Tsar's surplus appropriation system. The historical essence of surplus appropriation Prodrazvyorka and labor service


The transition to the NEP and the formation of the USSR

After the October Revolution, when most central departments stopped working, the Ministry of Food continued to conduct it, recognizing the food business as outside of politics, and its local authorities shared the same opinion. At first, representatives of the Soviet government behaved more or less passively in relation to existing bodies. However, back on October 26 (November 8), 1917, a decree on the basis of the Ministry of Food created the People's Commissariat of Food, whose responsibilities were the procurement and distribution of food and essential items on a national scale. Its head became, according to the Resolution of the 2nd Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies from the same date - before the meeting of the constituent assembly - a nobleman, professional revolutionary Ivan-Bronislav Adolfovich Teodorovich, former deputy chairman of the Petrograd City Duma. But by mid-December, when he finally left the post of People's Commissar, the results of his activities in the People's Commissariat were zero and the previous structure of the Ministry was actually functioning. The Council of People's Commissars appointed a professional revolutionary who did not have a higher education, A. G. Shlikhter, a supporter of strict administrative methods of work, as deputy people's commissar. He very quickly managed to turn both new and old food workers against himself. During the meeting of the Verussian Food Congress (late November 1917), the Ministry of Food was occupied by representatives of the Soviet government, which caused the cessation of work by its employees. After this, a long process of forming a new structure of the central food authority began. Various combinations were formed and died out - right up to dictatorship (Trotsky). This happened until February 1918, when the highest food power began to gradually concentrate in the hands of the Food Commissioner. On November 28, 1917, Tsyurupa was appointed “Comrade People’s Commissar of Food,” and on February 25, 1918, the Council of People’s Commissars approved him as People’s Commissar of Food. But by the spring of 1918 it was discovered that the long-term crisis of the central food authorities had led to the disorganization of food authorities and their activities on the ground. This was expressed in ignoring the orders of the center and the actual introduction of their own “norms” and “orders” in each individual province and district. The situation was aggravated by rapidly depreciating money and the lack of consumer goods to support it.

Tsyurupa proposed sending supplies of manufactured goods, agricultural machinery and essential items worth 1.162 million rubles to grain-producing regions. On March 25, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars approved Tsyurupa's report and provided him with the required resources. By the spring of 1918, the producing regions were either cut off or were under the control of forces hostile to Soviet Russia. In the controlled regions, grain owners did not recognize the decisions of the congresses and executive committees of the Soviets on limiting free sales and control measures, responding to attempts to account for and requisition surpluses by stopping the supply of grain to cities and rural bazaars. Bread became the strongest means of putting pressure on the authorities.


By spring sowing, the state managed to obtain only 18% of the required seeds. They had to be taken in battle.

The food situation within the country was becoming critical. The extreme conditions that prevailed in the country at the end of spring (1918) forced the Bolsheviks to resort to emergency measures to obtain grain. The basis for the question of the continued existence of Soviet power is food. On May 9, a Decree was issued confirming the state monopoly of grain trade (introduced by the provisional government) and prohibiting private trade in bread.

On May 13, 1918, the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars “On granting the People's Commissar of Food emergency powers to combat the rural bourgeoisie harboring and speculating on grain reserves” established the basic provisions of the food dictatorship. The goal of the food dictatorship was to centralize the procurement and distribution of food, suppress the resistance of the kulaks and combat baggage. The People's Commissariat for Food received unlimited powers in the procurement of food products. To develop plans for the distribution of essential products, the procurement of agricultural products and the exchange of goods, and to coordinate supply organizations, a special advisory body is established under the Food Commissariat - the Supply Council. Its members include representatives of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, departments of consumer societies (Centrosoyuz). The People's Commissariat for Food is given the right to set prices for essential items (under an Agreement with the Supreme Economic Council). The decree of May 27, which followed the decree of May 9, outlined some reorganization of local food authorities. The decree, preserving the district, provincial, regional, city and volost, rural and factory food committees, charges them with the steady implementation of the grain monopoly, the execution of commissariat orders and the distribution of basic necessities.

The Soviet government largely implemented the reforms planned by the Ministry of the Provisional Government. She strengthened the sole power of the commissars in the food organization and removed the volost authorities from procurement. It included representatives of consuming regions and the center among the members of the food brigades of producing regions. The adopted decrees did not contain instructions regarding the rights and powers of local bodies - which, under the new conditions, actually gave local representatives a free hand and arbitrariness from below. This arbitrariness actually turns into a real armed struggle for bread, ideologically motivated as one of the forms of class struggle of workers and the poor for bread. The weak supply of grain is presented as a certain policy of the “village kulaks and the rich.” The answer to “the violence of grain owners against the starving poor must be violence against the bourgeoisie.” The decree of May 9 declared everyone who had a surplus of grain and did not declare it within a week as “enemies of the people,” who were subject to a revolutionary trial and imprisonment for at least 10 years, free requisition of grain, and confiscation of property. Those who denounced such “enemies of the people” were entitled to half the cost of the bread not declared for delivery. The logical consequence of the decree of May 9 was the appearance of the Decree of July 11 “On the organization of the rural poor” - according to it, “volost and rural committees of the rural poor are established everywhere,” one of the two tasks of which is “to assist local food authorities in the removal of grain surplus from the hands of kulaks and rich people.” As an incentive for the work of the poor committees, from the surpluses seized before July 15, bread is distributed to the poor free of charge, between July 15 and August 15 - at half price, and in the second half of August - with a 20% discount from the fixed price. To ensure the success of the struggle for bread, according to the decree of May 27, food detachments of workers' organizations are organized. On August 6, a decree was issued on the organization of special harvesting and harvesting-requisition teams. Each such detachment must consist of at least 75 people and have 2-3 machine guns. With their help, the Soviet government planned to ensure the harvesting of winter crops sown by kulaks and landowners in the fall of 1917. The effectiveness of these measures was very low.

In connection with the introduction of the food dictatorship in May-June 1918, the Food Requisition Army of the People's Commissariat of Food of the RSFSR (Prodarmiya, consisting of armed food detachments) was created. To manage the Prodarmiya, on May 20, 1918, the Office of the Chief Commissar and the military leader of all food detachments was created under the People's Commissariat of Food.

Despite this, grain receipts were very low and came at a great cost. One and a half difficult months before the new harvest of 1918, the workers produced a little more than 2 million poods of grain, paying for it with the lives of more than 4,100 communists, workers and the poor.

The village, flooded with soldiers returning from the front, responded to armed violence with armed resistance and a series of uprisings.

Considerable attention was also paid to agitation - a form of influence on producers, also begun during the Provisional Government. Both in the center and locally, under the food authorities in the provinces, a network of courses for food agitators has been created. “Izvestia of the People’s Commissariat for Food”, “Bulletin of the People’s Commissariat for Food”, and “Product Worker’s Directory” are published regularly. “Memorable book of the food worker” and a number of other propaganda and reference publications.

Despite this, procurement in May 1918 fell 10 times compared to April of the same year.

The civil war forced emergency measures. On July 1, the People's Commissariat of Food by decree ordered local food authorities to take stock of grain and set deadlines for surpluses in accordance with the norms for leaving bread with the owners (dated March 25, 1917) but no more than until August 1, 1918.

On July 27, 1918, the People's Commissariat for Food adopted a special resolution on the introduction of a universal class food ration, divided into four categories, providing for measures to account for stocks and distribute food.

The decree of August 21 determined the size of the surplus for the new harvest of 1918, based on the same standards of March 1917 for seed grain; for food, the standards were reduced to 12 pounds of grain or flour and 3 pounds of cereal. In excess of the norm for each household up to 5 eaters - 5 poods, over 5 eaters +1 pood per each. Livestock standards were also reduced. As before, these standards could be lowered by decision of local organizations.

The food authorities, the People's Commissariat for Food and Tsyurupa personally were given emergency powers to supply the country with bread and other products. Relying on the personnel core of the People's Commissariat and old, experienced food workers, Tsyurupa implements the food appropriation system developed by Tsarist Minister Rittich and the law on grain monopoly carried out by cadet Shingaryov.

The strict grain collection measures recommended by Lenin in 1918 were not widespread. The People's Commissariat for Food was looking for more flexible methods of removing it, which would embitter the peasants less and could give maximum results. As an experiment, a number of provinces began to use a system of agreements, agreements between food authorities and peasants through Soviets and committees on the voluntary delivery of grain and payment for part of it in goods. The experiment was first tested in the summer in the Vyatka province by A. G. Shlichter. In September, he applied it in the Efremov district of the Tula province, achieving significant results under those conditions. Previously, in Efremovsky district, food workers could not feed their workers and the poor even with the help of emergency commissars and military force.

Schlichter's work experience showed that an agreement can be reached with peasants provided that they are attentive to their needs, understand their psychology, and respect for their work. Trust in the peasants, joint discussion with them of the difficult issue of determining surpluses, firm adherence to one’s line without threats or arbitrariness, fulfillment of promises made, all possible assistance to them - all this met with understanding among the peasants, bringing them closer to participation in solving the national cause. Explanation, help, and business control were most valued by the peasants.

The contractual allocation method provided a guaranteed harvest of grain. He partially practiced in other provinces - Penza, Kaluga, Pskov, Simbirsk. However, in the Kazan province, the use of agreements with peasants yielded only 18% of the surplus collection. Here, in the organization of allotment, a serious violation of the class principle was committed - taxation was carried out on an egalitarian basis.

Low grain supplies even with the beginning of the harvest led to famine in industrial centers. To alleviate hunger among the workers of Moscow and Petrograd, the government temporarily violated the grain monopoly, allowing them, using enterprise certificates, to purchase at free prices and transport one and a half pounds of bread privately for five weeks - from August 24 to October 1, 1918. Permission to transport one and a half pounds of bread 70% of the population of Petrograd took advantage, purchasing or exchanging 1,043,500 pounds of bread for things

Nevertheless, the fulfillment of procurement plans was extremely low (the Provisional Government planned to procure 440 million poods in 1918), and the methods of “unlimited” grain procurements locally, which in many cases looked like robbery and banditry, caused active opposition from the peasantry, which in a number of places developed into armed uprisings , which had anti-Bolshevik overtones.

By the fall of 1918, the territory of the former Russian Empire under the control of the Bolshevik Soviets amounted to no more than 1/4 of its original size. Before the completion of large-scale operations of the Civil War, various territories of the former Russian Empire passed from hand to hand and were controlled by forces of various orientations - from monarchists to anarchists. These regimes, in the case of more or less long-term control over the territory, also formed their own food policy.

Ukraine. On July 15, 1918, the government of Hetman Skoropadsky adopted the law “On the transfer of grain from the 1918 harvest to the disposal of the state,” which introduced a grain monopoly regime in the controlled territory. To fulfill obligations to the Austro-Hungarian troops, who essentially controlled this territory, 60 million pounds of grain had to be collected. The law provided for the same mechanisms for its implementation as the Law of the Provisional Government - the mandatory delivery of all agricultural products, with the exception of the norms established by the government. Refusal to surrender was also subject to requisition. These norms, as well as the practice of their implementation on the ground with the participation of units of the Austro-Hungarian army, caused active resistance from the peasants. In addition, in the regions there were detachments hired by former landowners, engaged in the “seizure of compensation” for land and other property dismantled by the peasants under the Bolsheviks.

At the beginning of 1919, the Petliura government made similar attempts to monopolize the market for bread and other food products and their distribution. It is worth noting that these attempts were not on a significant scale, because the territory controlled by the Petliura government was small.

Other armed groups that controlled various parts of the country, in most cases, limited themselves to “routine food seizures” - in essence, armed robberies.

Food appropriation under Soviet rule.

The surplus appropriation system was reintroduced by the Bolsheviks during the Civil War on January 11, 1919. (Decree on the introduction of surplus appropriation for bread) and became part of the Soviet policy of “war communism”.

The decree of the Council of People's Commissars of January 11, 1919 announced the introduction of surplus appropriation throughout the entire territory of Soviet Russia; in reality, surplus appropriation was carried out at first only in the central provinces controlled by the Bolsheviks: in Tula, Vyatka, Kaluga, Vitebsk, etc. Only as Bolshevik control spread over other territories later surplus appropriation was carried out in Ukraine (beginning of April 1919), in Belarus (1919), Turkestan and Siberia (1920). In accordance with the resolution of the People's Commissariat of Food of January 13, 1919 on the allocation procedure, state planning targets were calculated on the basis of provincial data on the size of sown areas, yields, and reserves of previous years. In the provinces, allocations were made to counties, volosts, villages, and then between individual peasant farms. Only in 1919 did improvements in the efficiency of the state food apparatus become noticeable. The collection of products was carried out by the bodies of the People's Commissariat for Food, food detachments, with the active assistance of the Committees of Poor People's Commissars (until the end of their existence at the beginning of 1919) and local Soviets.

Initially, the surplus appropriation system extended to bread and grain fodder. During the procurement campaign (1919-20), it also covered potatoes, meat, and by the end of 1920 - almost all agricultural products.

Food was confiscated from the peasants virtually free of charge, since the banknotes that were offered as payment were almost completely devalued, and the state could not offer industrial goods in exchange for the confiscated grain due to the decline in industrial production during the war and intervention.

In addition, when determining the size of the appropriation, they often proceeded not from the actual food surpluses of the peasants, but from the food needs of the army and urban population, therefore, not only the existing surpluses, but very often the entire seed fund and agricultural products necessary to feed the peasant himself were confiscated locally.

The discontent and resistance of the peasants during the seizure of food was suppressed by armed detachments of the poor peasants' committees, as well as special forces units of the Red Army (CHON) and detachments of the Food Army.

After suppressing the active resistance of the peasants to the surplus appropriation system, the Soviet authorities had to face passive resistance: the peasants hid grain, refused to accept money that had lost purchasing power, reduced acreage and production so as not to create surpluses that were useless for themselves, and produced products only in accordance with the consumer norm for their family.

As a result of the surplus appropriation system, 832,309 tons of grain were collected in the procurement campaign of 1916-1917; before the October Revolution of 1917, the Provisional Government collected 280 million poods (out of 720 planned) for the first 9 months of Soviet power - 5 million centners; for 1 year of surplus appropriation (08/1/1918-08/1/1919) - 18 million centners; 2nd year (08/1/1919-08/1/1920) - 35 million centners; 3rd year (08/1/1920-08/1/1921) - 46.7 million centners.

Weather data on grain procurements for this period: 1918/1919 - 1,767,780 tons; 1919/1920 - 3,480,200 tons; 1920/1921 - 6,011,730 tons.

Despite the fact that the surplus appropriation system allowed the Bolsheviks to solve the vital problem of supplying food to the Red Army and the urban proletariat, due to the ban on the free sale of bread and grain, commodity-money relations were significantly reduced, which began to slow down the post-war economic recovery, and in agriculture the sowing season began to decline. areas, yields and gross yields. This was explained by the disinterest of the peasants in producing products that were practically taken away from them. In addition, the food appropriation system in the RSFSR caused strong discontent among the peasantry and their armed revolts. The 1920 crop failure in the Volga region and the central regions of the RSFSR, against the backdrop of a lack of reserves among both peasants and the government, led to a new food crisis at the beginning of 1921.

In connection with the transition from war communism to the NEP, on March 21, 1921, the surplus appropriation system was replaced by a tax in kind, thereby existing during the most crisis years of the Civil War.

V.I. Lenin explained the existence of the food appropriation system and the reasons for abandoning it: Tax in food is one of the forms of transition from a kind of “war communism”, forced by extreme need, ruin and war, to correct socialist product exchange. And this latter, in turn, is one of the forms of transition from socialism with features caused by the predominance of the small peasantry in the population to communism.

A kind of “war communism” consisted in the fact that we actually took from the peasants all the surplus, and sometimes not even the surplus, but part of the food necessary for the peasant, and took it to cover the costs of the army and the maintenance of the workers. They mostly took it on credit, using paper money. Otherwise, we could not defeat the landowners and capitalists in a ruined small-peasant country...

But it is no less necessary to know the real measure of this merit. "War communism" was forced by war and ruin. It was not and could not be a policy that corresponded to the economic tasks of the proletariat. It was a temporary measure. The correct policy of the proletariat, exercising its dictatorship in a small-peasant country, is the exchange of grain for industrial products needed by the peasant. Only such a food policy meets the tasks of the proletariat, only it is capable of strengthening the foundations of socialism and leading to its complete victory.

Tax in kind is a transition to it. We are still so ruined, so oppressed by the oppression of the war (which happened yesterday and could break out thanks to the greed and malice of the capitalists tomorrow) that we cannot give the peasants industrial products for all the grain we need. Knowing this, we introduce a tax in kind, i.e. the minimum necessary (for the army and for workers).

On January 11, 1919, by decree of the Council of People's Commissars, food appropriation was introduced throughout the entire territory of Soviet Russia. It consisted in the obligatory delivery by peasants to the state at fixed prices of all surplus grain and other agricultural products in excess of the established minimum standards provided for satisfying personal and economic needs. Thus, the Soviet state resumed, in an expanded version, the policy of forced confiscation of food products, which was used by the Tsarist and then the Provisional Government to maintain the functioning of industrial centers in conditions of war and economic devastation.

V.I. Lenin considered surplus appropriation the most important element and basis of the entire policy of “war communism.” In his work “On the Food Tax,” he wrote: “A kind of “war communism” consisted in the fact that we actually took from the peasants all the surplus, and sometimes not even the surplus, but part of the food necessary for the peasant, and took it to cover the costs of the army and maintenance workers. They mostly took it on credit, using paper money. We could not defeat the landowners and capitalists in a ruined petty-bourgeois country otherwise.”

The collection of products was carried out by the bodies of the People's Commissariat of Food (Narkomfood), food detachments with the active assistance of the committees of the poor (Kombedov) and local Soviets. At the initial stage, in the second half of 1918 - early 1919, the surplus appropriation system captured only part of the provinces of Central Russia and extended to bread and grain fodder. During the procurement campaign of 1919-1920, it operated throughout the RSFSR, Soviet Ukraine and Belarus, Turkestan and Siberia and also covered potatoes, meat, and by the end of 1920 - almost all agricultural products.

Food was confiscated from the peasants virtually free of charge, since the banknotes that were issued as compensation were almost completely devalued, and the state could not offer industrial goods to replace the confiscated grain due to the decline in industrial production during the war and intervention.

The discontent and active resistance of the peasants during the seizure of food was suppressed by armed detachments of the Podkom, as well as special forces units of the Red Army and detachments of the Food Army. In response, the peasants switched to passive methods of struggle: they withheld grain, refused to accept money that had lost its solvency, reduced acreage and production so as not to create surpluses that were useless for themselves, and produced products only based on the needs of their own family.

The implementation of surplus appropriation led to dire consequences in both the economic and social spheres. There was a sharp narrowing of the scope of commodity-money relations: trade was curtailed, in particular, the free sale of bread and grain was prohibited, the depreciation of money accelerated, and workers' wages were naturalized. All this made it impossible to restore the national economy. In addition, the relationship between city and countryside, between peasants and representatives of the Soviet government, deteriorated significantly, and peasant uprisings broke out everywhere. Therefore, in March 1921, the surplus appropriation system was replaced by a clearly fixed food tax.

A little about surplus appropriation

The surplus appropriation system (in other words, the state monopoly on bread) is not an “invention” of the Bolsheviks.

The food appropriation system was first introduced in the Russian Empire back in 1916, when, during the First World War, surplus food was confiscated from peasants to supply the Russian army and industrial workers working for defense. On November 29, 1916, a decree on grain appropriation was signed, and on December 7, the norms for provincial supplies were determined, followed by the calculation of food appropriation for counties and volosts.

After the February Revolution, on March 25, 1917, the Provisional Government adopted a law on grain monopoly: “This is an inevitable, bitter, sad measure, to take the distribution of grain reserves into the hands of the state. It is impossible to do without this measure.” The food program was based on active government intervention in the economy: establishing fixed prices, distributing products, and regulating production.

But the Provisional Government did not have enough strength or will to implement these plans. But the Bolsheviks had enough, although not immediately and as a necessary measure (one of the Bolshevik slogans with which they came to power: “Land for the peasants!”).

During the Civil War, surplus appropriation was introduced on January 11, 1919 (“Decree on the introduction of surplus appropriation for bread”), when the Soviet government, being surrounded by fronts, was deprived of the most important sources of raw materials and food, Donetsk coal, Baku and Grozny oil, southern and Ural metal, Siberian, Kuban and Ukrainian bread, Turkestan cotton, and therefore in the economy it was forced to pursue the mobilization policy of war communism, part of which was the surplus appropriation system.

Initially, surplus appropriation extended to bread and grain fodder. During the procurement campaign (1919-20), it also covered potatoes, meat, and by the end of 1920 - almost all agricultural products.

Food was confiscated from the peasants virtually free of charge, since the banknotes that were offered as payment were almost completely devalued, and the state could not offer industrial goods in exchange for the confiscated grain due to the decline in industrial production during the war and intervention.

In addition, when determining the size of the appropriation, they often proceeded not from the actual food surpluses of the peasants, but from the food needs of the army and urban population, therefore, not only the existing surpluses, but very often the entire seed fund and agricultural products necessary to feed the peasant himself were confiscated locally.

The discontent and resistance of the peasants during the seizure of food was suppressed by armed detachments of the poor peasants' committees, as well as special forces units of the Red Army (CHON).

It can be said with a high degree of confidence that without using the surplus appropriation system, the Bolshevik government (like any other) in its place would not have been able to stay in power. It is impossible not to mention that all other armies, forces and governments that took place on Russian territory during the civil war also confiscated food from the rural population.

Nevertheless, the authorities had to suppress the active resistance of the peasants to the surplus appropriation system. This led to their passive resistance: the peasants hid grain, refused to accept money that had lost its solvency, reduced acreage and production so as not to create surpluses that were useless for themselves, and produced products only in accordance with the consumer norm for their family.

Many people tried to feed themselves during the famine through petty trade (the so-called “bag traders”). They boarded freight trains (there were no passenger trains during the Civil War), went to the villages and bought from peasants or traded bread and other food for valuable goods, which they then either consumed themselves or sold in the city at flea markets and black markets. Bag traders were persecuted by the Soviet authorities as “speculators”, and they were raided.

RODINA magazine, April 2016 (number four)

Nikolay Zayats, graduate student

Tsar's surplus appropriation system
How bread was confiscated from the peasants of the Voronezh province during the First World War

The surplus appropriation system is traditionally associated with the first years of Soviet power and the emergency conditions of the Civil War, but in Russia it appeared under the imperial government long before the Bolsheviks.

“The wheat and flour crisis”

With the outbreak of the First World War, basic necessities became more expensive in Russia, the prices of which increased two to three times by 1916. The governors' ban on the export of food from the provinces, the introduction of fixed prices, the distribution of cards and purchases by local authorities did not improve the situation. Cities suffered severely from food shortages and high prices. The essence of the crisis was clearly presented in a report from the Voronezh Exchange Committee to a meeting at the Moscow Exchange in September 1916. It stated that market relations had penetrated the village. The peasantry turned out to be able to sell less important items of production for a higher price and at the same time hold back grain for a rainy day due to the uncertainty of the outcome of the war and increasing mobilizations.

At the same time, the urban population suffered. “We consider it necessary to pay special attention to the fact that the wheat and flour crisis would have occurred much earlier if trade and industry had not had at their disposal some emergency supply of wheat in the form of regular cargo lying at railway stations, awaiting loading since 1915. and even since 1914,” wrote the stockbrokers, “and if the Ministry of Agriculture had not released wheat from its reserves to the mills in 1916... and that was intended in a timely manner not at all for food for the population, but for other purposes.” The note firmly expressed the belief that a solution to the crisis that threatened the entire country could be found only in a complete change in the country's economic policy and the mobilization of the national economy. Similar plans have been repeatedly expressed by a variety of public and government organizations. The situation required radical economic centralization and the involvement of all public organizations in the work.

Introduction of surplus appropriation

However, at the end of 1916, the authorities, not daring to make changes, limited themselves to a plan for the mass requisition of grain. Free purchase of bread was replaced by surplus appropriation between producers. The size of the outfit was established by the chairman of the special meeting in accordance with the harvest and the size of reserves, as well as the consumption standards of the province. Responsibility for collecting grain was assigned to provincial and district zemstvo councils. Through local surveys, it was necessary to find out the required amount of bread, subtract it from the total order for the county and distribute the remainder between the volosts, which were supposed to bring the amount of the order to each rural community. The councils had to distribute outfits among districts by December 14, by December 20 to develop outfits for volosts, by December 24 for rural communities, and finally, by December 31, every householder had to know about his outfit. The seizure was entrusted to the zemstvo bodies together with those authorized to procure food.

Having received the circular, the Voronezh provincial government convened a meeting of the chairmen of zemstvo councils on December 6-7, 1916, at which an allocation scheme was developed and orders were calculated for the districts. The council was instructed to develop schemes and volost allocations. At the same time, the question was raised about the impracticability of the order. According to a telegram from the Ministry of Agriculture, an allocation of 46.951 thousand poods was imposed on the province: rye 36.47 thousand, wheat 3.882 thousand, millet 2.43, oats 4.169 thousand. At the same time, the minister warned that additional allocation is not excluded in connection with the increase in the army, therefore “ I presently presently to you to increase the amount of grain assigned to the allocation in paragraph 1, and in the event of an increase of no less than 10%, I undertake not to include your province in any possible additional allocation.” This meant that the plan was raised to 51 million poods.

Calculations carried out by the zemstvos showed that the full implementation of the requisition was associated with the confiscation of almost all the grain from the peasants: at that time only 1.79 million poods of rye remained in the province, and wheat was threatened with a deficit of 5 million. This amount could hardly be enough for consumption and new sowing bread, not to mention feeding livestock, of which, according to rough estimates, there were more than 1.3 million heads in the province. Zemstvos noted: “In record years, the province gave 30 million throughout the year, and now it is expected to take 50 million within 8 months, moreover, in a year with a harvest below average and provided that the population, not confident in sowing and harvesting the future harvest, cannot help but strive to stock up.” Considering that the railway lacked 20% of cars, and this problem was not solved in any way, the meeting considered: “All these considerations lead to the conclusion that collecting the above amount of grain is in fact impossible.” The zemstvo noted that the ministry calculated the allocation, clearly not based on the statistical data presented to it. Of course, this was not random bad luck for the province - such a crude calculation, which did not take into account the real state of affairs, affected the entire country. As it was found out from a survey of the Union of Cities in January 1917: “the allocation of grain was made to the provinces on an unknown basis, sometimes incongruously, placing on some provinces a burden that was completely unbearable for them.” This alone indicated that it would not be possible to carry out the plan. At the December meeting in Kharkov, the head of the provincial government V.N. Tomanovsky tried to prove this to the Minister of Agriculture A.A. Rittich, to which he replied: “Yes, all this may be so, but such a quantity of grain is needed for the army and for factories working for defense, since this allocation covers exclusively these two needs... this must be given and we must give it.” obliged."

The meeting also informed the ministry that “the administrations have at their disposal neither material resources nor means of influencing those who do not want to comply with the terms of the allocation,” so the meeting requested that they be given the right to open dump stations and requisition premises for them. In addition, in order to preserve fodder for the army, the meeting asked to cancel provincial orders for oil cake. These considerations were sent to the authorities, but had no effect. As a result, the Voronezh residents distributed the allocation and even with the recommended increase of 10%.

The allocation will be completed!

The Voronezh provincial zemstvo assembly, due to the busyness of the chairmen of the district councils who were collecting grain in the villages, was postponed from January 15, 1917 to February 5, and then to February 26. But even this number did not constitute a quorum - instead of 30 people. 18 people gathered. 10 people sent a telegram that they could not come to the congress. Chairman of the Zemstvo Assembly A.I. Alekhine was forced to ask those who appeared not to leave Voronezh, hoping that a quorum would be assembled. Only at the meeting on March 1 was it decided to “immediately” begin collecting. This meeting also behaved ambivalently. After an exchange of views at the proposal of the representative of Valuysky district S.A. Blinov’s meeting developed a resolution to communicate to the government, in which it actually recognized its demands as impossible to fulfill: “The size of the order given to the Voronezh province is without a doubt excessively exaggerated and practically impossible... since its implementation in full would have to lead to the withdrawal of everything from the population there is no bread left." The meeting again pointed out the lack of fuel for grinding bread, bread bags, and the collapse of the railway. However, references to all these obstacles ended with the fact that the meeting, having submitted to the highest authority, promised that “through the common friendly efforts of the population and its representatives - in the person of zemstvo leaders” the allocation would be carried out. Thus, contrary to the facts, those “extremely decisive, optimistic statements of the official and semi-official press” that, according to contemporaries, accompanied the campaign were supported.

However, it is difficult to say how realistic were the assurances of the zemstvos about the confiscation of “all grain without remainder” in the event of full implementation of the requisition. It was no secret to anyone that there was bread in the province. But its specific quantity was unknown - as a result, the zemstvos were forced to derive figures from the available agricultural census data, consumption and sowing rates, farm yields, etc. At the same time, bread from previous harvests was not taken into account, since, according to the authorities, it had already been consumed. Although this opinion seems controversial, given that many contemporaries mention the grain reserves of the peasants and the noticeably increased level of their well-being during the war, other facts confirm that there was clearly a shortage of bread in the village. The city shops of Voronezh were regularly besieged by poor peasants from the suburbs and even other volosts. In the Korotoyak district, according to reports, the peasants said: “We ourselves can barely get enough bread, but the gentlemen [landowners] have a lot of grain and a lot of cattle, but their cattle was not requisitioned much, and therefore more bread and cattle should be requisitioned.” Even the most prosperous Valuysky district provided for itself largely due to the supply of grain from the Kharkov and Kursk provinces. When deliveries from there were prohibited, the situation in the county noticeably worsened. Obviously, the point is the social stratification of the village, in which the poor people of the village suffered no less than the poor people of the city. In any case, the implementation of the government allocation plan was impossible: there was no organized apparatus for collecting and accounting for grain, the allocation was arbitrary, there was not enough material resources for collecting and storing grain, and the railway crisis was not resolved. Moreover, the surplus appropriation system, aimed at supplying the army and factories, did not in any way solve the problem of supplying cities, which, with a decrease in grain reserves in the province, was only bound to worsen.

According to the plan, in January 1917 the province was supposed to deliver 13.45 million poods of grain: of which 10 million poods of rye, 1.25 of wheat, 1.4 of oats, 0.8 of millet; the same amount was supposed to be prepared in February. To collect grain, the provincial zemstvo organized 120 reference points, 10 per county, located 50-60 versts from each other, and most of them were supposed to open in February. Already during the allocation, difficulties began: the Zadonsk district took over only part of the supply (instead of 2.5 million poods of rye - 0.7 million, and instead of 422 thousand poods of millet - 188), and of those assigned to the Biryuchensky district, 1.76 million poods of bread were available by February only 0.5 million was deployed. The allocation of personnel to the volosts was released from the control of the administration due to the lack of reliable communication with the villages, so the matter there was greatly delayed.

“A whole number of volosts completely refuse... allotment”

Already during the period of procurement, zemstvo residents were skeptical about their result: “At least, this is confirmed by the messages received from some counties, firstly, that a number of volosts completely refuse any kind of allocation, and, secondly, that and in those volosts where the allocation was carried out by volost assemblies in full - in the future, with settlement and economic allocation, the impossibility of its implementation is revealed"16. The sale was not going well. Even in Valuysky district, where the smallest allocation was imposed, and the population was in the best position, things were going badly - many peasants claimed that they did not have so much grain17. Where there was grain, the laws were dictated by speculation. In one village, peasants agreed to sell wheat at a price of 1.9 rubles. per pood, but soon secretly abandoned this: “Then it happened that those who responded to the authorities’ proposal had not yet received money for the supplied grain when they heard that the fixed price for wheat had risen from 1 ruble 40 kopecks. up to 2 rub. 50 kopecks Thus, more patriotic peasants will receive less for bread than those who kept it for themselves. Now there is a prevailing belief among the peasants that the longer they hold back grain, the more the government will increase fixed prices, and the zemstvo bosses do not need to be trusted, since they are only deceiving the people.”

The procurement campaign was not supported by real means of implementation. The government tried to overcome this through threats. On February 24, Rittich sent a telegram to Voronezh in which he was ordered to begin the requisition of grain first in the villages that most stubbornly did not want to carry out the requisition. At the same time, it was necessary to leave one pound of grain per capita on the farm until the harvest of the new harvest, but no later than the first of September, as well as for the spring sowing of fields according to the standards established by the zemstvo government and for feeding livestock - according to the standards established by the authorized mismatch of actions). Governor M.D. Ershov, fulfilling the demands of the authorities, on the same day sent telegrams to the district zemstvo councils, in which he demanded to immediately begin supplying bread. If the delivery did not begin within three days, the authorities were ordered to begin requisitions “with a reduction in the fixed price by 15 percent and, in the event of failure of the owners [of bread] to be delivered to the receiving point, with a deduction in addition to the cost of transportation.” The government has not provided any specific guidelines for implementing these instructions. Meanwhile, such actions required providing them with an extensive network of executive apparatus, which the zemstvos did not have. It is not surprising that they, for their part, did not try to be zealous in carrying out an obviously hopeless undertaking. Ershov’s order of December 6 to provide the police with “all possible assistance” in collecting grain did not help much. V.N. Tomanovsky, who was usually very strict about state interests, took a moderate tone at the meeting on March 1: “From my point of view, we need to collect grain as much as possible, without resorting to any drastic measures, this will be some plus to the amount of reserves which we have. It is possible that the railway traffic will improve, more cars will appear... taking drastic measures in the sense that “let’s carry it, at all costs” would seem inappropriate.”

“The allocation undertaken by the Ministry of Agriculture was definitely a failure”

M.V. Rodzianko, just before the revolution, wrote to the emperor: “The allocation undertaken by the Ministry of Agriculture definitely failed. Here are the figures characterizing the progress of the latter. It was planned to allocate 772 million poods. Of these, by January 23, the following were theoretically allocated: 1) by provincial zemstvos 643 million poods, i.e. 129 million poods less than expected, 2) by district zemstvos 228 million poods. and, finally, 3) the volosts are only 4 million poods. These figures indicate a complete collapse of the appropriation system...”

By the end of February 1917, the province not only failed to fulfill the plan, but also lacked 20 million poods of grain. The collected grain, as was obvious from the very beginning, could not be taken out. As a result, 5.5 million poods of grain accumulated on the railway, which the district committee undertook to export no earlier than in two and a half months. Neither wagons for unloading nor fuel for locomotives were registered. It was not even possible to transport flour to dryers or grain for grinding, since the committee was not involved in domestic flights. And there was no fuel for the mills either, which is why many of them stood idle or were preparing to stop working. The last attempt of the autocracy to solve the food problem failed due to the inability and unwillingness to solve a complex of real economic problems in the country and the lack of state centralization of economic management necessary in war conditions.

This problem was also inherited by the Provisional Government, which followed the old path. After the revolution, at a meeting of the Voronezh Food Committee on May 12, Minister of Agriculture A.I. Shingarev said that the province had not delivered 17 out of 30 million poods of grain: “It is necessary to decide: how right is the central administration... and how successful will the execution of the order be, and can there be a significant excess of the order?” This time, members of the council, clearly falling into the optimism of the first revolutionary months, assured the minister that “the mood of the population has already been determined in terms of the supply of grain” and “with the active participation” of food authorities, the order will be fulfilled. In July 1917, the orders were completed by 47%, in August - by 17%. There is no reason to suspect local leaders loyal to the revolution of lack of zeal. But the future showed that this time the promise of the Zemstvo people was not fulfilled. The objectively current situation in the country - the economy leaving control of the state and the inability to regulate processes in the countryside - put an end to the well-intentioned efforts of local authorities.

Literature:

2 Journals of the Voronezh Provincial Zemstvo Assembly of the regular session of 1916 (February 28 ~ March 4, 1917). Voronezh, 1917. L.34-34ob.

3 State Archive of the Voronezh Region (GDVO). F.I-21. Op.1. D.2323. L.23ob.-25.

4 Journals of the Voronezh Provincial Zemstvo Assembly. L. 43ob.

5 Sidorov D.L. The economic situation of Russia during the First World War. M, 1973. P.489.

6 GAVO. F. I-21. Op.1. D.2225. L. 14ob.

7 Journals of the Voronezh Provincial Zemstvo Assembly. L. 35, 44-44ob.

10 Sidorov A.L. Decree. Op. P.493.

11 Popov P.A. Voronezh city government. 1870-1918. Voronezh, 2006. P. 315.

12 GAVO. F. I-1. Op. 1. D.1249. L.7

16 GAVO. F. I-21. Op.1. D.2323. L.23ob.-25.

18 GAVO. F. I-1. Op. 2.D. 1138. L.419.

19 GAVO. F. I-6. Op. 1. D. 2084. L. 95-97.

20 GAVO. F. I-6. Op.1. D. 2084. L.9.

21 GAVO. F. I-21. Op.1. D. 2323. L. 15ob.

22 Note from M.V. Rodzianki // Red Archive. 1925. T.3. P.69.

24 GAVO. F. I-21. Op.1. D.2323. L.15.

Surplus appropriation in documents of the era

The pages of the century are louder

Separate truths and falsehoods.

We are the helmsmen of this book

Simple statutory font.

Boris Pasternak

The year 1919 did not bring relief to the peasants - however, it could not have brought it. It has not become easier for anyone in the country. The war flared up, the fronts became longer, the army grew larger. It was possible to take a certain number of people from the cities, but everything else - food, fodder, horses - could only be supplied by the village. Moreover, with virtually no return, since Soviet Russia, turned into a military camp, devoted all its meager resources to the front.

In January 1919, food allocation was introduced. It differed from previous grain procurements in that the People's Commissariat for Food, based on the general needs of the country, determined firm tasks for the provinces for all types of agricultural products, the provinces passed it on lower - and so on to the volosts: do it as you want. Theoretically, about 60% of peasants were still exempt from surplus appropriation, but in reality, on the one hand, rich peasants were looking for many ways to distribute supplies to the entire village, and on the other, local authorities, caught in a pincer movement, either failed to complete the task or shook everyone who has at least something - quite often they took away bread not only from the middle peasants, but even from the poor.

Soon the state declared a monopoly on all food. Mobilizations in the Red Army came one after another, and labor obligations increased. Horses were requisitioned for the army. The government protected the peasants as best it could - the 3rd and further horses on the farm were subject to mobilization. But in practice this instruction was not carried out, because each commander had his own economic policy, very often different from the state one. In addition, he had the right to replace a horse unsuitable for combat service with a good one even in a one-horse yard, and as a result, the horse population in the village was rapidly deteriorating. But a horse in a peasant’s yard is not there for aesthetics, it needs to be worked on. But try to explain this to the said commander!

Whites had the same problems - however they controlled richer areas and received outside support. The Reds could only rely on internal resources.

In 1920, to other joys, there was added a crop failure that affected a number of Russian provinces. For example, in the richest Tambov province, the surplus appropriation task amounted to a third of the total grain collection, which, in turn, covered the internal needs of the province by only 50%. And you don’t need to go to a fortune-teller to understand that the more bread is exported through surplus appropriation, the more it will have to be imported to help the starving. And since the population of the province survived that winter, it follows that the wagons with bread were driven in both directions. But there was an aggravation of the permanent Tambov uprising, which had to be spent a lot of effort and money to eliminate it.

Fortunately, just at this time, rich provinces captured from the whites, in particular Siberia, joined Soviet Russia. The main burden of surplus appropriation fell on them. The local population, of course, did not like this - is it any wonder? So the winter of 1920–1921. It was also marked by a colossal West Siberian uprising. However, more on this a little later.

What was this constantly mentioned Bolshevik surplus appropriation system? Historical mythology believes it to be the complete requisition of all food from the peasants - survive as you want. In reality, of course, everything was completely different.

From the resolution of the Tyumen provincial executive committee and the board of the provincial food committee on the allocation of grain fodder and oilseeds on September 3, 1920.

"1. The entire amount of grain, grain fodder and oilseeds is subject, with the exception of the norm, to the state and is allocated for alienation from the population between the volosts according to the attached tables...

4. The entire amount of bread, grain fodder and oilseeds for the volost according to the allocation must be alienated from the population at established fixed prices and delivered by the population to the dump point within the time limits indicated below...

11. To those volosts that have surpluses and stubbornly do not hand them over, take repressive measures for entire volosts and individual villages in the form of arresting chairmen, secretaries of volost executive committees and village councils for their assistance and arresting all individuals who stubbornly do not hand over bread or are hiding it. and forward to the visiting session of the Food Revolutionary Tribunal.”

As you can see, everything is the same here - both norms and grain prices. The front line remained in the same place.

From the instructions of the Tyumen Provincial Food Committee on carrying out grain allocation. September 8, 1920

"4. The norm that must be left when calculating the grain allocation:

a) family members - 13 poods. 20 pounds, b) for sowing - 12 pounds, working horses - 19 pounds, d) foals - 5 pounds, e) cows - 5 pounds, f) calves - 5 pounds, etc. (Siberian norm even more than established in May 1918. - E.P.)

5. After determining the allocation for each village separately, members of the executive committee go to local communities and, based on household lists, make state and internal allocations for individuals.

Upon completion of the allotment, a list of names is drawn up indicating: what company, first name, surname, the amount of bread to be delivered, what the subscription is taken from, which determines the delivery date... The name list is submitted to the nearest dumping point, and a copy is left to the volost executive committee

6. When calculating for individuals, it is allowed to leave the norm for feeding livestock on the farm:

1) from one to 3 dessiatines - for one horse, from 4 to 6 dessiatines - for one horse and one foal, from 6 to 10 dessiatines. - for 2 horses and 2 foals, from 11 to 15 decades. - for 3 horses and 3 foals, etc.

2) the norm for livestock with one person is not left, with 2-3 people - for one calf, 4-5-6 and 7 - one cow and one calf, 8-9-10-11 people - for 2 cows and 2 calves, 12–13–14 and 15 people - 3 cows and 3 calves, etc.”

The percentage of poor people in the Tyumen province is unknown. But they were there, naturally, and they had to be fed. Therefore, in addition to state allocation, internal allocation was carried out.

From the instructions of the Tyumen Provincial Food Committee on carrying out internal grain allocation. October 12, 1920

Ҥ 2. According to the method of providing bread, the population is divided into groups: a) producers, provided by leaving them with products collected from their farms according to the norm of the People's Commissariat of Food... b) the population living in rural areas, but not engaged in agriculture, c) the population leading it in amounts that do not meet the annual food needs of farms.

§ 3. The rural population of the province, which does not have its own reserves or is provided with them for a period of less than one year, is supplied ... from the surplus remaining with producers in excess of the amount necessary to carry out state allocation and own consumption ...

§ 6. In parallel with the state appropriation, internal appropriation is carried out, i.e., the extraction of surpluses remaining with the kulaks, the middle peasants and the poor in excess of the amount after completing the appropriation and satisfying their needs according to the norm.

§ 7. All bread (wheat, rye, oats, barley, peas and cereals), which turns out to be a surplus during internal allocation, goes to the volost cooperative at the announced fixed price for bread...

§ 15. In order to receive rations, village councils draw up personal lists of farms that really need bread, indicating the number of eaters and the amount of missing bread - food and seed separately - and submit them to the volost executive committees...

§ 20. Until the organization of the card system in the county, each time food is issued, the wolf cooperative draws up a special personal list of those receiving rations, in which all those receiving food are signed...

§ 21. Products must be released strictly according to established standards - no more than 30 pounds per consumer per month - and at fixed prices established by the provincial food committee.”

This is what state policy towards peasants looked like in 1920. However, what kind of politics is there?! This is the practice of a besieged fortress: collect all the food and divide it among everyone in order to somehow survive until spring...

...So, first the state assignment, then the internal redistribution of grain to protect the local population from hunger. You can rent at fixed prices and buy at fixed prices. Surely, the surplus appropriation system was even beneficial for someone - if there was a shortfall in the task and after it was completed, there was more bread and other products left than normal. The opposite also happened - the task was overwhelming. Which is more common is unknown, because the peasants, naturally, always swore and swore that the grain was not harvested, was not threshed, there was nothing to hand over, and they themselves would certainly die of hunger. To understand the situation: this has always been stated by everyone, regardless of the actual amount of bread. Moreover, there was a direct reason for this: you don’t shout a lot, you quickly completed the task - and look no further, they’ll lay it out for those who didn’t pass. It’s easier for the provincial food director...

So the production workers had to solve the most complex economic and psychological puzzles. And they had twenty-five years of life behind them, of which from three to six were spent in war, parochial school and either revolutionary honesty, or criminal habits, or philistine selfishness. Which is worse is a philosophical question...

...Calling Siberian peasants to think about statesmanship and telling them about their starving compatriots was equally useless. Bread had to be taken away by force. The main acceptable punitive measures were a commodity blockade, fines, confiscation of property, and then hostage-taking was added.

A commodity blockade is an understandable thing. Villages that did not fulfill the food appropriation assignment were not supplied with industrial goods. The fourth measure is reflected in the following document.

Resolution No. 59 of the provincial control and inspection commission on carrying out food appropriation in Ishim district. Not earlier than December 21, 1920

“We, the undersigned, members of the provincial control and inspection commission for state appropriation in the Tyumen province ... have drawn up this resolution on the members of the Zhagrinsky village council: the chairman - Perezhogin Alexander Danilovich and members - Perezhogin Pavel Eremeevich, Lunev Fedor Fedotovich and Perezhogin Anton, that the above-mentioned citizens, serving in The Zhagrinsky village council, until December 21, did not distribute the grain allocation to individual householders and refused to distribute it at the request of the provincial commission. The chairman of the village council currently had 7 ovins of unthreshed bread, 60 poods of grain, did not export a single pound to the state and refused to export it... Also, members of the Zhagrinsky village council categorically refused to carry out the allocation.

The provincial commission decided: members of the Zhagrinsky village council Perezhogin Alexander, Perezhogin Anton, Lunev Fedor to be arrested and sent to the Petukhovskaya food office to work as hostages until all state allocations for the Zhagrinsky society are fulfilled, then - council member Anton Perezhogin - to 14 days administratively with imprisonment "

Well, yes, we thought that if someone was taken hostage, then he would certainly be sent to a concentration camp and would certainly be shot. As we can see, it is not at all necessary. I wonder why Pavel was not touched, but Anton was given another two weeks of imprisonment? Maybe the first one decided to hand over the bread, and the second one got in the teeth of someone from the authorities?

For those who were particularly persistent and resistant, a measure such as confiscation was applied. By the way, what is its punitive meaning is still a big question. Here is what is written in the order of a member of the board of the provincial food committee, Myers:

“You must firmly remember that requisitions must be carried out without regard for the consequences, up to and including the confiscation of all grain in the village, leaving the producers with a starvation standard.”

Well, how do you want to understand this? How does this measure differ from appropriation - everything except the norm is taken there, and here too. I have only one answer - money is paid for products taken according to allocation.

There were a wide variety of confiscations of property. Judging by the documents, the usual measure is confiscation of a quarter of the property, less often - half. If a person offered armed resistance or organized others, they could take everything, but also in a very unique way.

“2) All property of those who took part in the riot should be confiscated...

Note: Property should be subject to confiscation only that which personally belongs to the person who participated in the riot, but not to members of his family. If it is impossible to determine what property is the property of the family of a riot participant (for example, in relation to livestock or equipment) and is necessary for the family to maintain its economy, the determination of the part due to the family is made by the Volk Executive Committee or Volrevkom and is left to the family, and the rest is confiscated ... "

When I try to understand what it looked like in practice, my imagination simply fails me.

Where did the confiscated goods go? Food went to warehouses, as part of the allotment, but livestock and equipment were dealt with differently.

“The confiscation of property, according to Order No. 6, of 39 people arrested for opposing government appropriations and participating in counter-revolutionary actions on this basis, has been completed. Horses, sleighs and harnesses from the amount confiscated are distributed by the Aromashevsky Revolutionary Committee to the families of Red Army soldiers and the poor people of the volost.”

There is also the problem of illegal confiscations. If they were recognized as such (and this happened quite often), then the property was subject to return, and then the poor people who received it stood on their hind legs. Knots of accounts were being tied, which would begin to be cut as soon as the West Siberian uprising came to Tyumen.

Another problem is storage. Peasants throughout the country were outraged that the taken grain lay in heaps and rotted. Yes, it happened that it lay there and rotted, and the taken cattle died, and the potatoes froze. Not always - but each such incident echoed through the villages a thousand times. Of course, the evil Bolshevik authorities deliberately rotted food and experienced great and pure joy from every spoiled pood.

“If things go like this with the supply of wagons and containers, the grain risks remaining at the dumping points. Taking into account that the grain from the harvest of 20 is of very low quality and is covered with snow and ice, because threshing was not done on time (and maybe also to weigh more? - E.P.), with a further lack of containers during the first thaw, we are threatened with a terrible catastrophe. The bread may catch fire. And in this way, the possibility is not excluded that all the bread in the amount of up to 1.5 million poods will be spoiled... We cannot now say with confidence that the bread is no longer burning, since there is no way to check it with a probe, because it is impossible to push the probe further 3 arshins deep, because the bread below is frozen..."

But you can’t hide such a disgrace, and it’s not the peasants who bring the bread and ice themselves, but it’s not the food detachment workers who put it on them! - they immediately start shouting that the grain is burning and there is nothing to take, since you don’t know how to save it.

Two more documents about some of the nuances of development work at the interface between the detachment and the population.

From the report of A. Stepanov, a member of the provincial control and inspection commission for food appropriation. November 1920

“I would like to inform you that the allocation for the Suerskaya parish. were completely suspended due to the fact that the food detachment, which worked in the local volost under the leadership of Comrade. Babkin, had absolutely no work plans, but I was hiding my correct initiative. Wholesale searches were carried out, which could not yield any results. The people were recruited mostly from the philistine element, which brings complete disorganization to the villages. Drunkenness was noticed, and some members of the detachment were drunkenly tied to a table by citizens. The detachment stood for two months, and, despite the orders, the peasants’ grain was not threshed. The detachment had to be withdrawn due to lack of trust in him...”

“I... arrived in the Pinigino community with a detachment of 16 people and began energetically implementing state allocations... which have not yet been removed from the population. But after a few minutes, the Pinegin society grouped in the amount of 200 people, several of them on horseback, and approached us with the goal of prohibiting us from working, shouting counter-revolutionary words, refusing the orders of the Soviet government...

In addition, they categorically told us that we will not allow you to take out any bread. And they threatened us with various cases, unless you stop the work. In addition, I suggested several times to the assembled citizens that they should not interfere with their work. But after the proposal, the majority shouted that get out before it’s too late.”

In general, it’s both bad and not good. How good? And don’t pay taxes...

...And again, historical mythology says that the elimination of the surplus appropriation policy was a forced measure - either the Bolsheviks themselves realized its futility, or the peasant uprisings forced the Council of People's Commissars to do it. True, before its cancellation, one more event happened - a small, unnoticed one. And to say - ugh! - about nothing…

The war is over! But this, again, means absolutely nothing, because it is common knowledge that in its policy the Council of People’s Commissars was guided exclusively by communist ideas and visceral anger.

So, in the spring of 1921, almost immediately after the end of the main battles of the Civil War (but in no way as a result of this!) the surplus appropriation system was replaced by a tax in kind. Now, no longer for money, but for free, a fixed part of the harvest was taken from the peasant as a tax, while he could dispose of the rest at his own discretion.

Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the replacement of food and raw materials allocation with a tax in kind. March 21, 1921

"1. To ensure correct and calm management of the economy on the basis of freer disposal of the farmer with the products of his labor and his own economic means, to strengthen the peasant economy and increase its productivity, as well as to accurately establish state obligations falling on farmers, appropriation as a method of state procurement of food and raw materials and fodder is replaced by a tax in kind.

2. This tax should be less than that imposed hitherto through appropriation. The amount of the tax should be calculated so as to cover the most necessary needs of the army, urban workers and the non-agricultural population. The total amount of the tax should be constantly reduced as the restoration of transport and industry allows the Soviet government to receive agricultural products in exchange for factory and handicraft products.

3. The tax is levied in the form of a percentage or share of the products produced on the farm, based on the harvest, the number of eaters on the farm and the presence of livestock on it.

4. The tax must be progressive; the percentage of deductions for farms of middle peasants, low-income owners and for farms of urban workers should be reduced. The farms of the poorest peasants may be exempt from some, and in exceptional cases from all types of taxes in kind.

Diligent peasant owners who increase the sowing area on their farms, as well as increase the productivity of farms as a whole, receive benefits for the implementation of the tax in kind. (...)

7. Responsibility for fulfilling the tax is assigned to each individual owner, and the bodies of Soviet power are instructed to impose penalties on everyone who has not complied with the tax. Circular liability is abolished.

To control the application and implementation of the tax, organizations of local peasants are formed according to groups of payers of different tax amounts.

8. All supplies of food, raw materials and fodder remaining with farmers after they have fulfilled the tax are at their full disposal and can be used by them to improve and strengthen their economy, to increase personal consumption and for exchange for products of factory and handicraft industries and agricultural production. Exchange is allowed within the limits of local economic turnover, both through cooperative organizations and in markets and bazaars.

9. Those farmers who wish to hand over the surplus remaining to them after completing the tax to the state, in exchange for these voluntarily surrendered surpluses, should be provided with consumer goods and agricultural implements. For this purpose, a state permanent stock of agricultural implements and consumer goods is created, both from domestically produced products and from products purchased abroad. For the latter purpose, part of the state gold fund and part of the harvested raw materials are allocated.

10. Supply of the poorest rural population is carried out in the state order according to special rules. (...)"

The method of calculating the tax was determined in the decree on the tax in kind on bread, potatoes and oilseeds. Anyone who needs its exact text can refer to the Izvestia newspaper of April 21, 1921. And here, for variety and fun, we honor him in poetic form, in the form of captions for a series of posters. There have been such miracles in our art...

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Prodrazvyorstka

Prodrazvyorstka(short for the phrase food allocation) - in Russia, a system of government measures carried out during periods of military and economic crises, aimed at fulfilling the procurement of agricultural products. The principle of surplus appropriation was the obligatory delivery by producers to the state of an established (“deployed”) standard of products at prices set by the state.

The surplus appropriation system was first introduced in the Russian Empire on December 2, 1916; at the same time, the previously existing system of public procurement on the free market was preserved.

Due to the low supply of bread through state procurement and surplus appropriation, on March 25, 1917, the Provisional Government introduced a grain monopoly, which involved the transfer of the entire volume of bread produced minus established consumption standards for personal and economic needs.

The “grain monopoly” was confirmed by the power of the Council of People's Commissars by Decree of May 9, 1918. The surplus appropriation system was reintroduced by the Soviet government at the beginning of January 1919 in the critical conditions of civil war and devastation, as well as the food dictatorship in force since May 13, 1918. The surplus appropriation system became part of a set of measures known as the policy of “war communism.” During the procurement campaign of the 1919-20 financial year, food appropriation also extended to potatoes, meat, and by the end of 1920 - almost all agricultural products.

The methods used in procurement during the period of the food dictatorship caused an increase in peasant discontent, which turned into armed uprisings of the peasants. On March 21, 1921, the surplus appropriation system was replaced by a tax in kind, which was the main measure of the transition to the NEP policy.

Revolution of 1917 in Russia
Social processes
Before February 1917:
Prerequisites for the revolution

February - October 1917:
Democratization of the army
Land question
After October 1917:
Boycott of the government by civil servants
Prodrazvyorstka
Diplomatic isolation of the Soviet government
Russian Civil War
The collapse of the Russian Empire and the formation of the USSR
War communism

Institutions and organizations
Armed formations
Events
February - October 1917:

After October 1917:

Personalities
Related Articles

Prerequisites for introduction

I must say that where there were already cases of refusal or where there were shortcomings, now people from the field asked me what should be done next: should I act as required by the law, which indicates a certain way out when rural or volost societies did not decide the sentence that is required of them to fulfill this or that duty or assignment - should they do this, or should they, perhaps, resort to requisition, also provided for by the resolution of the Special Meeting, but I invariably and everywhere answered that here We need to wait with this, we need to wait: maybe the mood of the meeting will change; it is necessary to gather it again, show it the purpose for which this deployment is intended, that this is what the country and homeland need for defense, and depending on the mood of the gathering, I thought that these resolutions would change. In this direction, voluntary, I recognized the need to exhaust all means.

The tight deadlines resulted in mistakes, which were expressed, in particular, in the allocation of more food than was available in a number of provinces. Others simply sabotaged them, significantly increasing consumption rates and leaving no visible surplus. The desire not to infringe on the parallel free purchase that existed in parallel ultimately led to the virtual collapse of this idea, which required a readiness for self-sacrifice of the masses of producers - which was not the case - or the widespread use of requisitions - for which, in turn, the system was not ready.

Surplus appropriation after the February Revolution

After the February Revolution, on February 27, 1917, the Food Commission of the Provisional Government was organized. In the first two months of the Provisional Government’s activities, food policy was led by the zemstvo doctor, cadet A.I. Shingarev. Failure of preparations led to disaster. At the beginning of March 1917, in Petrograd and Moscow there were only a few days' worth of bread left, and there were sections of the front with hundreds of thousands of soldiers where there were only half a day's worth of bread. Circumstances forced action: on March 2, the Food Commission of the Provisional Government made a decision: “without stopping the usual purchases and receipt of grain according to allocation, immediately begin requisitioning grain from large landowners and tenants of all classes with at least 50 acres under cultivation, as well as from trading enterprises and banks." On March 25, 1917, the Law on the transfer of bread to the state (monopoly on bread) was published. According to him, “the entire amount of grain, food and fodder harvest of past years, 1916 and the future harvest of 1917, minus the reserve necessary for food and household needs of the owner, comes from the time the grain is registered, at the disposal of the state at fixed prices and can be alienated only through state food authorities.” That is, a state monopoly on all grain, except for personal consumption and economic needs, and a state monopoly on grain trade. The norms for own consumption and economic needs were established by the same law, based on the fact that: a) the amount of grain left for sowing is based on the sown area of ​​the farm and the average seeding density according to the Central Statistical Committee with possible adjustments according to zemstvo statistics. When using a seeder, the size is reduced by 20-40% (depending on the type of seeder); b) for food needs - for dependents 1.25 poods per month, for adult workers - 1.5 poods. In addition, 10 spools of cereal per capita per day; c) for livestock - for working horses - 8 pounds of oats or barley or 10 pounds of corn for each day. For cattle and pigs - no more than 4 pounds per head per day. For young animals, the norm was halved. Food standards could decrease locally; c) An additional 10% for each item (a, b, c) “just in case.”

On April 29, the supply standards for the rest of the population, especially the urban population, will be streamlined according to the rationing system. The maximum norm in cities and towns is 30 pounds of flour and 3 pounds of cereal per month. For persons engaged in hard work, a 50% premium was established.

On the same day, an “institution of emissaries with greater powers” ​​was approved to carry out food policy locally and establish closer ties with the center.

The law of March 25 and the instruction issued on May 3 tightened liability for hidden grain reserves that were subject to delivery to the state or refusal to hand over visible stocks. If hidden reserves were discovered, they were subject to alienation at half the fixed price; in case of refusal to voluntarily surrender visible reserves, they were forcibly alienated.

“This is an inevitable, bitter, sad measure,” said Shingarev, “to take the distribution of grain reserves into the hands of the state. It is impossible to do without this measure.” Having confiscated cabinet and appanage lands, he postponed the question of the fate of the landowners' estates until the Constituent Assembly.

On July 1, the People's Commissariat of Food by decree ordered local food authorities to take stock of grain and set deadlines for surpluses in accordance with the norms for leaving bread with the owners (dated March 25, 1917) but no more than until August 1, 1918.

On July 27, 1918, the People's Commissariat for Food adopted a special resolution on the introduction of a universal class food ration, divided into four categories, providing for measures to account for stocks and distribute food.

The decree of August 21 determined the size of the surplus for the new harvest of 1918, based on the same standards of March 1917 for seed grain; for food, the standards were reduced to 12 pounds of grain or flour and 3 pounds of cereal. In excess of the norm for each household up to 5 eaters - 5 poods, over 5 eaters +1 pood per each. Livestock standards were also reduced. As before, these standards could be lowered by decision of local organizations.

The food authorities, the People's Commissariat for Food and Tsyurupa personally were given emergency powers to supply the country with bread and other products. Relying on the personnel core of the People's Commissariat and old, experienced food workers, Tsyurupa implements the food appropriation system developed by Tsarist Minister Rittich and the law on grain monopoly carried out by cadet Shingaryov.

The strict grain collection measures recommended by Lenin in 1918 were not widespread. The People's Commissariat for Food was looking for more flexible methods of removing it, which would embitter the peasants less and could give maximum results. As an experiment, a number of provinces began to use a system of agreements, agreements between food authorities and peasants through Soviets and committees on the voluntary delivery of grain and payment for part of it in goods. The experiment was first tested in the summer in the Vyatka province by A. G. Shlichter. In September, he applied it in the Efremov district of the Tula province, achieving significant results under those conditions. Previously, in Efremovsky district, food workers could not feed their workers and the poor even with the help of emergency commissars and military force.

Schlichter's work experience showed that an agreement can be reached with peasants provided that they are attentive to their needs, understand their psychology, and respect for their work. Trust in the peasants, joint discussion with them of the difficult issue of determining surpluses, firm adherence to one’s line without threats or arbitrariness, fulfillment of promises made, all possible assistance to them - all this met with understanding among the peasants, bringing them closer to participation in solving the national cause. Explanation, help, and business control were most valued by the peasants.

The contractual allocation method provided a guaranteed harvest of grain. He partially practiced in other provinces - Penza, Kaluga, Pskov, Simbirsk. However, in the Kazan province, the use of agreements with peasants yielded only 18% of the surplus collection. Here, in the organization of allotment, a serious violation of the class principle was committed - taxation was carried out on an egalitarian basis.

Low grain supplies even with the beginning of the harvest led to famine in industrial centers. To alleviate hunger among the workers of Moscow and Petrograd, the government temporarily violated the grain monopoly, allowing them, using enterprise certificates, to purchase at free prices and transport one and a half pounds of bread privately for five weeks - from August 24 to October 1, 1918. Permission to transport one and a half pounds of bread 70% of the population of Petrograd took advantage, purchasing or exchanging 1,043,500 pounds of bread for things

In total, in 1918, 73,628 thousand poods of bread (43,995), cereals (4,347) and grain fodder (25,628) were procured - of which 10,533 thousand poods were procured before May 1918 - including 7,205 thousand poods of bread and 132 thousand poods of cereal. Nevertheless, the fulfillment of procurement plans was extremely low (the Provisional Government planned the procurement of 440 million poods for 1918) and the methods of “unlimited” grain procurements locally, which in many cases looked like robbery and banditry, caused active opposition from the peasantry, which in a number of places developed into armed uprisings that led to anti-Bolshevik subtext.

Grain procurement policy and practice of other regimes during the civil war

By the fall of 1918, the territory of the former Russian Empire under the control of the Bolshevik Soviets amounted to no more than 1/4 of its original size. Before the completion of large-scale operations of the Civil War, various territories of the former Russian Empire passed from hand to hand and were controlled by forces of various orientations - from monarchists to anarchists. These regimes, in the case of more or less long-term control over the territory, also formed their own food policy.

Ukraine

The surplus appropriation system was reintroduced by the Bolsheviks during the Civil War on January 11, 1919. (Decree on the introduction of surplus appropriation for bread) and became part of the Soviet policy of building communism.

The decree of the Council of People's Commissars of January 11, 1919 announced the introduction of surplus appropriation throughout the entire territory of Soviet Russia; in reality, surplus appropriation was carried out at first only in the central provinces controlled by the Bolsheviks: in Tula, Vyatka, Kaluga, Vitebsk, etc. Only as Bolshevik control spread over other territories later surplus appropriation was carried out in Ukraine (beginning of April 1919), in Belarus (1919), Turkestan and Siberia (1920). In accordance with the resolution of the People's Commissariat of Food of January 13, 1919 on the allocation procedure, state planning targets were calculated on the basis of provincial data on the size of sown areas, yields, and reserves of previous years. In the provinces, allocations were made to counties, volosts, villages, and then between individual peasant farms. Only in 1919 did improvements in the efficiency of the state food apparatus become noticeable. The collection of products was carried out by the bodies of the People's Commissariat for Food, food detachments, with the active assistance of the Committees of Poor People's Commissars (until the end of their existence at the beginning of 1919) and local Soviets. Initially, the surplus appropriation system extended to bread and grain fodder. During the procurement campaign (1919-20), it also covered potatoes, meat, and by the end of 1920 - almost all agricultural products.

Food was confiscated from the peasants virtually free of charge, since the banknotes that were offered as payment were almost completely devalued, and the state could not offer industrial goods in exchange for the confiscated grain due to the fall in industrial production during the war and intervention.

In addition, when determining the size of the appropriation, they often proceeded not from the actual food surpluses of the peasants, but from the food needs of the army and urban population, therefore, not only the existing surpluses, but very often the entire seed fund and agricultural products necessary to feed the peasant himself were confiscated locally.

The discontent and resistance of the peasants during the seizure of food was suppressed by armed detachments of the poor peasants' committees, as well as special forces units of the Red Army (CHON) and units of the Prodarmiya.

After suppressing the active resistance of the peasants to the surplus appropriation system, the Soviet authorities had to face passive resistance: the peasants hid grain, refused to accept money that had lost purchasing power, reduced acreage and production so as not to create surpluses that were useless for themselves, and produced products only in accordance with the consumer norm for their family.

As a result of the surplus appropriation system, 832,309 tons of grain were collected in the procurement campaign of 1916-1917; before the October Revolution of 1917, the Provisional Government collected 280 million poods (out of 720 planned) for the first 9 months of Soviet power - 5 million centners; for 1 year of surplus appropriation (1/VIII 1918-1/VIII 1919) - 18 million centners; 2nd year (1/VIII 1919-1/VIII 1920) - 35 million quintals 3rd year (1/VIII 1920-1/VIII 1921) - 46.7 million quintals.

Weather data on grain procurements for this period: 1918/1919 −1767780 tons; 1919/1920 −3480200 tons; 1920/1921 - 6011730 tons.

Despite the fact that the surplus appropriation system allowed the Bolsheviks to solve the vital problem of supplying food to the Red Army and the urban proletariat, due to the ban on the free sale of bread and grain, commodity-money relations were significantly reduced, which began to slow down the post-war economic recovery, and in agriculture the sowing season began to decline. areas, yields and gross yields. This was explained by the disinterest of the peasants in producing products that were practically taken away from them. In addition, surplus appropriation in

Prodrazvyorstka(short for the phrase food allocation) - in Russia, a system of government measures carried out during periods of military and economic crises, aimed at fulfilling the procurement of agricultural products. The principle of surplus appropriation was the obligatory delivery by producers to the state of an established (“deployed”) standard of products at prices set by the state.

The surplus appropriation system was first introduced in the Russian Empire on December 2, 1916; at the same time, the previously existing system of public procurement on the free market was preserved.

Due to the low supply of bread under state procurement and surplus appropriation, on March 25 (April 7), the Provisional Government introduced a grain monopoly, which involved the transfer of the entire volume of bread produced minus established consumption standards for personal and economic needs.

The “grain monopoly” was confirmed by the power of the Council of People's Commissars by Decree of May 9, 1918. The surplus appropriation system was reintroduced by the Soviet government at the beginning of January 1919 in the critical conditions of civil war and devastation, as well as the food dictatorship in force since May 13, 1918. The surplus appropriation system became part of a set of measures known as the policy of “war communism.” During the procurement campaign of the 1919-20 financial year, surplus appropriation also extended to potatoes, meat, and by the end of 1920 to almost all agricultural products.

The methods used in procurement during the period of the food dictatorship caused an increase in peasant discontent, which turned into armed uprisings of the peasants. On March 21, 1921, the surplus appropriation system was replaced by a tax in kind, which was the main measure of the transition to the NEP policy.

Revolution of 1917 in Russia
Social processes
Before February 1917:
Prerequisites for the revolution

February - October 1917:
Democratization of the army
Land question
After October 1917:
Boycott of the government by civil servants
Prodrazvyorstka
Diplomatic isolation of the Soviet government
Russian Civil War
The collapse of the Russian Empire and the formation of the USSR
War communism

Institutions and organizations
Armed formations
Events
February - October 1917:

After October 1917:

Personalities
Related Articles

Prerequisites for introduction

I must say that where there were already cases of refusal or where there were shortcomings, now people from the field asked me what should be done next: should I act as required by the law, which indicates a certain way out when rural or volost societies did not decide the sentence that is required of them to fulfill this or that duty or assignment - should they do this, or should they, perhaps, resort to requisition, also provided for by the resolution of the Special Meeting, but I invariably and everywhere answered that here We need to wait with this, we need to wait: maybe the mood of the meeting will change; it is necessary to gather it again, show it the purpose for which this deployment is intended, that this is what the country and homeland need for defense, and depending on the mood of the gathering, I thought that these resolutions would change. In this direction, voluntary, I recognized the need to exhaust all means.

The tight deadlines resulted in mistakes, which were expressed, in particular, in the allocation of more food than was available in a number of provinces. Others simply sabotaged them, significantly increasing consumption rates and leaving no visible surplus. The desire not to infringe on the parallel free purchase that existed in parallel ultimately led to the virtual collapse of this idea, which required a readiness for self-sacrifice of the masses of producers - which was not the case - or the widespread use of requisitions - for which, in turn, the system was not ready.

Surplus appropriation after the February Revolution

After the February Revolution, on February 27 (March 12), the Food Commission of the Provisional Government was organized. In the first two months of the Provisional Government’s activities, food policy was led by the zemstvo doctor, cadet A.I. Shingarev. Failure of preparations led to disaster. At the beginning of March 1917, in Petrograd and Moscow there were only a few days' worth of bread left, and there were sections of the front with hundreds of thousands of soldiers where there were only half a day's worth of bread. Circumstances forced action. On March 2, the Food Commission of the Provisional Government makes a decision: “without stopping the usual purchases and receipt of grain according to allocation, immediately begin requisitioning grain from large landowners and tenants of all classes with at least 50 dessiatines under cultivation, as well as from trading enterprises and banks.”
On March 25 (April 7) the Law on the transfer of bread to the state (monopoly on bread) was published. According to him, “the entire amount of grain, food and fodder harvest of past years, 1916 and the future harvest of 1917, minus the reserve necessary for food and household needs of the owner, comes from the time the grain is registered, at the disposal of the state at fixed prices and can be alienated only through state food authorities.” That is, a state monopoly on all grain, except for personal consumption and economic needs, and a state monopoly on grain trade. The norms for own consumption and economic needs were established by the same law, based on the fact that:
a) the amount of grain left for sowing is based on the sown area of ​​the farm and the average seeding density according to the data of the Central Statistical Committee with possible adjustments according to zemstvo statistics. When using a seeder, the size is reduced by 20-40% (depending on the type of seeder);
b) for food needs - for dependents 1.25 poods per month, for adult workers - 1.5 poods. In addition, 10 spools of cereal per capita per day;
c) for livestock - for working horses - 8 pounds of oats or barley or 10 pounds of corn for each day. For cattle and pigs - no more than 4 pounds per head per day. For young animals, the norm was halved. Food standards could decrease locally;
d) an additional 10% for each item (a, b, c) “just in case.”

On April 29, the supply standards for the rest of the population, especially the urban population, will be streamlined according to the rationing system. The maximum norm in cities and towns is 30 pounds of flour and 3 pounds of cereal per month. For persons engaged in hard work, a 50% premium was established.

On the same day, an “institution of emissaries with greater powers” ​​was approved to carry out food policy locally and establish closer ties with the center.

The law of March 25 and the instruction issued on May 3 tightened liability for hidden grain reserves that were subject to delivery to the state or refusal to hand over visible stocks. If hidden reserves were discovered, they were subject to alienation at half the fixed price; in case of refusal to voluntarily surrender visible reserves, they were forcibly alienated.

“This is an inevitable, bitter, sad measure,” said Shingarev, “to take the distribution of grain reserves into the hands of the state. It is impossible to do without this measure.” Having confiscated cabinet and appanage lands, he postponed the question of the fate of the landowners' estates until the Constituent Assembly.

The surplus appropriation system was reintroduced by the Bolsheviks during the Civil War on January 11, 1919. (Decree on the introduction of surplus appropriation for bread) and became part of the Soviet policy of “war communism”.

The decree of the Council of People's Commissars of January 11, 1919 announced the introduction of surplus appropriation throughout the entire territory of Soviet Russia; in reality, surplus appropriation was carried out at first only in the central provinces controlled by the Bolsheviks: in Tula, Vyatka, Kaluga, Vitebsk, etc. Only as Bolshevik control spread over other territories later surplus appropriation was carried out in Ukraine (beginning of April 1919), in Belarus (1919), Turkestan and Siberia (1920). In accordance with the resolution of the People's Commissariat of Food of January 13, 1919 on the allocation procedure, state planning targets were calculated on the basis of provincial data on the size of sown areas, yields, and reserves of previous years. In the provinces, allocations were made to counties, volosts, villages, and then between individual peasant farms. Only in 1919 did improvements in the efficiency of the state food apparatus become noticeable. The collection of products was carried out by the bodies of the People's Commissariat for Food, food detachments, with the active assistance of the Committees of Poor People's Commissars (until the end of their existence at the beginning of 1919) and local Soviets.

Initially, the surplus appropriation system extended to bread and grain fodder. During the procurement campaign (1919-20), it also covered potatoes, meat, and by the end of 1920 - almost all agricultural products.

Food was confiscated from the peasants virtually free of charge, since the banknotes that were offered as payment were almost completely devalued, and the state could not offer industrial goods in exchange for the confiscated grain due to the fall in industrial production during the war and intervention.

In addition, when determining the size of the appropriation, they often proceeded not from the actual food surpluses of the peasants, but from the food needs of the army and urban population, therefore, not only the existing surpluses, but very often the entire seed fund and agricultural products necessary to feed the peasant himself were confiscated locally.

The discontent and resistance of the peasants during the seizure of food was suppressed by armed detachments of the poor peasants' committees, as well as special forces units of the Red Army (CHON) and units of the Prodarmiya.

After suppressing the active resistance of the peasants to the surplus appropriation system, the Soviet authorities had to face passive resistance: the peasants hid grain, refused to accept money that had lost purchasing power, reduced acreage and production so as not to create surpluses that were useless for themselves, and produced products only in accordance with the consumer norm for their family.

As a result of the surplus appropriation system, 832,309 tons of grain were collected in the procurement campaign of 1916-1917; before the October Revolution of 1917, the Provisional Government collected 280 million poods (out of 720 planned) for the first 9 months of Soviet power - 5 million centners; for 1 year of surplus appropriation (08/1/1918-08/1/1919) - 18 million centners; 2nd year (08/1/1919-08/1/1920) - 35 million centners; 3rd year (08/1/1920-08/1/1921) - 46.7 million centners.

Weather data on grain procurements for this period: 1918/1919 - 1,767,780 tons; 1919/1920 - 3,480,200 tons; 1920/1921 - 6,011,730 tons.

Despite the fact that the surplus appropriation system allowed the Bolsheviks to solve the vital problem of supplying food to the Red Army and the urban proletariat, due to the ban on the free sale of bread and grain, commodity-money relations were significantly reduced, which began to slow down the post-war economic recovery, and in agriculture the sowing season began to decline. areas, yields and gross yields. This was explained by the disinterest of the peasants in producing products that were practically taken away from them. In addition, the food appropriation system in the RSFSR caused strong discontent among the peasantry and their armed revolts. The 1920 crop failure in the Volga region and the central regions of the RSFSR, against the backdrop of a lack of reserves among both peasants and the government, led to a new food crisis at the beginning of 1921.

In connection with the transition from war communism to the NEP, on March 21, the surplus appropriation system was replaced by a tax in kind, thereby existing during the most crisis years of the Civil War.

V.I. Lenin explained the existence of the surplus appropriation system and the reasons for abandoning it:

Tax in kind is one of the forms of transition from a kind of “war communism”, forced by extreme need, ruin and war, to correct socialist product exchange. And this latter, in turn, is one of the forms of transition from socialism with features caused by the predominance of the small peasantry in the population to communism.

A kind of “war communism” consisted in the fact that we actually took from the peasants all the surplus, and sometimes not even the surplus, but part of the food necessary for the peasant, and took it to cover the costs of the army and the maintenance of the workers. They mostly took it on credit, using paper money. Otherwise, we could not defeat the landowners and capitalists in a ruined small-peasant country...
But it is no less necessary to know the real measure of this merit. "War communism" was forced by war and ruin. It was not and could not be a policy that corresponded to the economic tasks of the proletariat. It was a temporary measure. The correct policy of the proletariat, exercising its dictatorship in a small-peasant country, is the exchange of grain for industrial products needed by the peasant. Only such a food policy meets the tasks of the proletariat, only it is capable of strengthening the foundations of socialism and leading to its complete victory.
Tax in kind is a transition to it. We are still so ruined, so oppressed by the oppression of the war (which happened yesterday and could break out thanks to the greed and malice of the capitalists tomorrow) that we cannot give the peasants industrial products for all the grain we need. Knowing this, we introduce a tax in kind, i.e. the minimum necessary (for the army and for workers).

Assessment of surplus appropriation and its display in various sources

The actions of food detachments under the conditions of a food dictatorship are almost immediately criticized both in the environment opposed to the Bolsheviks - and, to a certain extent, in their own environment. If in the literature of the 20-40s one can still find a mention that the surplus appropriation system and its further development, the grain monopoly, is a product of the tsarist and Provisional governments, then in widely available publications starting from the mid-50s this fact is not mentioned.

The food appropriation system was “remembered” again in the middle of Perestroika - the scientific and, to a much greater extent, popular press cited many facts of crimes on the part of food detachments. In the 90s of the 20th century, with the support of scientific centers of Western Sovietology, a number of works devoted to this period of Russian history were published. They express the opinion that there is a conflict between the state (Bolshevik) and the entire peasantry - in contrast to the previously proposed Soviet version of “the struggle of the poor and weak middle peasants against the dominance of kulak exploitation and sabotage with the active help of the urban proletariat.”

Thus, the Italian historian Andrea Graziosi (also known in scientific circles for his recognition of the Holodomor as genocide) in his work “The Great Peasant War in the USSR. Bolsheviks and peasants. 1917-1933" indicates that "a new conflict between the state and the peasants broke out in Russia itself in the spring of 1918, with the start of a massive food appropriation campaign, accompanied by atrocities that soon became a common procedure... However, grain was not the only goal of the war: in it itself the basis was the above-mentioned attempt of the Bolsheviks to re-impose the presence of the state on the peasantry that had just liberated itself from it.”

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Notes

Literature

  • Kondratyev N. D. The grain market and its regulation during war and revolution. - M.: Nauka, 1991. - 487 pp.: 1 l. portrait, ill., table.
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  • Graziosi A. The Great Peasant War in the USSR. Bolsheviks and peasants. 1917-1933 / Trans. from English - M.: ROSSPEN, 2001. - 96 p.
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  • Lyashenko P. I. History of the national economy of the USSR. T.2. Capitalism. - M.: Gospolitizdat, 1949.
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  • The national economy of Ukraine in 1921, report of the Ukrainian Economic Council of STO Kharkov 1922
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Excerpt characterizing the Prodrazvyorstka

- I’m listening s.
“Mon cher,” Nesvitsky said in a whisper to Prince Andrei, “le vieux est d”une humeur de chien. [My dear, our old man is very out of sorts.]
An Austrian officer with a green plume on his hat and a white uniform galloped up to Kutuzov and asked on behalf of the emperor: has the fourth column set out?
Kutuzov, without answering him, turned away, and his gaze accidentally fell on Prince Andrei, who was standing next to him. Seeing Bolkonsky, Kutuzov softened the angry and caustic expression of his gaze, as if realizing that his adjutant was not to blame for what was happening. And, without answering the Austrian adjutant, he turned to Bolkonsky:
– Allez voir, mon cher, si la troisieme division a depasse le village. Dites lui de s"arreter et d"attendre mes ordres. [Go, my dear, see if the third division has passed through the village. Tell her to stop and wait for my order.]
As soon as Prince Andrei drove away, he stopped him.
“Et demandez lui, si les tirailleurs sont postes,” he added. – Ce qu"ils font, ce qu"ils font! [And ask if the arrows are posted. “What are they doing, what are they doing!],” he said to himself, still without answering the Austrian.
Prince Andrei galloped off to carry out the order.
Having overtaken all the battalions in front, he stopped the 3rd division and became convinced that, indeed, there was no rifle chain ahead of our columns. The regimental commander of the regiment in front was very surprised by the order given to him from the commander-in-chief to scatter the riflemen. The regimental commander stood here in full confidence that there were still troops ahead of him, and that the enemy could not be closer than 10 miles. Indeed, nothing was visible ahead except a deserted area, sloping forward and covered with thick fog. Having ordered on behalf of the commander-in-chief to fulfill what had been missed, Prince Andrei galloped back. Kutuzov stood still in the same place and, senilely slumped in the saddle with his corpulent body, yawned heavily, closing his eyes. The troops no longer moved, but stood at gunpoint.
“Okay, okay,” he said to Prince Andrei and turned to the general, who, with a watch in his hands, said that it was time to move, since all the columns from the left flank had already descended.
“We’ll still have time, Your Excellency,” Kutuzov said through a yawn. - We'll make it! - he repeated.
At this time, behind Kutuzov, the sounds of regiments greeting each other were heard in the distance, and these voices began to quickly approach along the entire length of the stretched line of advancing Russian columns. It was clear that the one they were greeting was traveling quickly. When the soldiers of the regiment in front of which Kutuzov stood shouted, he drove a little to the side and looked back with a wince. On the road from Pratzen, a squadron of multi-colored horsemen galloped along. Two of them galloped side by side ahead of the others. One was in a black uniform with a white plume on a red anglicized horse, the other in a white uniform on a black horse. These were two emperors with their retinue. Kutuzov, with the affectation of a soldier at the front, commanded the troops standing at attention and, saluting, drove up to the emperor. His whole figure and manner suddenly changed. He took on the appearance of a commanding, unreasoning person. With an affectation of respect that obviously struck Emperor Alexander unpleasantly, he rode up and saluted him.
An unpleasant impression, just like the remnants of fog in a clear sky, ran across the emperor’s young and happy face and disappeared. He was, after ill health, somewhat thinner that day than on the Olmut field, where Bolkonsky saw him for the first time abroad; but the same charming combination of majesty and meekness was in his beautiful, gray eyes, and on his thin lips, the same possibility of varied expressions and the prevailing expression of complacent, innocent youth.
At the Olmut show he was more majestic, here he was more cheerful and energetic. He became somewhat flushed after galloping these three miles, and, stopping his horse, sighed with repose and looked back at the faces of his retinue, just as young and as animated as his. Chartorizhsky and Novosiltsev, and Prince Bolkonsky, and Stroganov, and others, all richly dressed, cheerful, young people, on beautiful, well-groomed, fresh horses, talking and smiling, stopped behind the sovereign. Emperor Franz, a ruddy, long-faced young man, sat extremely straight on a beautiful black stallion and looked around him with concern and leisurely. He called one of his white adjutants and asked something. “That’s right, what time did they leave,” thought Prince Andrei, observing his old acquaintance, with a smile that he could not contain, remembering his audience. In the retinue of the emperors there were selected young orderlies, Russian and Austrian, guards and army regiments. Between them, beautiful spare royal horses were led by riders in embroidered blankets.
It was as if, through the open window, the smell of fresh field air suddenly came into the stuffy room, so the gloomy Kutuzov headquarters smelled of youth, energy and confidence in success from these brilliant young people who had galloped up.
- Why don’t you start, Mikhail Larionovich? - Emperor Alexander hastily turned to Kutuzov, at the same time looking courteously at Emperor Franz.
“I’m waiting, Your Majesty,” answered Kutuzov, leaning forward respectfully.
The Emperor lowered his ear, frowning slightly to indicate that he had not heard.
“I’m waiting, your Majesty,” Kutuzov repeated (Prince Andrei noticed that Kutuzov’s upper lip trembled unnaturally while he said this, “I’m waiting”). “Not all the columns have assembled yet, Your Majesty.”
The Emperor heard, but apparently did not like this answer; he shrugged his stooped shoulders and glanced at Novosiltsev, who stood nearby, as if with this glance he was complaining about Kutuzov.
“After all, we are not in Tsaritsyn Meadow, Mikhail Larionovich, where the parade does not begin until all the regiments arrive,” said the sovereign, again looking into the eyes of Emperor Franz, as if inviting him, if not to take part, then to listen to what he speaks; but Emperor Franz, continuing to look around, did not listen.
“That’s why I’m not starting, sir,” Kutuzov said in a sonorous voice, as if warning against the possibility of not being heard, and something trembled in his face once again. “That’s why I’m not starting, sir, because we’re not at the parade or in Tsarina’s meadow,” he said clearly and distinctly.
In the sovereign's retinue, all the faces, instantly exchanging glances at each other, expressed murmur and reproach. “No matter how old he is, he should not, in no way should speak like that,” these persons expressed.
The Emperor looked intently and carefully into Kutuzov's eyes, waiting to see if he would say anything else. But Kutuzov, for his part, bowing his head respectfully, also seemed to be waiting. The silence lasted for about a minute.
“However, if you order, Your Majesty,” said Kutuzov, raising his head and again changing his tone to the previous tone of a stupid, unreasoning, but obedient general.
He started his horse and, calling the head of the column, Miloradovich, gave him the order to attack.
The army began to move again, and two battalions of the Novgorod regiment and a battalion of the Absheron regiment moved forward past the sovereign.
While this Absheron battalion was passing, the ruddy Miloradovich, without an overcoat, in a uniform and orders and with a hat with a huge plume, worn on one side and from the field, the march march jumped forward and, with a valiant salute, reined in the horse in front of the sovereign.
“With God, general,” the sovereign told him.
“Ma foi, sire, nous ferons ce que qui sera dans notre possibilite, sire, [Really, Your Majesty, we will do what we can do, Your Majesty,” he answered cheerfully, nevertheless causing a mocking smile from the gentlemen the sovereign's retinue with his bad French accent.
Miloradovich turned his horse sharply and stood somewhat behind the sovereign. The Absheronians, excited by the presence of the sovereign, with a valiant, brisk step, kicking their feet, passed by the emperors and their retinue.
- Guys! - Miloradovich shouted in a loud, self-confident and cheerful voice, apparently so excited by the sounds of shooting, the anticipation of battle and the sight of the brave Absheronians, even his Suvorov comrades, briskly passing by the emperors that he forgot about the presence of the sovereign. - Guys, this is not your first village to take! - he shouted.
- Glad to try! - the soldiers shouted.
The sovereign's horse shied away from an unexpected cry. This horse, which had already carried the sovereign at shows in Russia, here, on the Champs of Austerlitz, carried its rider, withstanding his scattered blows with his left leg, pricking up his ears at the sounds of gunshots, just as he did on the Champ de Mars, not understanding the meaning of either these heard shots, not the proximity of the black stallion of Emperor Franz, not everything that was said, thought, felt that day by the one who rode her.
The Emperor turned to one of his entourage with a smile, pointing to the fellows of Absheron, and said something to him.

Kutuzov, accompanied by his adjutants, rode at a pace behind the carabinieri.
Having traveled half a mile at the tail of the column, he stopped at a lonely abandoned house (probably a former inn) near the fork of two roads. Both roads went downhill, and troops marched along both.
The fog began to disperse, and vaguely, about two miles away, enemy troops were already visible on opposite hills. To the left below the shooting became louder. Kutuzov stopped talking with the Austrian general. Prince Andrei, standing somewhat behind, peered at them and, wanting to ask the adjutant for a telescope, turned to him.
“Look, look,” said this adjutant, looking not at the distant army, but down the mountain in front of him. - These are the French!
Two generals and adjutants began to grab the pipe, snatching it from one another. All the faces suddenly changed, and everyone expressed horror. The French were supposed to be two miles away from us, but they appeared suddenly, unexpectedly in front of us.
- Is this the enemy?... No!... Yes, look, he... probably... What is this? – voices were heard.
Prince Andrey with a simple eye saw below to the right a dense column of French rising towards the Absheronians, no further than five hundred steps from the place where Kutuzov stood.
“Here it is, the decisive moment has come! The matter has reached me,” thought Prince Andrei, and, hitting his horse, he rode up to Kutuzov. “We must stop the Absheronians,” he shouted, “Your Excellency!” But at that very moment everything was covered with smoke, close shooting was heard, and a naively frightened voice two steps from Prince Andrei shouted: “Well, brothers, it’s a Sabbath!” And it was as if this voice was a command. At this voice, everything started to run.
Mixed, ever-increasing crowds fled back to the place where five minutes ago the troops had passed by the emperors. Not only was it difficult to stop this crowd, but it was impossible not to move back along with the crowd.
Bolkonsky only tried to keep up with her and looked around, perplexed and unable to understand what was happening in front of him. Nesvitsky with an embittered look, red and not like himself, shouted to Kutuzov that if he did not leave now, he would probably be captured. Kutuzov stood in the same place and, without answering, took out a handkerchief. Blood was flowing from his cheek. Prince Andrei pushed his way up to him.
-Are you injured? – he asked, barely keeping his lower jaw from trembling.
– The wounds are not here, but where! - said Kutuzov, pressing a handkerchief to his wounded cheek and pointing at the fleeing people. - Stop them! - he shouted and at the same time, probably making sure that it was impossible to stop them, he hit the horse and rode to the right.
The newly surging crowd of fleeing people took him with them and dragged him back.
The troops fled in such a dense crowd that, once they got into the middle of the crowd, it was difficult to get out of it. Who shouted: “Go! Why did you hesitate? Who immediately turned around and fired into the air; who beat the horse on which Kutuzov himself was riding. With the greatest effort, getting out of the flow of the crowd to the left, Kutuzov, with his retinue, reduced by more than half, rode towards the sounds of close gun shots. Having emerged from the crowd of those running, Prince Andrei, trying to keep up with Kutuzov, saw on the descent of the mountain, in the smoke, a Russian battery still firing and the French running up to it. The Russian infantry stood higher up, moving neither forward to help the battery nor back in the same direction as those fleeing. The general on horseback separated from this infantry and rode up to Kutuzov. Only four people remained from Kutuzov’s retinue. Everyone was pale and silently looked at each other.
– Stop these scoundrels! - Kutuzov said breathlessly to the regimental commander, pointing to the fleeing; but at the same instant, as if in punishment for these words, like a swarm of birds, bullets whistled through Kutuzov’s regiment and retinue.
The French attacked the battery and, seeing Kutuzov, fired at him. With this volley, the regimental commander grabbed his leg; Several soldiers fell, and the ensign standing with the banner released it from his hands; the banner swayed and fell, lingering on the guns of neighboring soldiers.
The soldiers began to shoot without a command.
- Oooh! – Kutuzov muttered with an expression of despair and looked around. “Bolkonsky,” he whispered, his voice trembling from the consciousness of his senile impotence. “Bolkonsky,” he whispered, pointing to the disorganized battalion and the enemy, “what is this?”
But before he finished these words, Prince Andrei, feeling tears of shame and anger rising in his throat, was already jumping off his horse and running to the banner.
- Guys, go ahead! – he shouted childishly.
"Here it is!" thought Prince Andrei, grabbing the flagpole and hearing with pleasure the whistle of bullets, obviously aimed specifically at him. Several soldiers fell.
- Hooray! - Prince Andrei shouted, barely holding the heavy banner in his hands, and ran forward with undoubted confidence that the entire battalion would run after him.
Indeed, he only ran a few steps alone. One soldier set off, then another, and the whole battalion shouted “Hurray!” ran forward and overtook him. The non-commissioned officer of the battalion ran up and took the banner, which was shaking from the weight in the hands of Prince Andrei, but was immediately killed. Prince Andrei again grabbed the banner and, dragging it by the pole, fled with the battalion. Ahead of him, he saw our artillerymen, some of whom fought, others abandoned their cannons and ran towards him; he also saw French infantry soldiers who grabbed artillery horses and turned the guns. Prince Andrei and his battalion were already 20 steps from the guns. He heard the incessant whistling of bullets above him, and soldiers constantly groaned and fell to the right and left of him. But he didn't look at them; he peered only at what was happening in front of him - on the battery. He clearly saw one figure of a red-haired artilleryman with a shako knocked on one side, pulling a banner on one side, while a French soldier was pulling the banner towards himself on the other side. Prince Andrey already clearly saw the confused and at the same time embittered expression on the faces of these two people, who apparently did not understand what they were doing.
"What are they doing? - thought Prince Andrei, looking at them: - why doesn’t the red-haired artilleryman run when he has no weapons? Why doesn't the Frenchman stab him? Before he can reach him, the Frenchman will remember the gun and stab him to death.”
Indeed, another Frenchman, with a gun to his advantage, ran up to the fighters, and the fate of the red-haired artilleryman, who still did not understand what awaited him and triumphantly pulled out the banner, was to be decided. But Prince Andrei did not see how it ended. It seemed to him that one of the nearby soldiers, as if swinging a strong stick, hit him in the head. It hurt a little, and most importantly, it was unpleasant, because this pain entertained him and prevented him from seeing what he was looking at.
"What is this? I'm falling? My legs are giving way,” he thought and fell on his back. He opened his eyes, hoping to see how the fight between the French and the artillerymen ended, and wanting to know whether the red-haired artilleryman was killed or not, whether the guns were taken or saved. But he didn't see anything. There was nothing above him anymore except the sky - a high sky, not clear, but still immeasurably high, with gray clouds quietly creeping across it. “How quiet, calm and solemn, not at all like how I ran,” thought Prince Andrei, “not like how we ran, shouted and fought; It’s not at all like how the Frenchman and the artilleryman pulled each other’s banners with embittered and frightened faces - not at all like how the clouds crawl across this high endless sky. How come I haven’t seen this high sky before? And how happy I am that I finally recognized him. Yes! everything is empty, everything is deception, except this endless sky. There is nothing, nothing, except him. But even that is not there, there is nothing but silence, calm. And thank God!…"

On Bagration’s right flank at 9 o’clock the business had not yet begun. Not wanting to agree to Dolgorukov’s demand to start the business and wanting to deflect responsibility from himself, Prince Bagration suggested that Dolgorukov be sent to ask the commander-in-chief about this. Bagration knew that, due to the distance of almost 10 versts separating one flank from the other, if the one sent was not killed (which was very likely), and even if he found the commander-in-chief, which was very difficult, the sent one would not have time to return earlier evenings.
Bagration looked around at his retinue with his large, expressionless, sleep-deprived eyes, and Rostov’s childish face, involuntarily frozen with excitement and hope, was the first to catch his eye. He sent it.
- What if I meet His Majesty before the Commander-in-Chief, Your Excellency? - said Rostov, holding his hand to the visor.
“You can hand it over to your Majesty,” Dolgorukov said, hastily interrupting Bagration.
Having been released from the chain, Rostov managed to sleep for several hours before the morning and felt cheerful, courageous, decisive, with that elasticity of movements, confidence in his happiness and in that mood in which everything seems easy, fun and possible.
All his wishes were fulfilled that morning; a general battle was fought, he took part in it; Moreover, he was an orderly under the bravest general; Moreover, he was traveling on an errand to Kutuzov, and perhaps even to the sovereign himself. The morning was clear, the horse under him was good. His soul was joyful and happy. Having received the order, he set off his horse and galloped along the line. At first he rode along the line of Bagration’s troops, which had not yet entered into action and stood motionless; then he entered the space occupied by Uvarov’s cavalry and here he already noticed movements and signs of preparations for the case; Having passed Uvarov's cavalry, he already clearly heard the sounds of cannon and gunfire ahead of him. The shooting intensified.
In the fresh morning air there were no longer, as before, at irregular intervals, two, three shots and then one or two gun shots, and along the slopes of the mountains, in front of Pratzen, the rolls of gunfire were heard, interrupted by such frequent shots from guns that sometimes several cannon shots were no longer separated from each other, but merged into one common roar.
It was visible how the smoke of the guns seemed to run along the slopes, catching up with each other, and how the smoke of the guns swirled, blurred and merged with one another. Visible, from the shine of the bayonets between the smoke, were the moving masses of infantry and narrow strips of artillery with green boxes.
Rostov stopped his horse on a hill for a minute to examine what was happening; but no matter how hard he strained his attention, he could neither understand nor make out anything of what was happening: some people were moving there in the smoke, some canvases of troops were moving both in front and behind; but why? Who? Where? it was impossible to understand. This sight and these sounds not only did not arouse in him any dull or timid feeling, but, on the contrary, gave him energy and determination.
“Well, more, give it more!” - He turned mentally to these sounds and again began to gallop along the line, penetrating further and further into the area of ​​​​the troops who had already entered into action.
“I don’t know how it will be there, but everything will be fine!” thought Rostov.
Having passed some Austrian troops, Rostov noticed that the next part of the line (it was the guard) had already entered into action.
"All the better! I’ll take a closer look,” he thought.
He drove almost along the front line. Several horsemen galloped towards him. These were our life lancers, who were returning from the attack in disordered ranks. Rostov passed them, involuntarily noticed one of them covered in blood and galloped on.
“I don’t care about this!” he thought. Before he had ridden a few hundred steps after this, to his left, across the entire length of the field, a huge mass of cavalrymen on black horses, in shiny white uniforms, appeared, trotting straight towards him. Rostov put his horse into full gallop in order to get out of the way of these cavalrymen, and he would have gotten away from them if they had kept the same gait, but they kept speeding up, so that some horses were already galloping. Rostov heard their stomping and the clanking of their weapons more and more clearly, and their horses, figures, and even faces became more visible. These were our cavalry guards, going into an attack on the French cavalry, which was moving towards them.
The cavalry guards galloped, but still holding their horses. Rostov already saw their faces and heard the command: “march, march!” uttered by an officer who unleashed his blood horse at full speed. Rostov, fearing to be crushed or lured into an attack on the French, galloped along the front as fast as his horse could, and still did not manage to get past them.
The last cavalry guard, a huge, pockmarked man, frowned angrily when he saw Rostov in front of him, with whom he would inevitably collide. This cavalry guard would certainly have knocked down Rostov and his Bedouin (Rostov himself seemed so small and weak in comparison with these huge people and horses), if he had not thought of swinging his whip into the eyes of the cavalry guard's horse. The black, heavy, five-inch horse shied away, laying down its ears; but the pockmarked cavalry guard thrust huge spurs into her sides, and the horse, waving its tail and stretching its neck, rushed even faster. As soon as the cavalry guards passed Rostov, he heard them shout: “Hurray!” and looking back he saw that their front ranks were mingling with strangers, probably French, cavalrymen in red epaulets. It was impossible to see anything further, because immediately after that, cannons began firing from somewhere, and everything was covered in smoke.
At that moment, as the cavalry guards, having passed him, disappeared into the smoke, Rostov hesitated whether to gallop after them or go where he needed to go. This was that brilliant attack of the cavalry guards, which surprised the French themselves. Rostov was scared to hear later that out of all this mass of huge handsome people, out of all these brilliant, rich young men, officers and cadets riding thousands of horses, galloping past him, only eighteen people remained after the attack.
“Why should I envy, what is mine will not go away, and now, perhaps, I will see the sovereign!” thought Rostov and rode on.
Having caught up with the guards infantry, he noticed that cannonballs were flying through and around them, not so much because he heard the sound of cannonballs, but because he saw concern on the faces of the soldiers and unnatural, warlike solemnity on the faces of the officers.
Driving behind one of the lines of infantry guard regiments, he heard a voice calling him by name.
- Rostov!
- What? – he responded, not recognizing Boris.
- What is it like? hit the first line! Our regiment went on the attack! - said Boris, smiling that happy smile that happens to young people who have been on fire for the first time.
Rostov stopped.
- That's how it is! - he said. - Well?
- They recaptured! - Boris said animatedly, having become talkative. - You can imagine?
And Boris began to tell how the guard, having taken their place and seeing the troops in front of them, mistook them for Austrians and suddenly learned from the cannonballs fired from these troops that they were in the first line, and unexpectedly had to take action. Rostov, without listening to Boris, touched his horse.
- Where are you going? – asked Boris.
- To His Majesty with an errand.
- Here he is! - said Boris, who heard that Rostov needed His Highness, instead of His Majesty.
And he pointed him to the Grand Duke, who, a hundred paces away from them, in a helmet and a cavalry guard's tunic, with his raised shoulders and frowning eyebrows, was shouting something to the white and pale Austrian officer.
“But this is the Grand Duke, and I’m going to the commander-in-chief or the sovereign,” said Rostov and started to move his horse.
- Count, count! - shouted Berg, as animated as Boris, running up from the other side, - Count, I was wounded in my right hand (he said, showing his hand, bloody, tied with a handkerchief) and remained in the front. Count, holding a sword in my left hand: in our race, the von Bergs, Count, were all knights.
Berg said something else, but Rostov, without listening to him, had already moved on.
Having passed the guards and an empty gap, Rostov, in order not to fall into the first line again, as he came under attack by the cavalry guards, rode along the line of reserves, going far around the place where the hottest shooting and cannonade was heard. Suddenly, in front of him and behind our troops, in a place where he could not possibly suspect the enemy, he heard close rifle fire.
"What could it be? - thought Rostov. - Is the enemy behind our troops? It can’t be, Rostov thought, and a horror of fear for himself and for the outcome of the entire battle suddenly came over him. “Whatever it is, however,” he thought, “there’s nothing to go around now.” I must look for the commander-in-chief here, and if everything is lost, then it’s my job to perish along with everyone else.”
The bad feeling that suddenly came over Rostov was confirmed more and more the further he drove into the space occupied by crowds of heterogeneous troops, located beyond the village of Prats.
- What's happened? What's happened? Who are they shooting at? Who's shooting? - Rostov asked, matching the Russian and Austrian soldiers running in mixed crowds across his road.
- The devil knows them? Beat everyone! Get lost! - the crowds of people running and not understanding, just like him, what was happening here, answered him in Russian, German and Czech.
- Beat the Germans! - one shouted.
- Damn them - traitors.
“Zum Henker diese Ruesen... [To hell with these Russians...],” the German grumbled something.
Several wounded were walking along the road. Curses, screams, moans merged into one common roar. The shooting died down and, as Rostov later learned, Russian and Austrian soldiers were shooting at each other.
"My God! what is this? - thought Rostov. - And here, where the sovereign can see them at any moment... But no, these are probably just a few scoundrels. This will pass, this is not it, this cannot be, he thought. “Just hurry up, pass them quickly!”
The thought of defeat and flight could not enter Rostov’s head. Although he saw French guns and troops precisely on Pratsenskaya Mountain, on the very one where he was ordered to look for the commander-in-chief, he could not and did not want to believe it.

Near the village of Praca, Rostov was ordered to look for Kutuzov and the sovereign. But here not only were they not there, but there was not a single commander, but there were heterogeneous crowds of frustrated troops.
He urged his already tired horse to get through these crowds as quickly as possible, but the further he moved, the more upset the crowds became. The high road on which he drove out was crowded with carriages, carriages of all kinds, Russian and Austrian soldiers, of all branches of the military, wounded and unwounded. All this hummed and swarmed in a mixed manner to the gloomy sound of flying cannonballs from the French batteries placed on the Pratsen Heights.
- Where is the sovereign? where is Kutuzov? - Rostov asked everyone he could stop, and could not get an answer from anyone.
Finally, grabbing the soldier by the collar, he forced him to answer himself.
- Eh! Brother! Everyone has been there for a long time, they have fled ahead! - the soldier said to Rostov, laughing at something and breaking free.
Leaving this soldier, who was obviously drunk, Rostov stopped the horse of the orderly or the guard of an important person and began to question him. The orderly announced to Rostov that an hour ago the sovereign had been driven at full speed in a carriage along this very road, and that the sovereign was dangerously wounded.
“It can’t be,” said Rostov, “that’s right, someone else.”
“I saw it myself,” said the orderly with a self-confident grin. “It’s time for me to know the sovereign: it seems like how many times I’ve seen something like this in St. Petersburg.” A pale, very pale man sits in a carriage. As soon as the four blacks let loose, my fathers, he thundered past us: it’s time, it seems, to know both the royal horses and Ilya Ivanovich; It seems that the coachman does not ride with anyone else like the Tsar.
Rostov let his horse go and wanted to ride on. A wounded officer walking past turned to him.
-Who do you want? – asked the officer. - Commander-in-Chief? So he was killed by a cannonball, killed in the chest by our regiment.
“Not killed, wounded,” another officer corrected.
- Who? Kutuzov? - asked Rostov.
- Not Kutuzov, but whatever you call him - well, it’s all the same, there aren’t many alive left. Go over there, to that village, all the authorities have gathered there,” said this officer, pointing to the village of Gostieradek, and walked past.
Rostov rode at a pace, not knowing why or to whom he would go now. The Emperor is wounded, the battle is lost. It was impossible not to believe it now. Rostov drove in the direction that was shown to him and in which a tower and a church could be seen in the distance. What was his hurry? What could he now say to the sovereign or Kutuzov, even if they were alive and not wounded?
“Go this way, your honor, and here they will kill you,” the soldier shouted to him. - They'll kill you here!
- ABOUT! what are you saying? said another. -Where will he go? It's closer here.
Rostov thought about it and drove exactly in the direction where he was told that he would be killed.
“Now it doesn’t matter: if the sovereign is wounded, should I really take care of myself?” he thought. He entered the space where most of the people fleeing from Pratsen died. The French had not yet occupied this place, and the Russians, those who were alive or wounded, had long abandoned it. On the field, like heaps of good arable land, lay ten people, fifteen killed and wounded on every tithe of space. The wounded crawled down in twos and threes together, and one could hear their unpleasant, sometimes feigned, as it seemed to Rostov, screams and moans. Rostov started to trot his horse so as not to see all these suffering people, and he became scared. He feared not for his life, but for the courage that he needed and which, he knew, would not withstand the sight of these unfortunates.
The French, who stopped shooting at this field strewn with the dead and wounded, because there was no one alive on it, saw the adjutant riding along it, aimed a gun at him and threw several cannonballs. The feeling of these whistling, terrible sounds and the surrounding dead people merged for Rostov into one impression of horror and self-pity. He remembered his mother's last letter. “What would she feel,” he thought, “if she saw me now here, on this field and with guns pointed at me.”
In the village of Gostieradeke there were, although confused, but in greater order, Russian troops marching away from the battlefield. The French cannonballs could no longer reach here, and the sounds of firing seemed distant. Here everyone already saw clearly and said that the battle was lost. Whoever Rostov turned to, no one could tell him where the sovereign was, or where Kutuzov was. Some said that the rumor about the sovereign’s wound was true, others said that it was not, and explained this false rumor that had spread by the fact that, indeed, the pale and frightened Chief Marshal Count Tolstoy galloped back from the battlefield in the sovereign’s carriage, who rode out with others in the emperor’s retinue on the battlefield. One officer told Rostov that beyond the village, to the left, he saw someone from the higher authorities, and Rostov went there, no longer hoping to find anyone, but only to clear his conscience before himself. Having traveled about three miles and having passed the last Russian troops, near a vegetable garden dug in by a ditch, Rostov saw two horsemen standing opposite the ditch. One, with a white plume on his hat, seemed familiar to Rostov for some reason; another, unfamiliar rider, on a beautiful red horse (this horse seemed familiar to Rostov) rode up to the ditch, pushed the horse with his spurs and, releasing the reins, easily jumped over the ditch in the garden. Only the earth crumbled from the embankment from the horse’s hind hooves. Turning his horse sharply, he again jumped back over the ditch and respectfully addressed the rider with the white plume, apparently inviting him to do the same. The horseman, whose figure seemed familiar to Rostov and for some reason involuntarily attracted his attention, made a negative gesture with his head and hand, and by this gesture Rostov instantly recognized his lamented, adored sovereign.
“But it couldn’t be him, alone in the middle of this empty field,” thought Rostov. At this time, Alexander turned his head, and Rostov saw his favorite features so vividly etched in his memory. The Emperor was pale, his cheeks were sunken and his eyes sunken; but there was even more charm and meekness in his features. Rostov was happy, convinced that the rumor about the sovereign’s wound was unfair. He was happy that he saw him. He knew that he could, even had to, directly turn to him and convey what he was ordered to convey from Dolgorukov.
But just as a young man in love trembles and faints, not daring to say what he dreams of at night, and looks around in fear, looking for help or the possibility of delay and escape, when the desired moment has come and he stands alone with her, so Rostov now, having achieved that , what he wanted more than anything in the world, did not know how to approach the sovereign, and he was presented with thousands of reasons why it was inconvenient, indecent and impossible.
"How! I seem to be glad to take advantage of the fact that he is alone and despondent. An unknown face may seem unpleasant and difficult to him at this moment of sadness; Then what can I tell him now, when just looking at him my heart skips a beat and my mouth goes dry?” Not one of those countless speeches that he, addressing the sovereign, composed in his imagination, came to his mind now. Those speeches were mostly held under completely different conditions, they were spoken for the most part at the moment of victories and triumphs and mainly on his deathbed from his wounds, while the sovereign thanked him for his heroic deeds, and he, dying, expressed his love confirmed in fact my.
“Then why should I ask the sovereign about his orders to the right flank, when it is already 4 o’clock in the evening and the battle is lost? No, I definitely shouldn’t approach him. Shouldn't disturb his reverie. It’s better to die a thousand times than to receive a bad look from him, a bad opinion,” Rostov decided and with sadness and despair in his heart he drove away, constantly looking back at the sovereign, who was still standing in the same position of indecisiveness.
While Rostov was making these considerations and sadly driving away from the sovereign, Captain von Toll accidentally drove into the same place and, seeing the sovereign, drove straight up to him, offered him his services and helped him cross the ditch on foot. The Emperor, wanting to rest and feeling unwell, sat down under an apple tree, and Tol stopped next to him. From afar, Rostov saw with envy and remorse how von Tol spoke for a long time and passionately to the sovereign, and how the sovereign, apparently crying, closed his eyes with his hand and shook hands with Tol.
“And I could be in his place?” Rostov thought to himself and, barely holding back tears of regret for the fate of the sovereign, in complete despair he drove on, not knowing where and why he was going now.
His despair was the greater because he felt that his own weakness was the cause of his grief.
He could... not only could, but he had to drive up to the sovereign. And this was the only opportunity to show the sovereign his devotion. And he didn’t use it... “What have I done?” he thought. And he turned his horse and galloped back to the place where he had seen the emperor; but there was no one behind the ditch anymore. Only carts and carriages were driving. From one furman, Rostov learned that the Kutuzov headquarters was located nearby in the village where the convoys were going. Rostov went after them.
The guard Kutuzov walked ahead of him, leading horses in blankets. Behind the bereytor there was a cart, and behind the cart walked an old servant, in a cap, a sheepskin coat and with bowed legs.
- Titus, oh Titus! - said the bereitor.
- What? - the old man answered absentmindedly.
- Titus! Go threshing.
- Eh, fool, ugh! – the old man said, spitting angrily. Some time passed in silent movement, and the same joke was repeated again.
At five o'clock in the evening the battle was lost at all points. More than a hundred guns were already in the hands of the French.
Przhebyshevsky and his corps laid down their weapons. Other columns, having lost about half of the people, retreated in frustrated, mixed crowds.
The remnants of the troops of Lanzheron and Dokhturov, mingled, crowded around the ponds on the dams and banks near the village of Augesta.
At 6 o'clock only at the Augesta dam the hot cannonade of the French alone could still be heard, who had built numerous batteries on the descent of the Pratsen Heights and were hitting our retreating troops.
In the rearguard, Dokhturov and others, gathering battalions, fired back at the French cavalry that was pursuing ours. It was starting to get dark. On the narrow dam of Augest, on which for so many years the old miller sat peacefully in a cap with fishing rods, while his grandson, rolling up his shirt sleeves, was sorting out silver quivering fish in a watering can; on this dam, along which for so many years the Moravians drove peacefully on their twin carts loaded with wheat, in shaggy hats and blue jackets and, dusted with flour, with white carts leaving along the same dam - on this narrow dam now between wagons and cannons, under the horses and between the wheels crowded people disfigured by the fear of death, crushing each other, dying, walking over the dying and killing each other only so that, after walking a few steps, to be sure. also killed.
Every ten seconds, pumping up the air, a cannonball splashed or a grenade exploded in the middle of this dense crowd, killing and sprinkling blood on those who stood close. Dolokhov, wounded in the arm, on foot with a dozen soldiers of his company (he was already an officer) and his regimental commander, on horseback, represented the remnants of the entire regiment. Drawn by the crowd, they pressed into the entrance to the dam and, pressed on all sides, stopped because a horse in front fell under a cannon, and the crowd was pulling it out. One cannonball killed someone behind them, the other hit in front and splashed Dolokhov’s blood. The crowd moved desperately, shrank, moved a few steps and stopped again.
Walk these hundred steps, and you will probably be saved; stand for another two minutes, and everyone probably thought he was dead. Dolokhov, standing in the middle of the crowd, rushed to the edge of the dam, knocking down two soldiers, and fled onto the slippery ice that covered the pond.
“Turn,” he shouted, jumping on the ice that was cracking under him, “turn!” - he shouted at the gun. - Holds!...
The ice held it, but it bent and cracked, and it was obvious that not only under a gun or a crowd of people, but under him alone it would collapse. They looked at him and huddled close to the shore, not daring to step on the ice yet. The regiment commander, standing on horseback at the entrance, raised his hand and opened his mouth, addressing Dolokhov. Suddenly one of the cannonballs whistled so low over the crowd that everyone bent down. Something splashed into the wet water, and the general and his horse fell into a pool of blood. No one looked at the general, no one thought to raise him.
- Let's go on the ice! walked on the ice! Let's go! gate! can't you hear! Let's go! - suddenly, after the cannonball hit the general, countless voices were heard, not knowing what or why they were shouting.
One of the rear guns, which was entering the dam, turned onto the ice. Crowds of soldiers from the dam began to run to the frozen pond. The ice cracked under one of the leading soldiers and one foot went into the water; he wanted to recover and fell waist-deep.
The nearest soldiers hesitated, the gun driver stopped his horse, but shouts were still heard from behind: “Get on the ice, come on, let’s go!” let's go! And screams of horror were heard from the crowd. The soldiers surrounding the gun waved at the horses and beat them to make them turn and move. The horses set off from the shore. The ice holding the foot soldiers collapsed in a huge piece, and about forty people who were on the ice rushed forward and backward, drowning one another.
The cannonballs still whistled evenly and splashed onto the ice, into the water and, most often, into the crowd covering the dam, ponds and shore.

On Pratsenskaya Mountain, in the very place where he fell with the flagpole in his hands, Prince Andrei Bolkonsky lay, bleeding, and, without knowing it, moaned a quiet, pitiful and childish groan.
By evening he stopped moaning and became completely quiet. He didn't know how long his oblivion lasted. Suddenly he felt alive again and suffering from a burning and tearing pain in his head.
“Where is it, this high sky, which I did not know until now and saw today?” was his first thought. “And I didn’t know this suffering either,” he thought. - Yes, I didn’t know anything until now. But where am I?
He began to listen and heard the sounds of approaching horses and the sounds of voices speaking French. He opened his eyes. Above him was again the same high sky with floating clouds rising even higher, through which a blue infinity could be seen. He did not turn his head and did not see those who, judging by the sound of hooves and voices, drove up to him and stopped.

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