities, peasants entered the territory of the USSR and defiantly engaged in economic activities there: mowing and grazing, declaring that they were on Chinese territory.

The number of such provocations increased dramatically: in 1960 there were 100 of them, in 1962 - more than 5,000. Then the Red Guards began to attack border patrols.

The number of such events was in the thousands, each of them involved up to several hundred people.

On January 4, 1969, a Chinese provocation was carried out on Kirkinsky Island (Qiliqingdao) with the participation of 500 people.

According to the Chinese version of events, the Soviet border guards themselves staged provocations and beat up Chinese citizens who were engaged in economic activities where they always did it.

During the Kirkinsky incident, they used armored personnel carriers to oust civilians and crushed 4 of them, and on February 7, 1969, they fired several single automatic shots in the direction of the Chinese border detachment.

However, it has been repeatedly noted that none of these clashes, no matter whose fault they occurred, could result in a serious armed conflict without the approval of the authorities. The assertion that the events around Damansky Island on March 2 and 15 were the result of an action carefully planned by the Chinese side is now the most widely spread; including directly or indirectly recognized by many Chinese historians.

For example, Li Danhui writes that in 1968-1969, the directives of the CPC Central Committee limited the response to Soviet provocations, only on January 25, 1969, it was allowed to plan "retaliatory military operations" near Damansky Island with the forces of three companies. On February 19, the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC agreed to this.

Events March 1-2 and the next week
On the night of March 1-2, 1969, about 300 Chinese military personnel in winter camouflage, armed with AK assault rifles and SKS carbines, crossed to Damansky and lay down on the higher western coast of the island.

The group remained unnoticed until 10:40, when a report was received from the observation post at the 2nd Nizhne-Mikhailovka outpost of the 57th Iman border detachment that a group of up to 30 armed people was moving in the direction of Damansky. 32 Soviet border guards, including the head of the outpost, Senior Lieutenant Ivan Strelnikov, left for the scene in GAZ-69 and GAZ-63 vehicles and one BTR-60PB. At 11:10 they arrived at the southern tip of the island. The border guards under the command of Strelnikov were divided into two groups. The first group under the command of Strelnikov went to a group of Chinese servicemen who were standing on the ice southwest of the island.

The second group, under the command of Sergeant Vladimir Rabovich, was supposed to cover Strelnikov's group from the southern coast of the island. Strelnikov protested the violation of the border and demanded that the Chinese troops leave the territory of the USSR. One of the Chinese servicemen raised his hand, which served as a signal for the Chinese side to open fire on the groups of Strelnikov and Rabovich. The moment of the beginning of the armed provocation was captured on film by military photojournalist Private Nikolai Petrov. Strelnikov and the border guards following him died immediately, and a squad of border guards under the command of Sergeant Rabovich also died in a short-lived battle. Junior Sergeant Yuri Babansky took command of the surviving border guards.

Having received a report about the shooting on the island, the head of the neighboring, 1st outpost of the Kulebyakiny Sopki, Senior Lieutenant Vitaly Bubenin, drove out in the BTR-60PB and GAZ-69 with 20 fighters to help. In battle, Bubenin was wounded and sent an armored personnel carrier to the rear of the Chinese, skirting the northern tip of the island on the ice, but soon the armored personnel carrier was hit and Bubenin decided to go with his soldiers to the Soviet coast. Having reached the armored personnel carrier of the deceased Strelnikov and reseeded into it, the Bubenin group moved along the positions of the Chinese and destroyed their command post. They began to retreat.

In the battle on March 2, 31 Soviet border guards were killed, 14 were injured. The losses of the Chinese side (according to the KGB commission of the USSR) amounted to 247 people killed

At about 12:00 a helicopter arrived at Damansky with the command of the Iman border detachment and its chief, Colonel D.V. Leonov, and reinforcements from neighboring outposts. Reinforced detachments of border guards went to Damansky, and the 135th motorized rifle division of the Soviet Army was deployed in the rear with artillery and installations of the BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket system. On the Chinese side, the 24th Infantry Regiment of 5,000 men was preparing for combat operations.

On March 3, a demonstration was held in Beijing near the Soviet embassy. On March 4, the Chinese newspapers "People's Daily" and "Jiefangjun Bao" (解放军报) published an editorial entitled "Down with the new tsars!" invaded Zhenbaodao Island on the Wusulijiang River in our country's Heilongjiang Province, opened rifle and cannon fire on the border guards of the People's Liberation Army of China, killing and injuring many of them." On the same day, the Soviet newspaper Pravda published an article entitled “Shame on provocateurs!” According to the author of the article, “an armed Chinese detachment crossed the Soviet state border and headed for Damansky Island. On the Soviet border guards guarding this area, fire was suddenly opened from the Chinese side. There are dead and wounded." On March 7, the Chinese embassy in Moscow was picketed. The demonstrators also threw ink bottles at the building.

Events March 14-15
On March 14, at 15:00, an order was received to remove border guard units from the island. Immediately after the departure of the Soviet border guards, Chinese soldiers began to occupy the island. In response to this, 8 armored personnel carriers under the command of the head of the motorized maneuver group of the 57th border detachment, Lieutenant Colonel E. I. Yanshin, moved in battle formation towards Damansky; The Chinese retreated to their shore.



At 20:00 on March 14, the border guards received an order to occupy the island. On the same night, a group of Yanshin dug in there, consisting of 60 people in 4 armored personnel carriers. On the morning of March 15, after broadcasting through loudspeakers from both sides, at 10:00, from 30 to 60 barrels of Chinese artillery and mortars began shelling Soviet positions, and 3 companies of Chinese infantry went on the offensive. A fight ensued.

From 400 to 500 Chinese soldiers took up positions off the southern part of the island and prepared to go behind Yanshin's rear. Two armored personnel carriers of his group were hit, the connection was damaged. Four T-62 tanks under the command of D.V. Leonov attacked the Chinese at the southern tip of the island, but Leonov's tank was hit (according to various versions, by a shot from an RPG-2 grenade launcher or blown up by an anti-tank mine), and Leonov himself was killed by a Chinese sniper when trying to leave a burning car.

The situation was aggravated by the fact that Leonov did not know the island and, as a result, the Soviet tanks came too close to the Chinese positions. However, at the cost of losses, the Chinese were not allowed to enter the island.

Two hours later, having used up ammunition, the Soviet border guards were still forced to withdraw from the island. It became clear that the forces brought into battle were not enough and the Chinese significantly outnumbered the border guards. At 17:00, in a critical situation, in violation of the instructions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU not to bring Soviet troops into conflict, on the orders of the commander of the Far Eastern Military District Oleg Losik, fire was opened from secret at that time multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) "Grad".

The shells destroyed most of the material and technical resources of the Chinese group and the military, including reinforcements, mortars, and stacks of shells. At 17:10, motorized riflemen of the 2nd motorized rifle battalion of the 199th motorized rifle regiment and border guards under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Smirnov and Lieutenant Colonel Konstantinov went on the attack in order to finally crush the resistance of the Chinese troops. The Chinese began to withdraw from their positions. Around 19:00, several firing points “came to life”, after which three new attacks were made, but they were also repulsed.

The Soviet troops again retreated to their shore, and the Chinese side no longer undertook large-scale hostile actions on this section of the state border.

In total, during the clashes, Soviet troops lost 58 people killed and died from wounds (including 4 officers), 94 people were wounded (including 9 officers).

The irretrievable losses of the Chinese side are still classified information and, according to various estimates, range from 100-150 to 800 and even 3000 people. A memorial cemetery is located in Baoqing County, where the ashes of 68 Chinese soldiers who died on March 2 and 15, 1969 are located. Information received from a Chinese defector suggests that other burials exist.

For their heroism, five servicemen received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union: Colonel D. Leonov (posthumously), Senior Lieutenant I. Strelnikov (posthumously), Junior Sergeant V. Orekhov (posthumously), Senior Lieutenant V. Bubenin, Junior Sergeant Yu. Babansky.

Many border guards and military personnel of the Soviet Army were awarded state awards: 3 - Orders of Lenin, 10 - Orders of the Red Banner, 31 - Orders of the Red Star, 10 - Orders of Glory III degree, 63 - medals "For Courage", 31 - medals "For Military Merit" .

Settlement and aftermath
The Soviet soldiers failed to return the destroyed T-62 due to constant Chinese shelling. An attempt to destroy it with mortars was unsuccessful, and the tank fell through the ice. Subsequently, the Chinese were able to pull it ashore and now it stands in the Beijing Military Museum.

After the ice melted, the exit of Soviet border guards to Damansky was difficult and Chinese attempts to capture it had to be hindered by sniper and machine-gun fire. On September 10, 1969, a ceasefire was ordered, apparently to create a favorable background for negotiations that began the next day at the Beijing airport.

Damansky and Kirkinsky were immediately occupied by the Chinese armed forces.

On September 11, in Beijing, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A. N. Kosygin, who was returning from the funeral of Ho Chi Minh, and the Premier of the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai, agreed to stop hostile actions and that the troops remain in their positions. In fact, this meant the transfer of Damansky to China.

On October 20, 1969, new negotiations were held between the heads of government of the USSR and the PRC, and an agreement was reached on the need to revise the Soviet-Chinese border. Further, a series of negotiations were held in Beijing and Moscow, and in 1991 Damansky Island finally went to the PRC.

O. Damansky became the site of an armed confrontation between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The Daman conflict is another indicator of human irresponsibility and cynicism. Calm had not yet reigned in the world after the Second World War, and pockets of armed confrontation arose here and there. And before colliding face to face, the USSR and China actively participated in various confrontations that did not directly concern them.

background

After the Second Opium War ended, countries such as France, Russia and Great Britain were able to sign treaties with China on favorable terms. So, in 1860, Russia supported the Beijing Treaty, according to its terms, a border was drawn along the Chinese bank of the Amur, and Chinese peasants did not have the right to use it.

For a long time, the countries maintained friendly relations. The frontier population was sparse, so there were no conflicts about who owned the deserted river islands.

In 1919, the Paris Peace Conference was held, as a result, a provision on state borders appeared. It stated that the border should run in the middle of the main fairway of the river. As an exception, it could pass along the coast, but only in two cases:

  1. This is how it happened historically.
  2. As a result of the colonization of land by one of the parties.

At first, this decision did not provoke any disagreements and misunderstandings. Only after a while, the provision on state borders was taken seriously, and it became an additional reason for the emergence of the Daman conflict.

In the late 1950s, China began to seek to increase its international influence, therefore, without much delay, it entered into conflict with Taiwan (1958), and took an active part in the border war with India. Also, the PRC did not forget about the provision on state borders and decided to use it to revise the existing Soviet-Chinese borders.

The ruling elite of the Soviet Union was not opposed, and in 1964 a consultation was held on border issues. True, it ended to no avail - everything remained the same as it was. During the Cultural Revolution in the PRC and after the Prague Spring, the Chinese government declared that the Soviet Union began to support "socialist imperialism", relations between the countries escalated even more. And at the center of this conflict was the island question.

What else could be the prerequisites for the Daman conflict?

After World War II, China became a powerful ally for the USSR. The Soviet Union provided assistance to China in the war with Japan and supported in the civil war against the forces of the Kuomintang. The Chinese communists began to be loyal to the USSR, and there was a short calm.

This fragile peace continued until 1950, when the Cold War broke out between Russia and the United States. Two large countries wanted to unite the Korean Peninsula, but their "noble" aspirations led to global bloodshed.

At that time, the peninsula split into communist and South Korea. Each of the parties was sure that it was their vision of the country's development that was true; on this basis, an armed confrontation arose. At first, communist Korea was in the lead in the war, but then to the aid of South Korea came America and the UN forces. China did not stand aside, the government understood that if South Korea won, then the country would have a strong adversary who would certainly attack sooner or later. Therefore, the PRC is on the side of communist Korea.

During the conduct of hostilities, the front line shifted to the 38th parallel and remained there until the end of the war, until 1953. When the confrontation subsided, the PRC government rethought its position in the international arena. China decides to get out of the influence of the USSR and pursue its own foreign policy, which would not depend on anyone.

This opportunity presented itself in 1956. At that time, the 20th Congress of the CPSU was held in Moscow, at which it was decided to abandon the personality cult of Stalin and radically change the foreign policy doctrine. The PRC was not enthusiastic about such innovations, the country began to call Khrushchev's policy revisionist, and the country chose a completely different foreign policy course.

This split became known as the war of ideas between China and the Soviet Union. If the opportunity arose, the PRC tried to show that it was opposed to the USSR, like some other countries of the world.

In 1968, a period of liberalization (Prague Spring) began in Czechoslovakia. The first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubchenko, proposed reforms that significantly expanded the rights and freedoms of citizens and also assumed the decentralization of power in the country. The inhabitants of the state supported such changes, but for the USSR they were not acceptable, so the Soviet Union sent troops into the country. This action was condemned by the PRC, it became another, really real reason for the start of the Daman conflict.

Feelings of superiority or deliberate provocation

Historians argue that as a result of the aggravation of relations between countries in the USSR, a sense of superiority over the inhabitants of China began to be cultivated. Russian border guards chose the exact location of the border for deployment and frightened Chinese fishermen by driving boats near their boats at high speed.

Although according to other sources, it was the Chinese side that arranged the provocations. The peasants crossed the border and went about their business, not paying attention to the border guards, who had to catch them and send them back. The weapons were not used.

Perhaps these were the main causes of the Daman conflict.

Islands

O. Damansky at that time was part of the Pozharsky district of Primorsky Krai, on the Chinese side it was located not far from the main channel of the Ussuri River. The size of the island was small: the length from north to south was approximately 1700 meters, from west to east - 600-700. The total area is 0.74 km2. When floods come, the land is completely submerged. But despite this, there are several brick buildings on the island, and water meadows are a valuable natural resource.

Due to the increased number of provocations from China, the situation on the island became more and more tense. If in 1960 there were about 100 illegal border crossings, then in 1962 their number increased to 5 thousand. The conflict on Damansky Island was approaching.

Information began to appear about the attack of the Red Guards on the border guards. Such situations were not isolated, their number was already in the thousands.

On January 4, 1969, the first mass provocation was carried out on Kirkinsky Island, more than 500 Chinese residents took part in it.

To our time, the memoirs of a junior sergeant who served at the frontier post that year, Yuri Babansky, have survived:

In February, he was unexpectedly appointed to the post of commander of the outpost section, the head of which was Senior Lieutenant Ivan Strelnikov. I come to the outpost, and there, except for the cook, there is no one. “Everything,” he says, “is on the shore, they are fighting with the Chinese.” Of course, I have a machine gun on my shoulder - and to the Ussuri. And there is actually a fight. Chinese border guards crossed the Ussuri on the ice and invaded our territory. So Strelnikov raised the outpost "in the gun." Our guys were both taller and healthier. But the Chinese are not born with a bast - dexterous, evasive; they do not climb on the fist, they try in every possible way to dodge our blows. While everyone was thrashed, an hour and a half passed. But without a single shot. Only in the face. Even then I thought: "Merry Outpost".

These were the first prerequisites for a conflict on Damansky Island. According to the Chinese version, it was the Russians who acted as provocateurs. They beat Chinese citizens for no reason who were peacefully going about their business on their own territory. During the Kirkinsky Incident, the Soviet military used armored personnel carriers to force out civilians, and on February 7, 1969, they fired several automatic shots at the Chinese border guards.

True, no matter whose fault these clashes were, they could not lead to a serious armed conflict without the approval of the government.

Culprits

Now the most common opinion is that the military conflict on Damansky Island was a planned action by China. Even Chinese historians directly or indirectly write about this in their writings.

Li Danhui wrote that at the end of the 60s of the last century, the directives of the CPC Central Committee forbade the Chinese to respond to the "provocations" of Soviet soldiers, only on 01/25/1969 it was allowed to plan retaliatory military operations. Three companies of soldiers were brought in for this purpose. On February 19, the decision on retaliatory military operations was approved by the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC. There is also an opinion that Marshal Lin Biao warned the USSR government in advance about the upcoming action, which then turned into a conflict.

An American intelligence bulletin, which was released on July 13, 1969, said that China was conducting propaganda, the main ideas of which emphasized the need to unite citizens and urged them to prepare for war.

Sources also say that intelligence informed the forces of the Soviet Union about the armed provocation in a timely manner. In any case, the impending attack was somehow known. In addition, it was hard not to notice that the Chinese leadership wanted not so much to defeat the USSR as to clearly demonstrate to America that it was also an enemy of the Soviet Union, and therefore could be a reliable partner for the United States.

The beginning of the conflict. March 1969

The conflict with China on Damansky Island in 1969 began on the first night of March - from the 1st to the 2nd. A group of Chinese soldiers of 80 people crossed the Ussuri River and landed in the western part of the island. Until 10 am, no one noticed these unauthorized intruders, as a result, the Chinese military was able to improve the location and plan further actions.

At about 10:20 a.m., Chinese military personnel were spotted at a Soviet observation post.

A group of Russian border guards headed by Senior Lieutenant Strelnikov immediately went to the place of violation of the border. Arriving on the island, they were divided into two subgroups: one led by Strelnikov went to the Chinese military, the other, led by Sergeant Rabovich, moved along the coast, thereby cutting off the Chinese military group from moving inland.

The Chinese conflict on Damansky began in the morning, when Strelnikov's group approached the violators and protested against the unauthorized invasion. The Chinese soldiers suddenly opened fire. At the same time, they open fire on Rabovich's group. The Soviet border guards were taken by surprise and almost completely destroyed.

The conflict on March 2, 1969 on Damansky Island did not end there. The shots were heard by the head of the Kulebyakiny Sopki outpost, which was located next door, Senior Lieutenant Bubenin. He quickly decided to advance with 23 fighters to help. But as soon as they approached the island, Bubenin's group was forced to immediately take up a defensive position. The Chinese military launched an offensive operation with the goal of completely capturing Damansky Island. Soviet soldiers courageously defended the territory, not giving the Chinese the opportunity to throw themselves into the river.

True, such a conflict on the Damansky Peninsula could not continue for a long time. Lieutenant Bubenin made a fateful decision, which on March 2 determined the outcome of the battle for the island. Sitting on an armored personnel carrier, Bubenin went to the rear of the Chinese troops, thereby trying to completely disorganize them. True, the armored personnel carrier was soon knocked out, but this did not stop Bubenin, he got to the transport of the murdered lieutenant Strelnikov and continued his movement. As a result of this raid, the command post was destroyed, the enemy suffered serious losses. At 13:00, the Chinese began to withdraw troops from the island.

Due to the military conflict between the USSR and China on Damansky Island on March 2, the Soviet army lost 31 people, 14 were wounded. According to Soviet data, the Chinese side was left without 39 soldiers.

Events from 2 to 14 March 1969

After the end of the first stage of the military conflict, the military command of the Imansky border detachment arrived on the Damansky Peninsula. They planned activities that could stop similar provocations in the future. It was decided to increase the border detachments. As an additional increase in combat capability, the 135th motorized rifle division settled in the area of ​​​​the island with the latest Grads in its arsenal. On the Chinese side, the 24th Infantry Regiment was put up against the Soviet army.

True, the countries did not limit themselves to military maneuvers: organizing a demonstration in the center of the capital is a holy cause. So, on March 3, a demonstration took place near the Soviet embassy in Beijing, the participants of which demanded an end to aggressive actions. Also, the Chinese press began to publish completely implausible and propaganda materials. The publications said that the Soviet army invaded China and opened fire on the troops.

The Moscow newspaper Pravda also did not remain indifferent and expressed its point of view on the border conflict on Damansky Island. Here the events that took place were more reliably described. On March 7, the Chinese embassy in Moscow was picketed and pelted with ink vials, apparently, the public learned about the implausible rumors that were circulating among the Chinese about the Soviet army.

Whatever it was, and such provocative actions on March 2-14 did not significantly affect the course of events, a new border conflict on Damansky Island was just around the corner.

Fight in the middle of March

On March 14, at about three o'clock in the afternoon, the Soviet army received an order to retreat, the Russian participants in the Daman conflict had to leave the island. Immediately after the retreat of the Soviet army, the territory of the island began to be occupied by the Chinese military.

The government of the USSR could not calmly look at the current situation, obviously, the border conflict on Damansky Island in 1969 was forced to move to the second stage. The Soviet army sent 8 armored personnel carriers to the island, as soon as the Chinese noticed them, they immediately moved to their shore. On the evening of March 14, the Soviet border guards were ordered to occupy the island, a group under the command of Lieutenant Colonel E. Yanshin immediately carried it out.

On March 15, fire was opened on Soviet troops in the morning. The Daman conflict of 1969 entered its second phase. According to intelligence data, about 60 enemy artillery barrels fired at the Soviet troops, after the shelling, three companies of Chinese fighters went on the offensive. However, the enemy did not succeed in capturing the island, the Daman conflict of 1969 was just beginning.

After the situation became critical, reinforcements advanced to the Yanshin group, a group led by Colonel D. Leonov. The newly arrived soldiers immediately entered into battle with the Chinese in the south of the island. In this conflict on Damansky Island (1969), Colonel Leonov dies, his group suffers serious losses, but still does not leave their positions and inflicts damage on the enemy.

Two hours after the start of the battle, the ammunition was used up, and the Soviet troops had to retreat from Damansky Island. The 1969 conflict did not end there: the Chinese felt their numerical advantage and began to occupy the vacant territory. But at the same time, the Soviet leadership gives the green light to the use of Grads to deliver a fire strike on enemy forces. At about 5 pm, Soviet troops opened fire. The Chinese suffered heavy losses, mortars were disabled, ammunition and reinforcements were completely destroyed.

Half an hour after the artillery attack, motorized riflemen began to attack the Chinese, followed by border guards under the command of lieutenant colonels Konstantinov and Smirnov. The Chinese troops had no choice but to hastily leave the island. The conflict with China on the Damansky Peninsula continued at seven o'clock in the evening - the Chinese decided to counterattack. True, their efforts were fruitless, and the position of the Chinese army in this war did not change significantly.

During the hostilities on March 14-15, the Soviet army lost 27 soldiers, 80 were wounded. As for the losses in the Daman conflict of the Chinese side, these data were strictly classified. Tentatively, it can be assumed that they lost about 200 people.

Confrontation Settlement

During the conflict with China on the Damansky Peninsula, Soviet troops lost 58 people, among the dead were four officer soldiers, 94 people were injured, including 9 officers. What losses the Chinese side suffered is still unknown, this is classified information, and historians only assume that the number of dead Chinese soldiers ranges from 100 to 300 people. There is a memorial cemetery in Bioqing County, which contains the ashes of 68 Chinese soldiers who died in the Daman conflict in 1969. One of the Chinese defectors said that there were other burials, so the number of buried soldiers could exceed 300 people.

As for the side of the Soviet Union, five military men received the title of "Hero of the Soviet Union" for their heroism. Among them:

  • Colonel Democrat Vladimirovich Leonov - the title was awarded posthumously.
  • Senior Lieutenant Ivan Ivanovich Strelnikov - awarded posthumously.
  • Junior Sergeant Vladimir Viktorovich Orekhov - received the rank posthumously.
  • Senior Lieutenant Vitaly Dmitrievich Bubenin.
  • Junior Sergeant Yuri Vasilyevich Babansky.

Many border guards and military personnel received state awards. For conducting hostilities on Damansky Island, the participants were awarded.

  • Three orders of Lenin.
  • Ten Orders of the Red Banner.
  • Order of the Red Star (31 pieces).
  • Ten Orders of Glory, Third Class.
  • Medal "For Courage" (63 pcs.).
  • Medal "For Military Merit" (31 pcs.).

During the operation, the Soviet army left the T-62 tank on enemy soil, but due to constant shelling, it could not be returned. There was an attempt to destroy the vehicle with a mortar, but this idea was unsuccessful - the tank ingloriously fell through the ice. True, a little later, the Chinese were able to pull it to their shore. It is currently a priceless exhibit in the Beijing Military Museum.

After hostilities ended, Soviet troops left the territory of Damansky Island. Soon the ice around the island began to melt, and it was difficult for Soviet soldiers to cross to its territory with their former agility. The Chinese took advantage of this situation and immediately took up positions on the lands of the border islands. To interfere with the plans of the enemy, Soviet soldiers fired at him with cannons, but this did not give a tangible result.

The Damansky conflict did not stop there. In August of the same year, another large Soviet-Chinese armed conflict took place. It went down in history as an incident near Lake Zhalanashkol. Relations between states have indeed reached a critical point. The possibility of starting a nuclear war was closer than ever between the USSR and the PRC.

Provocations and military clashes along the Soviet-Chinese border continued until September. As a result of the border conflict, the leadership was nevertheless able to realize that it was impossible to continue an aggressive policy towards the northern neighbor. The condition in which the Chinese army was, only once again confirmed this idea.

September 10, 1969 received an order to cease fire. Apparently, in this way they tried to create a favorable environment for political negotiations, which began the day after receiving the order at the Beijing airport.

As soon as the shooting stopped, the Chinese immediately took up stronger positions on the islands. This situation played an important role in the negotiations. On September 11, in Beijing, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kosygin, who was returning from the funeral of Ho Chi Minh, and the Premier of the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai, met and agreed that it was time to stop hostilities and all sorts of hostile actions. They also agreed that the troops would remain in the positions they had previously taken. Roughly speaking, Damansky Island passed into the possession of China.

Negotiation

Naturally, this state of affairs did not please the government of the USSR, so on October 20, 1969, another negotiations took place between the Soviet Union and the PRC. During these negotiations, the countries agreed that it was necessary to revise the documents confirming the position of the Soviet-Chinese border.

After that, a whole series of negotiations were carried out, which were alternately held either in Moscow or in Beijing. And only in 1991, Damansky Island finally became the property of the PRC (although de facto this happened back in 1969).

Nowadays

In 2001, the archives of the KGB of the USSR declassified photographs of the discovered bodies of Soviet soldiers. The images clearly indicated the presence of the fact of abuse from the Chinese side. All materials were transferred to the Dalnerechensk Historical Museum.

In 2010, a series of articles was published in a French newspaper stating that the USSR was preparing a nuclear strike against the PRC in the fall of 1969. The materials referred to the People's Daily newspaper. A similar publication appeared in the print media in Hong Kong. According to these data, America refused to remain neutral in the event of a nuclear attack on China. The articles stated that on October 15, 1969, the United States threatened to attack 130 Soviet cities in the event of an attack on the PRC. True, the researchers do not specify from which sources such data were taken and themselves admit the fact that other experts do not agree with these statements.

The Daman conflict is considered a serious disagreement between two powerful states, which almost led to tragedy. But no one can say how true this is. Each country held to its own point of view, disseminated the information that was beneficial to it, and furiously concealed the truth. As a result, dozens of lost lives and ruined destinies.

War is always a tragedy. And we, those who are far from politics and the noble desire to shed blood for a lofty ideal, are completely incomprehensible why it is necessary to take up arms without fail. Mankind has long since left the caves, the cave paintings of bygone times have turned into quite understandable speech, and besides, you no longer need to hunt for survival. But the rituals of human sacrifice have been transformed and turned into completely legitimate armed confrontations.

The Daman conflict is another indicator of human irresponsibility and cynicism. It seems that the tragedy of the Second World War should have taught the rulers of all countries of the world one simple truth: "War is bad." Although this is bad only for those who do not return from the battlefield, for the rest, you can get some benefit from any confrontation - "here's a medal for you, and disappear completely." This principle was also applied during the Damansky conflict: the soldiers were sure that the enemy was provoking them, while government officials, meanwhile, resolved their issues. Some historians believe that the conflict was only an excuse to divert public attention from what is really going on in the world.

The fact that the conflict on Damansky was carefully planned is indirectly recognized even by Chinese historians themselves. For example, Li Danhui notes that in response to "Soviet provocations" it was decided to conduct a military operation with the forces of three companies. There is a version that the leadership of the USSR was aware in advance through Marshal Lin Biao of the upcoming action of the Chinese.
On the night of March 2, about 300 Chinese soldiers crossed the ice to the island. Due to the fact that it was snowing, they managed to go unnoticed until 10 am. When the Chinese were discovered, the Soviet border guards did not have an adequate idea of ​​their numbers for several hours. According to a report received at the 2nd outpost "Nizhne-Mikhailovka" of the 57th Iman border detachment, the number of armed Chinese was 30 people. 32 Soviet border guards left for the scene. Near the island, they split into two groups. The first group, under the command of Senior Lieutenant Ivan Strelnikov, headed straight for the Chinese, who were standing on the ice southwest of the island. The second group, under the command of Sergeant Vladimir Rabovich, was supposed to cover Strelnikov's group from the southern coast of the island. As soon as Strelnikov's detachment approached the Chinese, a hurricane of fire was opened on him. Rabovich's group was also ambushed. Almost all border guards were killed on the spot. Corporal Pavel Akulov was captured in an unconscious state. His body with signs of torture was later handed over to the Soviet side. The squad of junior sergeant Yuri Babansky entered the battle, which was somewhat delayed, advancing from the outpost, and therefore the Chinese could not destroy it using the surprise factor. It was this unit, together with the help of 24 border guards who came to the rescue from the neighboring Kulebyakiny Sopki outpost, in a fierce battle, showed the Chinese how high the morale of their opponents was. “Of course, it was still possible to retreat, return to the outpost, wait for reinforcements from the detachment. But we were seized with such fierce anger at these bastards that in those moments we wanted only one thing - to put as many of them as possible. For the guys, for ourselves, for this span of land that no one needs, but still our land, ”recalled Yuri Babansky, who was later awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for his heroism.
As a result of the battle, which lasted about 5 hours, 31 Soviet border guards were killed. The irretrievable losses of the Chinese, according to the Soviet side, amounted to 248 people.
The surviving Chinese were forced to withdraw. But in the border area, the 24th Chinese Infantry Regiment, numbering 5,000 people, was already preparing for combat operations. The Soviet side pulled up the 135th motorized rifle division to Damanskoye, which was given installations of the then secret Grad multiple launch rocket systems.

Original taken from parker_111 in the Conflict on Damansky Island.1969

After the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, a provision appeared that the borders between states should, as a rule (but not necessarily), run along the middle of the main fairway of the river. But it also provided for exceptions, such as drawing a border along one of the coasts, when such a border developed historically - by agreement or if one side colonized the other coast before the other began to colonize it.


In addition, international treaties and agreements do not have retroactive effect. Nevertheless, in the late 1950s, when the PRC, seeking to increase its international influence, came into conflict with Taiwan (1958) and participated in the border war with India (1962), the Chinese used the new border provisions as an excuse to revise the Soviet -Chinese border.

The leadership of the USSR was ready to go for it, in 1964 a consultation was held on border issues, but ended to no avail.

In connection with ideological differences during the Cultural Revolution in China and after the Prague Spring of 1968, when the PRC authorities declared that the USSR had embarked on the path of "socialist imperialism", relations became especially aggravated.

Damansky Island, which was part of the Pozharsky district of Primorsky Krai, is located on the Chinese side of the main channel of the Ussuri. Its dimensions are 1500-1800 m from north to south and 600-700 m from west to east (an area of ​​about 0.74 km²).

During the flood period, the island is completely hidden under water and does not represent any economic value.

Since the early 1960s, the situation in the area of ​​the island has been heating up. According to the statements of the Soviet side, groups of civilians and military personnel began to systematically violate the border regime and enter Soviet territory, from where they were expelled each time by border guards without the use of weapons.

At first, at the direction of the Chinese authorities, peasants entered the territory of the USSR and defiantly engaged in economic activities there: mowing and grazing, declaring that they were on Chinese territory.

The number of such provocations increased dramatically: in 1960 there were 100 of them, in 1962 - more than 5,000. Then the Red Guards began to attack border patrols.

The number of such events was in the thousands, each of them involved up to several hundred people.

On January 4, 1969, a Chinese provocation was carried out on Kirkinsky Island (Qiliqingdao) with the participation of 500 people.

According to the Chinese version of events, the Soviet border guards themselves staged provocations and beat up Chinese citizens who were engaged in economic activities where they always did it.

During the Kirkinsky incident, they used armored personnel carriers to oust civilians and crushed 4 of them, and on February 7, 1969, they fired several single automatic shots in the direction of the Chinese border detachment.

However, it has been repeatedly noted that none of these clashes, no matter whose fault they occurred, could result in a serious armed conflict without the approval of the authorities. The assertion that the events around Damansky Island on March 2 and 15 were the result of an action carefully planned by the Chinese side is now the most widely spread; including directly or indirectly recognized by many Chinese historians.

For example, Li Danhui writes that in 1968-1969, the directives of the CPC Central Committee limited the response to Soviet provocations, only on January 25, 1969, it was allowed to plan "retaliatory military operations" near Damansky Island with the forces of three companies. On February 19, the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC agreed to this.

Events March 1-2 and the next week
On the night of March 1-2, 1969, about 300 Chinese military personnel in winter camouflage, armed with AK assault rifles and SKS carbines, crossed to Damansky and lay down on the higher western coast of the island.

The group remained unnoticed until 10:40, when a report was received from the observation post at the 2nd Nizhne-Mikhailovka outpost of the 57th Iman border detachment that a group of up to 30 armed people was moving in the direction of Damansky. 32 Soviet border guards, including the head of the outpost, Senior Lieutenant Ivan Strelnikov, left for the scene in GAZ-69 and GAZ-63 vehicles and one BTR-60PB. At 11:10 they arrived at the southern tip of the island. The border guards under the command of Strelnikov were divided into two groups. The first group under the command of Strelnikov went to a group of Chinese servicemen who were standing on the ice southwest of the island.

The second group, under the command of Sergeant Vladimir Rabovich, was supposed to cover Strelnikov's group from the southern coast of the island. Strelnikov protested the violation of the border and demanded that the Chinese troops leave the territory of the USSR. One of the Chinese servicemen raised his hand, which served as a signal for the Chinese side to open fire on the groups of Strelnikov and Rabovich. The moment of the beginning of the armed provocation was captured on film by military photojournalist Private Nikolai Petrov. Strelnikov and the border guards following him died immediately, and a squad of border guards under the command of Sergeant Rabovich also died in a short-lived battle. Junior Sergeant Yuri Babansky took command of the surviving border guards.

Having received a report about the shooting on the island, the head of the neighboring, 1st outpost of the Kulebyakiny Sopki, Senior Lieutenant Vitaly Bubenin, drove out in the BTR-60PB and GAZ-69 with 20 fighters to help. In battle, Bubenin was wounded and sent an armored personnel carrier to the rear of the Chinese, skirting the northern tip of the island on the ice, but soon the armored personnel carrier was hit and Bubenin decided to go with his soldiers to the Soviet coast. Having reached the armored personnel carrier of the deceased Strelnikov and reseeded into it, the Bubenin group moved along the positions of the Chinese and destroyed their command post. They began to retreat.

In the battle on March 2, 31 Soviet border guards were killed, 14 were injured. The losses of the Chinese side (according to the KGB commission of the USSR) amounted to 247 people killed

At about 12:00 a helicopter arrived at Damansky with the command of the Iman border detachment and its chief, Colonel D.V. Leonov, and reinforcements from neighboring outposts. Reinforced detachments of border guards went to Damansky, and the 135th motorized rifle division of the Soviet Army was deployed in the rear with artillery and installations of the BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket system. On the Chinese side, the 24th Infantry Regiment of 5,000 men was preparing for combat operations.

On March 3, a demonstration was held in Beijing near the Soviet embassy. On March 4, the Chinese newspapers "People's Daily" and "Jiefangjun Bao" (解放军报) published an editorial entitled "Down with the new tsars!" invaded Zhenbaodao Island on the Wusulijiang River in our country's Heilongjiang Province, opened rifle and cannon fire on the border guards of the People's Liberation Army of China, killing and injuring many of them." On the same day, the Soviet newspaper Pravda published an article entitled “Shame on provocateurs!” According to the author of the article, “an armed Chinese detachment crossed the Soviet state border and headed for Damansky Island. On the Soviet border guards guarding this area, fire was suddenly opened from the Chinese side. There are dead and wounded." On March 7, the Chinese embassy in Moscow was picketed. The demonstrators also threw ink bottles at the building.

Events March 14-15
On March 14, at 15:00, an order was received to remove border guard units from the island. Immediately after the departure of the Soviet border guards, Chinese soldiers began to occupy the island. In response to this, 8 armored personnel carriers under the command of the head of the motorized maneuver group of the 57th border detachment, Lieutenant Colonel E. I. Yanshin, moved in battle formation towards Damansky; The Chinese retreated to their shore.



At 20:00 on March 14, the border guards received an order to occupy the island. On the same night, a group of Yanshin dug in there, consisting of 60 people in 4 armored personnel carriers. On the morning of March 15, after broadcasting through loudspeakers from both sides, at 10:00, from 30 to 60 barrels of Chinese artillery and mortars began shelling Soviet positions, and 3 companies of Chinese infantry went on the offensive. A fight ensued.

From 400 to 500 Chinese soldiers took up positions off the southern part of the island and prepared to go behind Yanshin's rear. Two armored personnel carriers of his group were hit, the connection was damaged. Four T-62 tanks under the command of D.V. Leonov attacked the Chinese at the southern tip of the island, but Leonov's tank was hit (according to various versions, by a shot from an RPG-2 grenade launcher or blown up by an anti-tank mine), and Leonov himself was killed by a Chinese sniper when trying to leave a burning car.

The situation was aggravated by the fact that Leonov did not know the island and, as a result, the Soviet tanks came too close to the Chinese positions. However, at the cost of losses, the Chinese were not allowed to enter the island.

Two hours later, having used up ammunition, the Soviet border guards were still forced to withdraw from the island. It became clear that the forces brought into battle were not enough and the Chinese significantly outnumbered the border guards. At 17:00, in a critical situation, in violation of the instructions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU not to bring Soviet troops into conflict, on the orders of the commander of the Far Eastern Military District Oleg Losik, fire was opened from secret at that time multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) "Grad".

The shells destroyed most of the material and technical resources of the Chinese group and the military, including reinforcements, mortars, and stacks of shells. At 17:10, motorized riflemen of the 2nd motorized rifle battalion of the 199th motorized rifle regiment and border guards under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Smirnov and Lieutenant Colonel Konstantinov went on the attack in order to finally crush the resistance of the Chinese troops. The Chinese began to withdraw from their positions. Around 19:00, several firing points “came to life”, after which three new attacks were made, but they were also repulsed.

The Soviet troops again retreated to their shore, and the Chinese side no longer undertook large-scale hostile actions on this section of the state border.

In total, during the clashes, Soviet troops lost 58 people killed and died from wounds (including 4 officers), 94 people were wounded (including 9 officers).

The irretrievable losses of the Chinese side are still classified information and, according to various estimates, range from 100-150 to 800 and even 3000 people. A memorial cemetery is located in Baoqing County, where the ashes of 68 Chinese soldiers who died on March 2 and 15, 1969 are located. Information received from a Chinese defector suggests that other burials exist.

For their heroism, five servicemen received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union: Colonel D. Leonov (posthumously), Senior Lieutenant I. Strelnikov (posthumously), Junior Sergeant V. Orekhov (posthumously), Senior Lieutenant V. Bubenin, Junior Sergeant Yu. Babansky.

Many border guards and military personnel of the Soviet Army were awarded state awards: 3 - Orders of Lenin, 10 - Orders of the Red Banner, 31 - Orders of the Red Star, 10 - Orders of Glory III degree, 63 - medals "For Courage", 31 - medals "For Military Merit" .

Settlement and aftermath
The Soviet soldiers failed to return the destroyed T-62 due to constant Chinese shelling. An attempt to destroy it with mortars was unsuccessful, and the tank fell through the ice. Subsequently, the Chinese were able to pull it ashore and now it stands in the Beijing Military Museum.

After the ice melted, the exit of Soviet border guards to Damansky was difficult and Chinese attempts to capture it had to be hindered by sniper and machine-gun fire. On September 10, 1969, a ceasefire was ordered, apparently to create a favorable background for negotiations that began the next day at the Beijing airport.

Damansky and Kirkinsky were immediately occupied by the Chinese armed forces.

On September 11, in Beijing, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A. N. Kosygin, who was returning from the funeral of Ho Chi Minh, and the Premier of the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai, agreed to stop hostile actions and that the troops remain in their positions. In fact, this meant the transfer of Damansky to China.

On October 20, 1969, new negotiations were held between the heads of government of the USSR and the PRC, and an agreement was reached on the need to revise the Soviet-Chinese border. Further, a series of negotiations were held in Beijing and Moscow, and in 1991 Damansky Island finally went to the PRC.

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