Second Pacific Squadron in the Korea Strait.

Unlike the Japanese fleet, the II Pacific Squadron, which had passed half the world, did not seek to impose a battle on the enemy. The main task of the Russian ships after the fall of Port Arthur was to break through to Vladivostok, to which they went along the shortest route - through the Tsushima Strait. The squadron was discovered by an auxiliary Japanese cruiser on the morning of May 27, after which the Japanese fleet weighed anchors and headed towards the enemy.

Around 11 am, a Japanese cruiser detachment (4 cruisers) approached the Russian squadron, at which the battleships fired several volleys, after which the Japanese cruisers retreated. By this time, the ships of the Russian squadron were reorganized into battle formation.

The beginning of the battle.

At 13:20, the main Japanese forces were discovered moving from east to west and crossing the course of the Russian squadron. After 20 minutes, the Japanese ships were to the left of the wake of the main Russian forces, and the previously fired cruising detachment went south and prepared to attack the auxiliary Russian ships that were behind the main forces.

"The Loop of Togo".

At 13:40 - 13:45, the Japanese armored ships of the 1st and 2nd detachments began a sequential turn on a course parallel to the wake column of the Russian battleships. At this moment, a unique situation developed, which, apparently, was the mistake of Admiral Togo: the Russian battleships took their places in the ranks, the auxiliary forces were to the right, and the Japanese ships, due to the turn that had begun, could not use all their guns, because. the ships that completed the turn were in front of the ships of the column, which had not yet completed the turn. Alas, in order to take full advantage of this situation, the distance had to be noticeably closer (by the time the Japanese began to turn around, it was more than 30 cables).

At 13:49, the flagship Knyaz Suvorov opened fire on the Mikasa, followed by Emperor Alexander III, Borodino, Oslyabya and Oryol. Three coastal defense battleships and the Shisoy Veliky fired at the Nissin and Kasuga. At 13:51 the Japanese ships also opened fire.

The death of "Oslyabi" and the failure of the "Prince Suvorov".

At the beginning of the battle, both sides demonstrated high firing accuracy: by 14:20 Mikasa, Knyaz Suvorov and Oslyabya, as well as the armored cruisers Asama and Iwate, were seriously damaged. By this time, the Asama, which was poorly controlled due to damage to the rudders, began to exit the battle, the Mikasa, which received 29 hits, including shells of the main caliber, turned away and left the zone of destruction of most of the Russian guns.

Unfortunately, the damage to the Japanese ships did not greatly affect their combat capability, but in the Russian squadron everything was much worse: the Prince Suvorov, engulfed in flames, stopped obeying the helm and began an uncontrolled circulation to the right, and the Oslyabya, which received the most hits (in the first phase battle, the Japanese fire was concentrated on it) turned to the right and sank at 14:50.

After the failure of the "Prince Suvorov" and the death of the "Oslyabi", the "Emperor Alexander III" stood at the head of the wake column of the Russian squadron, the Russian forces continued to move north. The Japanese forces on the left made a turn "all of a sudden" and turned to the Russian ships on the left side (Nissin stood at the head of the column).

This maneuver solved several problems at once: it made it possible to use the guns of the undamaged side, gave rest to the exhausted gunners, and made it possible to eliminate damage to the starboard side, which had received a fair amount of Russian shells. During the rebuilding, the Japanese were under heavy fire: the Asama, which left the ranks, was again heavily damaged, a fire started on the Fuji, which almost led to the explosion of the shells of the aft tower. The parties parted, which gave a respite to both the heavily damaged Russian ships and the noticeably less affected Japanese.

The second phase of the battle.

The fierce battle resumed at 15:30 - 15:40: by this time the Japanese made the second turn "all of a sudden" and the enemy columns again moved parallel to the north, showering each other with shells. The "Emperor Alexander III", "Eagle" and "Sisoy the Great" received heavy damage.

"Prince Suvorov" by this time already did not represent any combat value, although it kept afloat. Since the Japanese blocked the path of the Russian column, the Borodino, which was in its head, led the squadron to the east. At 16:17, the opponents lost sight of each other and the battle was again suspended. At 17:30, the destroyer "Buyny" removed the wounded commander of the squadron, Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky, and 19 people from his headquarters from the burning "Prince Suvorov".

End of the day's fight.

The battle resumed at about 17:40 and went according to the same scenario, with the only difference being that the composition of the Second Pacific Squadron noticeably thinned out. The main blow of the Japanese this time fell on the battleships "Orel" and "Borodino", but at first it suffered the most and was already barely afloat "Emperor Alexander III": it, noticeably lagging behind the main forces, came under fire from the ships of the 2nd Japanese combat squad. After heavy shelling, the flaming battleship rolled over and sank very quickly.

Around the same time, a fire broke out on the Borodino, and then the 152-mm gun ammunition detonated from a Japanese shell. At 19:15, the battleship Borodino sank. At the same time, the battle actually ended due to sunset.

Night attacks by destroyers and the surrender of Admiral Nebogatov's ships.

After sunset, the Japanese destroyers went on the attack, before that they had practically not participated in the battle. The battleships Navarin and Sisoy Veliky were heavily damaged and sunk, the crew of Admiral Nakhimov sank, and the rest of the ships scattered. The second Pacific squadron finally ceased to exist.

The next day, most of the surviving Russian ships surrendered. 6 ships, incl. the cruiser "Aurora" reached neutral ports, where they were interned. The cruiser "Almaz" and 2 destroyers reached Vladivostok.

Overall result of the battle.

In general, when describing the results of the Tsushima battle, the word “rout” would be most appropriate: a powerful Russian squadron ceased to exist, losses exceeded 5,000 people, and the Russo-Japanese war was finally lost.

There were, of course, many reasons for the defeat: both the long path traveled by the Second Pacific Squadron and the controversial decisions of Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky, and insufficient training of Russian sailors, and unsuccessful armor-piercing shells (about a third of the shells that hit Japanese ships did not explode).

For the Japanese, the Battle of Tsushima became a matter of national pride, and for good reason. Interestingly, two ships that took part in that battle have survived to this day: the Japanese flagship Mikasa and the Russian cruiser Aurora, both ships in the status of museums are in eternal parking.

-the purpose of the operation is the speedy arrival of the squadron in Vladivostok;

-squadron losses should be kept to a minimum-combat with the Japanese fleet is undesirable;

-the personnel of the squadron, after a continuous seven-month campaign in conditions "close to combat", is in a state of extreme fatigue, the ships require repairs;

Combat training of the squadron is insufficient:

The Russian squadron surpasses the enemy squadron in the number of battleships, the total number of ships in the battle line is the same;

-the Russian squadron is significantly inferior to the enemy in terms of light forces.

It follows that if a battle with the Japanese fleet is inevitable, it is desirable to take it as far as possible from the Japanese naval bases in order to deprive the enemy of the opportunity to use the reserve, as well as a clear advantage in the auxiliary forces of the fleet.

Consequently, the squadron must bypass Japan from the east and break through to Vladivostok by the Kuril Straits, or, in extreme cases, by the La Perouse Strait. Even the route through the Sangar Strait has to be recognized as unacceptable. The option with the Korea Strait is not subject to consideration at all.

Nevertheless, such a decision was made, and, probably, there were some grounds for this? Before looking for them, you should consider the operational situation from the point of view of Admiral Togo:

-even after all the victories won, the capture of Port Arthur and the destruction of the 1st Pacific squadron, the position of Japan cannot be considered strong; the possibilities of the Empire to continue the war are practically exhausted; accordingly, the main goal of all operations, both conducted by the army and organized by the navy, should be the conclusion of peace: one can say to the Empire, if it wants to continue to exist, it is necessary to conclude a victorious peace at any cost;

-the long-sown seeds of rivalry between the army and the navy, clearly aware of Togo's priority for the speedy development of the fleet for the Island Empire, all this leads him to the idea that the navy should make a decisive contribution to achieving this victorious peace; therefore, the fleet must defeat the 2nd Pacific squadron-a victory so loud that Russia, under the influence of psychological shock, immediately went to peace negotiations; a victory so impressive that the top leadership of the country had no doubts about the decisive contribution of the fleet to the won war; So, the conclusion, which is not entirely consistent with the classic description of the Russian-Japanese war at sea: Rozhdestvensky was quite satisfied with a draw, Togo only needed a victory:

-the experience of fighting the 1st Pacific Squadron did not give Togo any reason to consider the combat training of Russian sailors insufficient; the authority of Rozhdestvensky as an artilleryman was quite high in naval circles: as for the disappointing results of the firing of the 2nd squadron near Madagascar, it is doubtful that Togo knew about it at all (and if he did, he should have considered this information disinformation); Russian artillery has always aroused the respect of its opponents: Russian armor-piercing shells were rightly considered the best in the world; of course, I didn’t know about the “high humidity of pyroxylin” on the ships of Rozhdestvensky Togo (and even now we don’t have the slightest reason to believe that the percentage of unexploded Russian armor-piercing shells in the Tsushima battle was abnormally high).

In other words, Togo should have planned a victorious battle against a squadron that was comparable in its combat capabilities to his fleet. A decisive victory in such a situation is possible only if one manages to use all one's combat capabilities and prevent the enemy from doing so. At the same time, it is highly desirable to impose a battle on the enemy before the arrival of the 2nd squadron in Vladivostok.

But how to intercept a squadron that has at least 4 possible routes? What could Togo do in this situation?

Possible actions: a) concentrate the squadron in the place where the enemy is likely to appear, 6) break the squadron into combat detachments, blocking all possible routes to Vladivostok, c) concentrate the squadron in the "center of the position", with the help of auxiliary ships and reconnaissance ships, detect the route of the Russian movement and intercept them. The second option is unprofessional and not subject to consideration. The third one is not really real.

May on the Pacific coast of Japan is characterized by unstable weather with rain and fog. There is little hope that auxiliary vessels under such conditions will find the enemy in a timely manner (moreover, the main forces, and not some kind of Ural, strenuously pretending to be a whole squadron). Travel difference -5 knots - essential in a squadron battle, but it might not be enough to intercept it. It probably wouldn't even be enough.

In any case, Togo did not go for this option, so tempting for the vast majority of naval commanders. The only option left is a) initially concentrate the fleet where the enemy will go. And pray that he will go there. But where? Sangarsky, La Perouse, Kuril Straits-approximately equally likely (from Togo's point of view). But it is very inconvenient to "catch" ships there-first of all, based on weather conditions, and secondly, because due to the same weather conditions, only the core of the fleet can take part in the operation: neither old destroyers, nor auxiliary cruisers, nor, finally, Fuso with Chin "Yenom" cannot be dragged into the Kuril Straits.

The Tsushima Strait is likely to be distinguished (though by the fact that it is - smallest). At the same time, from all other points of view, the strait is ideal: it is located near the main base of the fleet (that is, all ships, even the most obsolete and unseaworthy, can be used), it is wide, provides opportunities for squadron maneuver, and has relatively tolerant weather.

If the Russian squadron comes here- all chances are on the side of the Japanese. If not, from the point of view of the interests of the fleet and the Empire, it is better "by negligence" to let the enemy squadron into the base (and then start blockade operations in a new circle), than to demonstrate to the whole world the inability of the fleet to intercept and defeat the enemy. There is a difference between: "Well, they missed ..." and "Tried, but could not." Quite this is probably why the Japanese fleet is concentrating for operations in the Korea Strait.

And now let's return to the alleged reasoning of Admiral Rozhdestvensky:

-the Japanese fleet can intercept us in any of the straits through which we go, or-directly on the approach to Vladivostok; the last option seems to be the most realistic; thus, the chances of meeting the Japanese squadron are approximately equal for any choice of route (here it is important to understand that Rozhdestvensky, being Russian, considered this war a continuous chain of mistakes and failures of Russian weapons; he was not able to understand the gravity of Japan's situation and the need for her resounding naval victory: therefore, he mistakenly proceeded from the fact that Togo was enough of a draw).

-any route, except for the route through the Korea Strait, will require additional coal loading, moreover, at sea, and extra days of travel; taking into account the fact that both the teams and the officers are tired of being at sea for a long time, any delay in arriving at the base will be perceived by people extremely negatively and, probably, interpreted as cowardice of the commander.

Surely it would be so. Nebogatov, whose relations with the personnel were normal, could, without causing acute discontent, send a squadron around Japan. The image that Rozhdestvensky created for himself required him to lead a squadron to Vladivostok by the shortest route. But this analysis can be continued. Sending a squadron obviously inadequate to its tasks to the Pacific theater of operations, the Admiralty was obliged to put at the head of the admiral of the style Z.P. Rozhdestvensky. In other words, the movement through the Korea Strait was predetermined as early as October 1904. years in St. Petersburg. If Togo knew the personality traits of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky, he could assess in what psychological state the squadron would enter the Pacific Ocean. In this case, it would be much easier for him to make a decision to deploy the entire fleet in the Korea Strait ...

Tsushima battle. Hike to the bottom of the Sea of ​​Japan

The Russo-Japanese War is rightfully considered one of the most tragic pages in the history of our state. Was the main reason for the defeat the failures of Russian diplomacy, the spinelessness and indecision of the tsarist commanders, the remoteness of the theater of operations, or was it the fault of Lady Luck's disfavor? A little bit of everything. Almost all the key battles of this war took place under the banner of doom and excessive passivity, resulting in complete defeat. The Tsushima battle, in which the forces of the 2nd Pacific squadron of the Russian Empire clashed with the forces of the Japanese fleet, is an example of this.

The war for Russia did not start as well as planned. The blockade in Port Arthur of the 1st Pacific squadron, the loss of the Varyag cruiser and the Koreets gunboat in the battle near Chemulpo became the reasons for St. Petersburg's attempts to radically change the situation in the theater of operations. Such an attempt was the preparation and departure of the 2nd, and then the 3rd Pacific squadron. Literally, 38 warships passed through half the world, accompanied by auxiliary transports, loaded with provisions so that the waterlines were thoroughly under water, worsening the already weak armor protection of Russian ships, which were only 40% armored, while Japanese ones were covered by all 60 %.

Commander of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, Vice Admiral Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhestvensky

Initially, the squadron's campaign was considered by many theorists of the Russian fleet (for example, Nikolai Lavrentievich Klado) to be already losing and unpromising in advance. Moreover, the entire personnel - from admirals to a simple sailor - felt doomed to failure. The hopelessness was added by the news that overtook the squadron in Madagascar about the fall of Port Arthur and the loss of almost the entire grouping of the 1st Pacific squadron. Having learned about this on December 16, 1904, the commander of the squadron, Rear Admiral Zinovy ​​Rozhestvensky, tried using telegrams to convince the higher authorities of the advisability of continuing the campaign, but instead he was ordered to wait for reinforcements in Madagascar and make an attempt to break through to Vladivostok by any means.

It was not customary to discuss orders, and on May 1, 1905, the squadron, which had already reached Indochina by that time, headed for Vladivostok. It was decided to break through the Tsushima Strait - the closest way, since the Sangarsky and La Perouse straits were not considered due to remoteness and problems in navigation support.

Tsushima Strait

Some battleships, such as the Emperor Nicholas I, were armed with outdated artillery and were forced to use extremely black powder, which caused the ship to become clouded in smoke after several volleys, making further sighting noticeably difficult. The coastal defense battleships "Admiral Ushakov", "Admiral Apraksin" and "Admiral Senyavin", based on the name of their type, were not intended for long-distance cruises at all, since this class of ships was created to protect coastal fortifications and was often jokingly called "armadillo, protected shores.

A large number of transport and auxiliary ships should not have been dragged into battle at all, since they did not bring any benefit in battle, but only slowed down the squadron and required a significant number of cruisers and destroyers for their protection. Most likely, they should have split up, gone to a neutral port, or tried to get to Vladivostok by far detours. The camouflage of the Russian squadron also left much to be desired - the bright yellow pipes of the ships were a good guide, while the Japanese ships were olive in color, which often merged with the water surface.

Coastal defense battleship "Admiral Ushakov"

On the eve of the battle, on May 13, it was decided to conduct exercises in order to increase the maneuverability of the squadron. As a result of these exercises, it became clear that the squadron was not at all ready for coordinated maneuvers - the column of ships was constantly destroyed. The situation was unsatisfactory with the “all of a sudden” turns. Some ships, not understanding the signal, made turns “sequentially” at that time, introducing confusion into the maneuver, and when, on a signal from the flagship battleship, the squadron moved into front formation, there was complete confusion.

During the time spent on maneuvers, the squadron could have passed the most dangerous part of the Tsushima Strait under the cover of night and, perhaps, Japanese reconnaissance ships would not have seen it, but on the night of May 13-14, the squadron was spotted by the Japanese reconnaissance cruiser Shinano - Maru. I would like to note that, unlike the Japanese fleet, which was actively conducting reconnaissance operations, the Russian squadron was almost blind. It was forbidden to conduct reconnaissance because of the danger of revealing the location to the enemy.

The curiosity of the moment reached the point that it was forbidden to pursue enemy reconnaissance cruisers and even prevent them from telegraphing, although the Ural auxiliary cruiser had a wireless telegraph capable of interrupting Japanese reports about the location of the Russian squadron. As a result of such passivity of Admiral Rozhdestvensky, the commander of the Japanese fleet, Admiral Heihachiro Togo, knew not only the location of the Russian fleet, but also its composition and even tactical formation - enough to start a battle.

Battleship "Emperor Nicholas I"

Almost the entire morning of May 14, the Japanese reconnaissance cruisers were on a parallel course, only closer to noon the fog hid Rozhdestvensky's squadron from their eyes, but not for long: already at 13:25 visual contact was established with the Japanese squadron, which was going across.

The lead was the battleship Mikasa under the flag of Admiral Togo. It was followed by the battleships Shikishima, Fuji, Asahi and the armored cruisers Kassuga and Nisshin. These ships were followed by six more armored cruisers: Izumo under the flag of Admiral Kamimura, Yakumo, Asama, Azuma, Tokiwa and Iwate. The main Japanese force was followed by numerous auxiliary cruisers and destroyers under the command of Rear Admirals Kamimura and Uriu.

The composition of the Russian squadron at the time of the meeting with enemy forces was as follows: the squadron battleships "Prince Suvorov" under the flag of Vice Admiral Rozhestvensky, "Emperor Alexander III", "Borodino", "Eagle", "Oslyabya" under the flag of Rear Admiral Felkerzam, who long before the battle, he died of a stroke, unable to withstand the hardships and trials of a long campaign, "Sisoy the Great", "Nicholas I" under the pennant of Rear Admiral Nebogatov.

Admiral Togo

Coastal defense battleships: "General-Admiral Apraksin", "Admiral Senyavin", "Admiral Ushakov"; armored cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov"; cruisers "Oleg" under the flag of Rear Admiral Enkvist, "Aurora", "Dmitry Donskoy", "Vladimir Monomakh", "Svetlana", "Emerald", "Pearl", "Diamond"; auxiliary cruiser "Ural".

Destroyers: 1st detachment - "Troublesome", "Fast", "Wild", "Brave"; 2nd squad - "Loud", "Terrible", "Brilliant", "Flawless", "Cheerful". Transports "Anadyr", "Irtysh", "Kamchatka", "Korea", towing steamers "Rus" and "Svir" and hospital ships "Orel" and "Kostroma".

The squadron marched in the march formation of two wake columns of warships, between which a detachment of transports walked, having the 1st and 2nd detachments of destroyers guarded on both sides, while giving out a speed of 8 knots at the most. Behind the squadron were both hospital ships, thanks to the bright illumination of which the squadron was noticed the day before.

Tactical formation of the Russian squadron before the battle

Although the list looks impressive, only the first five warships were a serious fighting force that could compete with the Japanese battleships. In addition, the total speed of 8 knots was due to the slowness of transports and some obsolete battleships and cruisers, although the main backbone of the squadron could almost double the speed.

Admiral Togo was going to take a cunning maneuver, turning around in front of the very nose of the Russian squadron, while concentrating fire on the head battleships - knocking them out of action, and then knocking out those following the head ones. Auxiliary Japanese cruisers and destroyers were supposed to finish off enemy ships with torpedo attacks.

The tactics of Admiral Rozhdestvensky consisted, to put it mildly, "in nothing." The main directive was to break through to Vladivostok, and in the event of loss of control of the flagship battleships, their place was taken by the next in the column. Also, the destroyers "Buyny" and "Bedovy" were assigned to the flagship battleship as evacuation ships and were obliged to save the vice admiral and his staff in the event of the death of the battleship.

Captain 1st rank Vladimir Iosifovich Baer in his youth

By 13:50, shots were fired from the main caliber guns of Russian battleships at the lead Japanese Mikasa, the answer was not long in coming. Taking advantage of the passivity of Rozhdestvensky, the Japanese covered the head of the Russian squadron and opened fire. The flagship "Prince Suvorov" and "Oslyabya" suffered the most. After half an hour of battle, the battleship Oslyabya, engulfed in fire and a huge list, rolled out of the general formation, and after another half an hour turned over with a keel. Together with the battleship, its commander, Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Iosifovich Baer, ​​who until the last time led the evacuation of sailors from the sinking ship, died. The entire staff of mechanics, engineers and stokers, who were in the very depths of the battleship, also died: during the battle, the engine room should have been covered with armored plates from the protection of fragments and shells, and during the death of the ship, the sailors assigned to lift these plates fled.

Soon, the battleship Knyaz Suvorov, engulfed in flames, jumped out of action. The place at the head of the squadron was taken by the battleships Borodino and Alexander III. Closer to 15:00, fog shrouded the water surface, and the battle stopped. The Russian squadron headed north, having by that time also lost the hospital ships that were at the tail of the squadron. As it turned out later, they were captured by light Japanese cruisers, thereby leaving the Russian squadron without medical care.

The last minutes of the life of the battleship "Oslyabya"

After 40 minutes, the battle resumed. Enemy squadrons reached fairly close distances, which led to even faster destruction of Russian ships. The battleships Sisoy the Great and Eagle, having on board more dead than living crew members, barely kept up with the main forces.

By half past five, the 2nd Pacific Squadron headed northeast, where it connected with cruisers and transports that fought against the stray cruiser detachments of the Japanese Admiral Uriu. Meanwhile, the wounded Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky and his entire staff were removed from the battleship "Prince Suvorov", which miraculously kept on the water, by the destroyer "Buyny". The main part of the crew refused to leave the battleship and, having only stern small-caliber guns in service, continued to fight off enemy attacks. After 20 minutes, the "Prince Suvorov", surrounded by 12 enemy ships, was shot at almost point-blank range from mine vehicles and sank, taking the entire crew with it to the bottom. In total, 17 torpedoes were fired at the battleship during the battle, only the last three hit the target.

Surrounded, but not broken "Prince Suvorov"

An hour and a half before sunset, unable to withstand a large number of hits and unable to fend off the increasing list, the head battleships Borodino and Alexander III sank one after another. Later, the only survivor from the Borodin crew, sailor Semyon Yuschin, was rescued from the water by the Japanese. The crew of "Alexander III" was completely lost along with the ship.

Battleship "Borodino" during sea trials

With the onset of twilight, Japanese destroyers entered the business. Due to their invisibility and large numbers (about 42 units), destroyers were selected at critically close distances to Russian ships. As a result, during the night battle, the Russian squadron lost the cruiser Vladimir Monomakh, the battleships Navarin, Sisoy Veliky, Admiral Nakhimov and the destroyer Imperfect. The crews of "Vladimir Monomakh", "Sisogo the Great" and "Admiral Nakhimov" were lucky - almost all the sailors of these ships were rescued and captured by the Japanese. Only three people were saved from the Navarin, and not a single one from the Impeccable.

Night attacks by Japanese destroyers on a scattered Russian squadron

Meanwhile, a detachment of cruisers under the command of Rear Admiral Enkvist, having lost the Ural cruiser and the Rus tugboat during the battle, persistently tried to head north. This was hampered by the incessant attacks of Japanese destroyers for almost an hour. As a result, unable to withstand the pressure and losing sight of all the transports and cruisers except the Aurora and Oleg, Enquist took these cruisers to Manila, where they were disarmed. Thus, the most famous "ship of the revolution" was saved.

Rear Admiral Oskar Adolfovich Enkvist

Starting from the very morning of May 15, the 2nd Pacific continued to suffer losses. In an unequal battle, having lost almost half of the personnel, the destroyer Loud was destroyed. The former tsar's yacht Svetlana could not stand the "one against three" battle. The destroyer "Fast", seeing the death of the "Svetlana", tried to get away from the chase, but, unable to do this, jumped ashore on the Korean Peninsula; his crew was taken prisoner.

Closer to noon, the battleships "Emperor Nicholas I", "Eagle", "General-Admiral Apraksin" and "Admiral Senyavin" that remained on the move were surrounded and surrendered. From the point of view of combat capabilities, these ships could only die heroically without causing any damage to the enemy. The crews of the battleships were exhausted, demoralized and had no desire to fight against the main forces of the Japanese armored fleet.

The fast cruiser Izumrud, which accompanied the surviving battleships, broke out of the encirclement and broke away from the chase sent, but how bold and glorious its breakthrough was, the death of this cruiser was just as inglorious. Subsequently, the crew of the Emerald, already off the coast of the Motherland, got lost and, constantly tormented by the fear of being chased by Japanese cruisers, ran the cruiser aground in a fever and then blew it up. The tortured crew of the cruiser reached Vladivostok by land routes.

Cruiser "Izumrud", blown up by the crew in the Gulf of Vladimir

By evening, the commander-in-chief of the squadron, Admiral Rozhestvensky, who by that time was on the destroyer Bedovy, surrendered himself. The last losses of the 2nd Pacific Squadron were the death of the cruiser "Dmitry Donskoy" near the island of Evenlet and the heroic death of the battleship "Admiral Ushakov" under the command of Vladimir Nikolaevich Miklukho-Maclay, brother of the famous traveler and discoverer of Australia and Oceania. The commanders of both ships were killed.

On the left is the commander of the battleship Admiral Ushakov, captain 1st rank Vladimir Nikolayevich Miklukho-Maclay. Right tocommander of the cruiser "Dmitry Donskoy" captain 1st rank Ivan Nikolaevich Lebedev

The results of the Tsushima battle for the Russian Empire were deplorable: the squadron battleships "Prince Suvorov", "Emperor Alexander III", "Borodino", "Oslyabya" died in battle from enemy artillery fire; coastal defense battleship "Admiral Ushakov"; cruisers "Svetlana", "Dmitry Donskoy"; auxiliary cruiser "Ural"; destroyers "Gromky", "Brilliant", "Flawless"; transports "Kamchatka", "Irtysh"; towing ship "Rus".

The squadron battleships Navarin and Sisoy Veliky, the armored cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, and the cruiser Vladimir Monomakh were killed in battle as a result of torpedo attacks.

Destroyed by their personnel due to the impossibility of further resistance to the enemy, the destroyers "Buyny" and "Fast", the cruiser "Izumrud".

The squadron battleships "Emperor Nicholas I", "Eagle" capitulated to the Japanese; battleships of the coastal turnover "General-Admiral Apraksin", "Admiral Senyavin" and the destroyer "Badovy".

Scheme with the alleged designation of the places of death of the ships of the 2nd Pacific squadron

The cruisers "Oleg", "Aurora", "Zhemchug" were interned and disarmed in neutral ports; transport "Korea"; tugboat "Svir" The hospital ships "Orel" and "Kostroma" were captured by the enemy.

Only the Almaz cruiser and the destroyers Bravy and Grozny managed to break through to Vladivostok. Suddenly, a heroic fate fell on the Anadyr transport, which independently returned to Russia, and later managed to fight in World War II.

The 2nd Pacific squadron of the Russian fleet out of 16170 people lost 5045 people killed and drowned. 7282 people were taken prisoner, including 2 admirals. 2110 people went to foreign ports and were interned. 910 people managed to break into Vladivostok.

The Japanese losses were much less. 116 people were killed and 538 wounded. The fleet lost 3 destroyers. Of these, one was sunk in battle - presumably by the cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh" - during the night phase of the battle. Another destroyer was sunk by the battleship Navarin, also while repulsing night mine attacks. The rest of the ships escaped with only damage.

The devastating defeat of the Russian fleet gave rise to a whole chain of scandals and trials of the perpetrators. During the trial of the Naval Court of the Kronstadt Port in St. Petersburg in the case of the surrender to the enemy of the ships of the detachment of Rear Admiral Nebogatov: the battleships "Emperor Nicholas I" and "Eagle" and the coastal defense battleships "General Admiral Apraksin" and " Admiral Senyavin, Rear Admiral Nebogatov, the commanders of the ships that had surrendered, and 74 officers of the same 4 ships were put on trial.

At the trial, Admiral Nebogatov took the blame on himself, justifying his subordinates up to the sailors. After holding 15 meetings, the court delivered a verdict, according to which Nebogatov and the captains of the ships were sentenced to death with a petition to Nicholas II to replace it with imprisonment in a fortress for 10 years; the flag-captain of the headquarters of Rear Admiral Nebogatov, captain of the 2nd rank Cross was sentenced to imprisonment in the fortress for 4 months, the senior officers of the ships "Emperor Nicholas I" and "Admiral Senyavin" captain of the 2nd rank Vedernikov and captain of the 2nd rank Artshvager - for 3 months; senior officer of the coastal defense battleship "General-Admiral Apraksin" Lieutenant Fridovsky - for 2 months. All others were justified. However, in less than a few months, Nebogatov and the commanders of the ships were released ahead of schedule by decision of the emperor.

Rear Admiral Nikolai Ivanovich Nebogatov

Rear Admiral Enquist, who almost treacherously took away the cruisers from the battlefield, received no punishment at all and was dismissed from service with a promotion to vice admiral in 1907. The head of the broken squadron, Vice-Admiral Rozhdestvensky, was acquitted in view of a serious wound and an almost unconscious state at the time of surrender. Under pressure from public opinion, Emperor Nicholas II was forced to dismiss from service his uncle, the chief commander of the fleet and the Naval Department, General Admiral Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich, who became famous more for his active social life in Paris than for his competent leadership of the Imperial Navy.

Another unpleasant scandal is associated with the colossal problems of the Russian fleet in the field of shells. In 1906, the battleship Slava, which at the time of the formation of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was still on the stocks, took part in the suppression of the Sveaborg uprising. During the uprising, the battleship fired on the fortifications of Sveaborg with main-caliber guns. After the suppression of the uprising, it was noticed that none of the shells fired from the Glory exploded. The reason for this was the substance pyroxylin, which was very susceptible to moisture.

Battleship Slava, 1906

The battleships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron also used shells with pyroxylin, moreover: before a long voyage, it was decided to increase the amount of moisture in the shells of the squadron's ammunition in order to avoid involuntary detonation. The consequences were quite predictable: the shells did not detonate even when they hit Japanese ships.

Japanese naval commanders, on the other hand, used the explosive substance shimozu for their shells, shells with which often exploded right in the barrel channels. When they hit Russian battleships or even when they came into contact with the water surface, such shells almost completely exploded and produced a huge amount of fragments. As a result, a successful hit by a Japanese shell produced great destruction and often caused a fire, while a Russian pyroxylin shell left behind only a smooth hole.

A hole from a Japanese shell in the hull of the battleship "Eagle" and the battleship itself after the battle

The 2nd Pacific Squadron was not ready for battle either tactically or in terms of weapons, and in fact went to voluntary suicide in the Sea of ​​Japan. War provides costly and important lessons, and the Battle of Tsushima is one of them. Any weakness, any laxity, any letting things take their course leads to approximately the same results. We must learn to appreciate the lessons of the past - the most comprehensive conclusions must be drawn from each defeat. First of all, in the name and for our future victories.

Photos from open sources

On May 27-28, 1905, the Russian 2nd Pacific squadron was defeated by the Japanese fleet. "Tsushima" has become a household name for the fiasco. We decided to understand why this tragedy happened.

1 Long hike

Initially, the task of the 2nd Pacific squadron was to help the besieged Port Arthur. But after the fall of the fortress, the Rozhdestvensky squadron was assigned the very vague task of independently gaining dominance at sea, which was difficult to achieve without good bases.

The only major port (Vladivostok) was far enough away from the theater of operations and had too little infrastructure for a huge squadron. The campaign, as you know, took place in extremely difficult conditions and was a feat in itself, since it was possible to concentrate an armada of 38 different types of ships and auxiliary vessels in the Sea of ​​Japan without losses in the ship composition and serious accidents.

The squadron command and ship commanders had to solve a lot of problems, ranging from the most difficult loading of coal on the high seas to organizing leisure time for crews who quickly lost discipline during long monotonous stops. All this, of course, was done to the detriment of the combat state, and the ongoing exercises did not and could not give good results. And this is more the rule than the exception, since there are no examples in naval history when a squadron that made a long hard trip away from bases could achieve victory in a naval battle.

2 Artillery: pyroxylin against shimose

Often in the literature on the Tsushima battle, the terrible high-explosive action of Japanese shells, which burst even from hitting the water, is emphasized, as opposed to Russian ammunition. The Japanese in the Tsushima battle fired shells with a powerful high-explosive action that caused great destruction. True, Japanese shells also had the unpleasant property of exploding in the barrels of their own guns.

So, under Tsushima, the Nissin cruiser lost three of its four main battery guns. Russian armor-piercing shells loaded with wet pyroxylin had a less explosive effect, and often pierced light Japanese ships without bursting. Of the twenty-four 305 mm shells that hit the Japanese ships, eight did not explode. So, at the end of the daytime battle, the flagship of Admiral Kammamura, the cruiser Izumo, was lucky when a Russian shell from the Shisoya the Great hit the engine room, but, fortunately for the Japanese, did not explode.

The significant overload of Russian ships with a large amount of coal, water and various cargoes also played into the hands of the Japanese, when the main armor belt of most Russian battleships in the Tsushima battle was below the waterline. And high-explosive shells, which could not penetrate the armor belt, caused terrible damage in terms of their scale, falling into the skin of ships.

But one of the main reasons for the defeat of the 2nd Pacific squadron was not even the quality of the shells, but the competent use of artillery by the Japanese, who concentrated fire on the best Russian ships. The start of the battle, unsuccessful for the Russian squadron, allowed the Japanese to very quickly disable the flagship Knyaz Suvorov and inflict fatal damage on the battleship Oslyabya. The main result of the decisive daytime battle was the death of the core of the Russian squadron - the battleships "Emperor Alexander III", "Prince Suvorov" and "Borodino", as well as the high-speed "Oslyabya". The fourth battleship of the "Borodino" type - "Eagle" received a large number of hits, but retained its combat capability.

It must be taken into account that out of 360 hits of large shells, about 265 fell on the aforementioned ships. The Russian squadron fired less concentrated fire, and although the battleship Mikasa was the main target, due to the disadvantageous position, the Russian commanders were forced to transfer fire to other enemy ships.

3 Low speed

The advantage of Japanese ships in speed became a significant factor in the death of the Russian squadron. The Russian squadron fought at a speed of 9 knots; Japanese fleet - 16. However, it should be noted that most Russian ships could develop a much larger speed.

So, four of the newest Russian battleships of the Borodino type were not inferior to the enemy in speed, and the ships of the 2nd and 3rd combat detachments could give a speed of 12-13 knots and the enemy’s advantage in speed would not be so significant.

Having tied himself up with low-speed transports, which still turned out to be impossible to protect from the attacks of light enemy forces, Rozhdestvensky untied the hands of the enemy. Having an advantage in speed, the Japanese fleet fought in favorable conditions, covering the head of the Russian squadron. The daytime battle was marked by a number of pauses, when the opponents lost sight of each other and the Russian ships had a chance to break through. But again, the low squadron speed led to the fact that the enemy overtook the Russian squadron. In the battles of May 28, low speed tragically affected the fate of individual Russian ships and became one of the reasons for the death of the battleship Admiral Ushakov, the cruisers Dmitry Donskoy and Svetlana.

4 Management crisis

One of the reasons for the defeat in the Tsushima battle was the lack of initiative of the squadron command - both Rozhdestvensky himself and the junior flagships. There were no specific instructions before the battle. In the event of a failure of the flagship, the squadron was supposed to be led by the next battleship in the ranks, keeping the set course. This automatically nullified the role of Rear Admirals Enquist and Nebogatov. And who led the squadron in the daytime battle after the failure of the flagship?

The battleships "Alexander III" and "Borodino" died with the entire crew, and who really led the ships, replacing the retired ship commanders - officers, and maybe sailors - this will never be known. In reality, after the failure of the flagship and the injury of Rozhdestvensky himself, the squadron fought virtually without a commander.

Only in the evening Nebogatov took command of the squadron - more precisely, with what he could gather around him. In the outset of the battle, Rozhdestvensky began an unsuccessful rebuilding. Historians argue whether the Russian admiral could seize the initiative, taking advantage of the fact that the core of the Japanese fleet had to fight for the first 15 minutes, actually doubling the formation and passing the turning point. The hypotheses are different .... but only one thing is known - neither at that moment, nor later, decisive actions were taken by Rozhdestvensky.

5 Night battle, searchlights and torpedoes

On the evening of May 27, after the completion of the daytime battle, the Russian squadron was subjected to numerous attacks by Japanese destroyers and suffered serious losses. It is noteworthy that only those single Russian ships that turned on searchlights and tried to shoot back were torpedoed. So the battleship Navarin died with almost the entire crew, and the Sisoy Veliky, Admiral Nakhimov and Vladimir Monomakh, which received hits from torpedoes, sank on the morning of May 28.

For comparison, during the battle in the Yellow Sea on July 28, 1904, the Russian squadron was also attacked by Japanese destroyers at night, but then, observing the disguise, successfully disengaged from the battle, and the night battle was marked by the useless consumption of coal and torpedoes, as well as the misfortunes of the Japanese destroyers.

In the Tsushima battle, mine attacks, as well as during the battle in the Yellow Sea, were poorly organized - as a result, many destroyers were damaged by Russian artillery fire or as a result of accidents. Destroyers No. 34 and No. 35 were sunk, and No. 69 sank after a collision with the Akatsuki-2 (former Russian Resolute, illegally captured by the Japanese in neutral Chifu).

Tsushima naval battle (1905)

Tsushima battle - took place on May 14 (27) - May 15 (28), 1905 in the area of ​​\u200b\u200babout. Tsushima, in which the Russian 2nd squadron of the Pacific Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky suffered a crushing defeat from the Japanese squadron under the command of Admiral Heihachiro Togo.

balance of power

The final stage of the campaign of the 2nd Pacific Squadron to the Far East was the Battle of Tsushima, which took place on May 14, 1905 in the Korea Strait. By that time, the Russian squadron had 8 squadron battleships (of which 3 were old), 3 coastal defense battleships, an armored cruiser, 8 cruisers, 5 auxiliary cruisers and 9 destroyers. The main forces of the squadron, which consisted of 12 armored ships, were divided into 3 detachments of 4 ships each. The cruisers were consolidated into 2 detachments - cruising and reconnaissance. The squadron commander, Admiral Rozhestvensky, held his flag on the battleship Suvorov.

The Japanese fleet, under the command of Admiral Togo, consisted of 4 squadron battleships, 6 coastal defense battleships, 8 armored cruisers, 16 cruisers, 24 auxiliary cruisers and 63 destroyers. It was divided into 8 combat detachments, of which the first and second, consisting of squadron battleships and armored cruisers, represented the main forces. The commander of the first detachment was Admiral Togo, the second - Admiral Kamimura.

Weapon quality

The Russian fleet in terms of the number of armored ships (squadron battleships and armored cruisers) was not inferior to the enemy, but in terms of quality, the superiority was on the side of the Japanese. The main forces of the Japanese squadron had significantly more large and medium caliber guns; Japanese artillery was almost three times superior to Russian in rate of fire, and Japanese shells had 5 times more explosive than Russian high-explosive shells. Thus, the armored ships of the Japanese squadron had higher tactical and technical data than the Russian squadron battleships and armored cruisers. To this it should be added that the Japanese had multiple superiority in cruisers, especially in destroyers.

combat experience

The great advantage of the Japanese squadron was that it had combat experience, while the Russian squadron, having no such, after a long and difficult transition, had to immediately engage in battle with the enemy. The Japanese had a lot of experience in carrying out live firing at long distances, which was gained in the first period of the war. They were well trained in the conduct of concentrated fire with several ships at a single target at long distances. Russian gunners, on the other hand, did not have experience-tested rules for firing at long distances and did not have the practice of conducting this kind of firing. The experience of the Russian Port Arthur squadron in this regard was not studied and even ignored by both the leaders of the main naval headquarters and the commander of the 2nd Pacific squadron.

Admiral Rozhdestvensky and Admiral Togo

Side tactics

At the time of the arrival of the Russian squadron in the Far East, the main forces of the Japanese in the 1st and 2nd combat detachments were concentrated in the Korean port of Mozampo, and the cruisers and destroyers - about. Tsushima. 20 miles south of Mozampo, between the islands of Goto Kvelpart, the Japanese deployed a patrol of cruisers, whose task was to timely detect the Russian squadron when approaching the Korea Strait and ensure the deployment of their main forces on its movements.

Thus, the initial position of the Japanese before the battle was so favorable that any possibility of the passage of the Russian squadron through the Korea Strait without a fight was excluded. Rozhdestvensky decided to break through to Vladivostok by the shortest route through the Korea Strait. Considering that the Japanese fleet was much stronger than the Russian squadron, he did not draw up a battle plan, but decided to act depending on the actions of the enemy fleet. Thus, the commander of the Russian squadron abandoned active operations, giving the initiative to the enemy. Literally the same thing was repeated as in the battle in the Yellow Sea.

balance of power

On the night of May 14, the Russian squadron approached the Korean Strait and was built into a night marching order. Ahead, cruisers were deployed along the course, followed by squadron battleships and transports between them in two wake columns. Behind the squadron at a distance of one mile were 2 hospital ships. When moving through the Rozhdestvensky Strait, contrary to the elementary requirements of tactics, he refused to conduct reconnaissance and did not darken the ships, which helped the Japanese to detect the Russian squadron and concentrate their fleet on its way.

First at 2:25. noticed the Russian squadron by fire and reported to Admiral Togo the auxiliary cruiser Shinano-Maru, which was on patrol between the islands of Goto-Kvelpart. Soon, due to the intensive work of Japanese radiotelegraph stations on Russian ships, they realized that they had been discovered. But Admiral Rozhdestvensky abandoned any attempt to interfere with the Japanese negotiations.

Having received a report about the discovery of the Russians, the commander of the Japanese fleet left Mozampo and deployed the main forces of his fleet in the path of the Russian movement. The tactical plan of Admiral Togo was to cover the head of the Russian squadron with the main forces and with concentrated fire on the flagships to disable them than to deprive the squadron of control, and then develop the success of the daytime battle with night attacks of destroyers and complete the defeat of the Russian squadron.

On the morning of May 14, Rozhdestvensky rebuilt his squadron, first into the formation of a wake, and then two wake columns, leaving the transports behind the squadron under the protection of cruisers. Following in the ranks of two wake columns by the Korea Strait, the Russian squadron at 13 h 30 min. to the right of the bow, she discovered the main forces of the Japanese fleet, which were going to cross her course.

The Japanese admiral, trying to cover the head of the Russian squadron, did not calculate his maneuver and passed at a distance of 70 cab. from the lead Russian ship. At the same time, Rozhdestvensky, believing that the Japanese wanted to attack the left column of the squadron, which consisted of old ships, again rebuilt his fleet from two wake columns into one. The main forces of the Japanese fleet, maneuvering as part of two combat detachments, having gone to the port side, began a sequential turn of 16 points in order to cover the head of the Russian squadron.

This turn, which was made at a distance of 38 cab. from the lead Russian ship and lasting 15 minutes, put the Japanese ships in an extremely disadvantageous position. Making a successive turn on the return flight, the Japanese ships described the circulation in almost one place, and if the Russian squadron had opened fire in time and concentrated it on the turning point of the Japanese fleet, the latter could have suffered serious losses. But this favorable moment was not used.

The lead ships of the Russian squadron opened fire only at 13:49. The fire was ineffective, because due to improper control it was not focused on the Japanese ships, which were turning around on the spot. As the enemy ships turned, they opened fire, concentrating it on the flagships Suvorov and Oslyabya. Each of them was simultaneously fired from 4 to 6 Japanese battleships and cruisers. Russian squadron battleships also tried to concentrate their fire on one of the enemy ships, but due to the lack of appropriate rules and experience in such firing, they could not achieve a positive result.

The superiority of the Japanese fleet in artillery and the weakness of armoring their ships had an immediate effect. At 14:23 battleship "Oslyabya", was seriously damaged and out of order and soon sank. Around 2:30 p.m. the battleship "Surov" went out of order. Having been seriously damaged and completely engulfed in flames, for another 5 hours he repelled the continuous attacks of enemy cruisers and destroyers, but at 19:30. also sank.

After the battleships "Oslyabya" and "Suvorov" went out of action, the order of the Russian squadron was disrupted, and it lost control. The Japanese took advantage of this and, going into the head of the Russian squadron, increased their fire. At the head of the Russian squadron was the battleship "Alexander III", and after his death - "Borodino".

In an effort to break through to Vladivostok, the Russian squadron was on a general course of 23 degrees. The Japanese, having a great advantage in speed, covered the head of the Russian squadron and concentrated fire on almost all of their battleships on the leading ship. Russian sailors and officers, finding themselves in a difficult situation, did not leave their combat posts and, with their characteristic courage and stamina, repulsed enemy attacks to the last.

At 15:05 fog began, and visibility decreased to such an extent that the opponents, having dispersed on counter courses, lost each other. Around 3:40 p.m. the Japanese again discovered the Russian ships heading to the northeast, and resumed the battle with them. At about 4 p.m., the Russian squadron, evading envelopment, turned south. Soon the battle was again stopped due to fog. This time, Admiral Togo could not find the Russian squadron for an hour and a half and, finally, was forced to use his main forces to search for it.

daytime fight

Having organized reconnaissance well before the battle, Togo neglected it during the Tsushima battle, as a result of which he lost sight of the Russian squadron twice. In the daytime phase of the battle, the Japanese destroyers, who were keeping close to their main forces, launched several torpedo attacks against the Russian ships damaged in the artillery battle. These attacks were carried out simultaneously by a group of destroyers (4 ships per group) from different directions. The shells were fired from a distance of 4 to 9 cab. Of the 30 torpedoes, only 5 hit the target, while three of them hit the battleship Suvorov.

At 5:52 p.m. the main forces of the Japanese fleet, discovered the Russian squadron, which at that time was fighting with Japanese cruisers, attacked it again. Admiral Togo, this time, was distracted from the head-covering maneuver and fought on parallel courses. By the end of the daytime battle, which lasted until 19:12, the Japanese were able to sink 2 more Russian battleships - Alexander III and Borodino. With the onset of darkness, the Japanese commander stopped the artillery battle and headed with the main forces to about. Ollyndo, and ordered the destroyers to attack the Russian squadron with torpedoes.

Night fight

Around 20:00, up to 60 Japanese destroyers, divided into small detachments, began to cover the Russian squadron. Their attacks began at 20:45. simultaneously from three directions and were unorganized. Of the 75 torpedoes fired from a distance of 1 to 3 cabs, only six hit the target. Reflecting torpedo attacks, Russian sailors were able to destroy 2 Japanese destroyers and damaged 12. In addition, as a result of collisions between their ships, the Japanese lost another destroyer, and six destroyers were seriously damaged.

Morning May 15

By the morning of May 15, the Russian squadron ceased to exist as an organized force. As a result of frequent evasions from attacks by Japanese destroyers, Russian ships dispersed throughout the Korea Strait. Only individual ships tried to break through to Vladivostok on their own. Encountering superior forces of the Japanese on their way, they entered into an unequal battle with them and fought it to the last shell.

The crews of the coastal defense battleship Admiral Ushakov under the command of Captain 1st Rank Miklukho-Maclay and the cruiser Dmitry Donskoy under the command of Captain 2nd Rank Lebedev fought heroically against the enemy. These ships died in an unequal battle, but did not lower their flags in front of the enemy. The junior flagship of the Russian squadron, Admiral Nebogatov, acted differently, surrendering to the Japanese without a fight.

Losses

In the Battle of Tsushima, the Russian squadron lost 8 armored ships, 4 cruisers, an auxiliary cruiser, 5 destroyers and several transports. 4 armored ships and a destroyer, together with Rozhdestvensky (due to the wound, he was unconscious) and Nebogatov surrendered. Some of the ships were interned in foreign ports. And only the Almaz cruiser and 2 destroyers were able to break through to Vladivostok. The Japanese lost 3 destroyers in this battle. Many of their ships were seriously damaged.

Reasons for the defeat

The defeat of the Russian squadron was due to the overwhelming superiority of the enemy in forces and the unpreparedness of the Russian squadron for battle. Much of the blame for the defeat of the Russian fleet lies with Rozhestvensky, who, as a commander, made a number of serious mistakes. He ignored the experience of the Port Arthur squadron, abandoned reconnaissance and led the squadron blindly, did not have a battle plan, misused his cruisers and destroyers, refused active operations and did not organize force control during the battle.

Actions of the Japanese squadron

The Japanese squadron, having sufficient time and action; in favorable conditions, well prepared for a meeting with the Russian fleet. The Japanese chose an advantageous position for the battle, thanks to which they were able to timely detect the Russian squadron and concentrated their main forces along its route.

But Admiral Togo also made serious mistakes. He miscalculated his maneuvering before the battle, as a result of which he could not cover the head of the Russian squadron when it was discovered. Having made a sequential turn in 38 cab. from the Russian squadron, Togo exposed his ships to its attack, and only the inept actions of Rozhdestvensky saved the Japanese fleet from the serious consequences of this wrong maneuver. Togo did not organize tactical reconnaissance during the battle, as a result he repeatedly lost contact with the Russian squadron, incorrectly used the cruisers in the battle, resorting to the search for the Russian squadron by the main forces.

conclusions

The experience of the Tsushima battle once again showed that the main means of striking in battle was large-caliber artillery, which decided the outcome of the battle. Artillery of medium caliber with increasing combat distance did not justify itself. It became necessary to develop new, more advanced methods of controlling artillery fire, as well as the possibility of using torpedo weapons from destroyers in day and night conditions to build on the success achieved in artillery combat.

An increase in the penetration ability of armor-piercing and destructive high-explosive shells required an increase in the armor area of ​​the ship's side and strengthening the horizontal armor. The battle formation of the fleet - a single-keel column with a large number of ships - did not justify itself, as it made it difficult to use weapons and control forces in battle. The advent of radio increased the ability to communicate and control forces at a distance of up to 100 miles.